This article is from the source 'nytimes' and was first published or seen on . It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.
You can find the current article at its original source at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/22/world/europe/intelligence-spying-germany-us.html
The article has changed 6 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.
Version 1 | Version 2 |
---|---|
Another Spying Scandal Adds to Political Crisis for Merkel | Another Spying Scandal Adds to Political Crisis for Merkel |
(about 3 hours later) | |
BERLIN — Eleven years ago, as the Iraq war raged, the National Security Agency quietly turned over to its German counterpart a sprawling electronic spying station in Bavaria. The transfer came with a deal: In consultation with the Americans, German spies would continue operating the station to intercept communications in Europe and the Middle East and share what they picked up. | |
For the third time now, Washington and Berlin are at loggerheads over that agreement. After a month of intelligence leaks, awkward telephone calls between top aides to President Obama and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, and demands that the government here release data about what spying Germany did at America’s bidding, the relationship between the two countries is again tense and Ms. Merkel’s political reputation is on the line. | |
Ms. Merkel’s critics accuse her of being the N.S.A.’s lap dog, and her intelligence services of perhaps facilitating spying on at least two European companies, the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company and Eurocopter, both part of what is now the Airbus Group. | |
Adding to the political pressure, emails between American and German officials have been leaked, all but confirming that a much-publicized effort in 2013 and 2014 to create rules that would halt any American snooping on German soil was largely a sham. The Germans who pushed for the agreement optimistically called them “no spy” rules; the Americans considered them impossible from the start. | |
For Ms. Merkel, who has maintained that the partnership with the United States is essential to Germans’ safety, the situation highlights the practical and political difficulties of disentangling intelligence relationships between the two countries, even as she is under political duress. | |
In 2013, after documents released by Edward J. Snowden strongly suggested that the N.S.A. had been tapping Ms. Merkel’s personal cellphone for a decade, Ms. Merkel seemed to be the victim of American spying overreach. Last summer, tensions flared again, and Ms. Merkel’s government expelled the C.I.A. station chief in Germany after Berlin said it found evidence of American spies’ recruiting at least one German official. | |
This time is different. With German officials now being called to answer to parliamentary committees almost daily and Ms. Merkel’s inability to strike an intelligence deal increasingly evident, the pressure on her and her allies is mounting. | |
Mr. Obama is planning to attend a Group of 7 meeting on June 7 and 8 at a Bavarian castle about 70 miles from the old N.S.A. station. In the days before his arrival, Ms. Merkel is under pressure even from partners in her coalition government to hand over a list of thousands of search terms and other “selectors” the N.S.A. is said to have given to German intelligence officials to conduct electronic monitoring. | |
During more than an hour of questioning on Thursday before a parliamentary committee investigating what has here become known as the “N.S.A. affair,” Brig. Gen. Hartmut Pauland, director of the technical intelligence division of Germany’s foreign intelligence service, known as the BND, testified that the Germans lagged far behind many of their allies in technology, and insisted that search terms “were not an issue” before the latest United States spying allegations emerged in March. | |
American officials have declined to discuss the latest allegations, other than to provide assurances that the work the N.S.A. asked Germany to do did not violate the American ban on industrial espionage. | |
The officials would not confirm whether conversations or emails at the companies had been intercepted, but they have hinted at a pressing national security issue, perhaps counterespionage investigations, at a time when Russian and Chinese hackers and other spies are seeking defense technologies. | The officials would not confirm whether conversations or emails at the companies had been intercepted, but they have hinted at a pressing national security issue, perhaps counterespionage investigations, at a time when Russian and Chinese hackers and other spies are seeking defense technologies. |
In conversations between Mr. Obama’s chief of staff, Denis R. McDonough, and the head of Ms. Merkel’s office, Peter Altmaier, the Obama administration has indicated that the information is secret for a reason. | In conversations between Mr. Obama’s chief of staff, Denis R. McDonough, and the head of Ms. Merkel’s office, Peter Altmaier, the Obama administration has indicated that the information is secret for a reason. |
Parliamentary committees are unlikely to see a list of selectors. Other information they received, including emails between German officials and their National Security Council counterparts in the White House from 2013, were leaked to the German news media. | Parliamentary committees are unlikely to see a list of selectors. Other information they received, including emails between German officials and their National Security Council counterparts in the White House from 2013, were leaked to the German news media. |
Moreover, American officials, eager to put the Snowden revelations behind them after two years, said that helping Ms. Merkel by producing a list of spying targets could create a perilous precedent for other countries to make similar demands. | Moreover, American officials, eager to put the Snowden revelations behind them after two years, said that helping Ms. Merkel by producing a list of spying targets could create a perilous precedent for other countries to make similar demands. |
That has left Ms. Merkel with little to offer but broad statements about the importance of intelligence cooperation at a time when Europeans are concerned about potential attacks by Islamic extremists. | That has left Ms. Merkel with little to offer but broad statements about the importance of intelligence cooperation at a time when Europeans are concerned about potential attacks by Islamic extremists. |
Her adversaries — and some coalition partners — have seized on Germans’ concerns about privacy and civil liberties, an issue that resonates in a country with a Nazi and Communist past. (Mr. Obama halted the practice of tapping Ms. Merkel’s cellphone after she reminded him that she had grown up under the Stasi, the East German secret service.) | |
But Hans-Georg Maassen, the head of Germany’s domestic intelligence service, said last week that cooperation with Washington could suffer. | |
“When, over months and months, secret documents repeatedly become public, then I worry that the Americans will be more hesitant to supply information,” Mr. Maassen warned, adding that the situation would hurt Germany’s security. And so far, he continued, there is “no proof that American intelligence services are spying on top German companies.” | “When, over months and months, secret documents repeatedly become public, then I worry that the Americans will be more hesitant to supply information,” Mr. Maassen warned, adding that the situation would hurt Germany’s security. And so far, he continued, there is “no proof that American intelligence services are spying on top German companies.” |
“The Americans were, are and remain a very important partner for us,” he told a security conference in Berlin this month. | “The Americans were, are and remain a very important partner for us,” he told a security conference in Berlin this month. |
Concerns about American spying prompted Germany this month to reduce its cooperation with the N.S.A., sources said. Berlin has limited surveillance to telephone contacts and halted collection using search terms, Internet Protocol addresses or other web-based data, the sources said. | Concerns about American spying prompted Germany this month to reduce its cooperation with the N.S.A., sources said. Berlin has limited surveillance to telephone contacts and halted collection using search terms, Internet Protocol addresses or other web-based data, the sources said. |
Intelligence officials caution that it is not easy to disrupt cooperation, and it is not clear how the German curtailment is affecting day-to-day intelligence operations or national security. | |
Douglas Frantz, the American assistant secretary of state for public affairs, who visited Berlin last week, referred briefly to the uproar. | Douglas Frantz, the American assistant secretary of state for public affairs, who visited Berlin last week, referred briefly to the uproar. |
“We need to find the right spot in our relationship with Germany,” he said, referring to balancing tensions between surveillance and civil liberties. “Cooperation shouldn’t be held hostage to what people are calling a scandal.” | “We need to find the right spot in our relationship with Germany,” he said, referring to balancing tensions between surveillance and civil liberties. “Cooperation shouldn’t be held hostage to what people are calling a scandal.” |
The German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and the public broadcasters WDR and NDR added to the debate this month with coverage of large parts of the email exchanges about reaching a “no spy” agreement. | The German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and the public broadcasters WDR and NDR added to the debate this month with coverage of large parts of the email exchanges about reaching a “no spy” agreement. |
The exchanges started in the summer of 2013, with Ms. Merkel’s top foreign policy adviser worrying that the Snowden revelations could affect her re-election bid in September that year. The adviser, Christoph Heusgen, conveyed to Karen Donfried, who was senior director for European affairs at the National Security Council at the time, that “this issue remains crucial in turbulent domestic times at a critical juncture.” | The exchanges started in the summer of 2013, with Ms. Merkel’s top foreign policy adviser worrying that the Snowden revelations could affect her re-election bid in September that year. The adviser, Christoph Heusgen, conveyed to Karen Donfried, who was senior director for European affairs at the National Security Council at the time, that “this issue remains crucial in turbulent domestic times at a critical juncture.” |
Ms. Donfried replied that “everyone here understands the very difficult position the chancellor is in” and “wants to do our very best to be helpful.” | Ms. Donfried replied that “everyone here understands the very difficult position the chancellor is in” and “wants to do our very best to be helpful.” |
Over July and August, however, the only concrete action on the “no spy” issue was the cancellation of a 1968 agreement between Britain, Germany and the United States on intelligence sharing — an outdated and largely irrelevant document. | Over July and August, however, the only concrete action on the “no spy” issue was the cancellation of a 1968 agreement between Britain, Germany and the United States on intelligence sharing — an outdated and largely irrelevant document. |
Senior German officials visited Washington early in August 2013. A confidential summary of their conclusions, seen by The New York Times and mentioned in Süddeutsche Zeitung, cited James R. Clapper Jr., who was then the director of national intelligence, as mentioning a possible working group to study a broad intelligence agreement with the Germans, similar to the memorandum governing the Bad Aibling operation. He emphasized, however, that this was a political decision, and not his to make. | |
Within days, Ronald Pofalla, head of Ms. Merkel’s office at the time, assured reporters that the controversy was “off the table.” | |
Senior politicians started talking of a “no spy” accord, despite explicit warnings from the Americans that nothing concrete had been agreed. Mr. Heusgen reported to Ms. Donfried that Mr. Pofalla, after meeting lawmakers with oversight of intelligence services, had “succeeded in calming down the different storms.” | Senior politicians started talking of a “no spy” accord, despite explicit warnings from the Americans that nothing concrete had been agreed. Mr. Heusgen reported to Ms. Donfried that Mr. Pofalla, after meeting lawmakers with oversight of intelligence services, had “succeeded in calming down the different storms.” |
“It would be great,” he added, “if you could somehow give your public blessing to the start” of talks on an N.S.A.-BND agreement. | “It would be great,” he added, “if you could somehow give your public blessing to the start” of talks on an N.S.A.-BND agreement. |
By January 2014, several email exchanges later, it was clear to Berlin that no such accord would emerge. | By January 2014, several email exchanges later, it was clear to Berlin that no such accord would emerge. |
“As you know,” Mr. Heusgen wrote to Ms. Donfried on Jan. 9, 2014, “we started the exercise with a view to conclude a ‘no spy agreement.’ (I promise not to use the term again in the future.) We have realized that this objective will not be reached.” | “As you know,” Mr. Heusgen wrote to Ms. Donfried on Jan. 9, 2014, “we started the exercise with a view to conclude a ‘no spy agreement.’ (I promise not to use the term again in the future.) We have realized that this objective will not be reached.” |