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| Security Law Suggests a Broadening of China’s ‘Core Interests’ | Security Law Suggests a Broadening of China’s ‘Core Interests’ |
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| BEIJING — After China enacted a sweeping national security law this week, one official said the measure was intended to safeguard the country’s “core interests.” President Xi Jinping has repeatedly used the same term in speeches at international forums, inside and outside China. | BEIJING — After China enacted a sweeping national security law this week, one official said the measure was intended to safeguard the country’s “core interests.” President Xi Jinping has repeatedly used the same term in speeches at international forums, inside and outside China. |
| In recent years, foreign officials and scholars have been struggling to understand Chinese leaders’ evolving definition of this concept and what it means for policy toward China. The term the Chinese use when talking with foreign officials, and in public pronouncements, is hexin liyi; traditionally, it has meant critical issues on which there is very little room, if any, for negotiation. | In recent years, foreign officials and scholars have been struggling to understand Chinese leaders’ evolving definition of this concept and what it means for policy toward China. The term the Chinese use when talking with foreign officials, and in public pronouncements, is hexin liyi; traditionally, it has meant critical issues on which there is very little room, if any, for negotiation. |
| With the national security law, it has become even clearer that the term refers to what Chinese leaders see as three sacrosanct rights of the nation: maintaining the political system, with unquestioned rule by the Communist Party; defending sovereignty claims and territorial integrity; and economic development. | With the national security law, it has become even clearer that the term refers to what Chinese leaders see as three sacrosanct rights of the nation: maintaining the political system, with unquestioned rule by the Communist Party; defending sovereignty claims and territorial integrity; and economic development. |
| That represents a considerable expansion of what China considers nonnegotiable. Until recent years, “core interests” was understood to refer only to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang — specific sovereignty issues that China has always said are internal matters. But with China’s rising economic, diplomatic and military power has come a redefinition of the term. | That represents a considerable expansion of what China considers nonnegotiable. Until recent years, “core interests” was understood to refer only to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang — specific sovereignty issues that China has always said are internal matters. But with China’s rising economic, diplomatic and military power has come a redefinition of the term. |
| Zheng Shuna, deputy director of the legislative affairs commission of the National People’s Congress, a pro forma legislature, gave an unambiguous definition of the phrase at a news conference on Wednesday, while tying the national security law to the defense of those interests. | Zheng Shuna, deputy director of the legislative affairs commission of the National People’s Congress, a pro forma legislature, gave an unambiguous definition of the phrase at a news conference on Wednesday, while tying the national security law to the defense of those interests. |
| “Our national security law is to maintain the core interests of the nation and other major interests,” Ms. Zheng said. “For safeguarding national core interests, China has repeatedly said that we adhere to a peaceful path of development but will never give up our righteous interests and sacrifice the core national interests.” | “Our national security law is to maintain the core interests of the nation and other major interests,” Ms. Zheng said. “For safeguarding national core interests, China has repeatedly said that we adhere to a peaceful path of development but will never give up our righteous interests and sacrifice the core national interests.” |
| She said the term was “restated in Article Two of the national security law” and referred to “the political regime; the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the nation; and people’s livelihoods, sustainable economic development of society and other major interests.” | She said the term was “restated in Article Two of the national security law” and referred to “the political regime; the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the nation; and people’s livelihoods, sustainable economic development of society and other major interests.” |
| Ms. Zheng might assert that the definition of “core interests” is clear now, but it was murky for about five years. | Ms. Zheng might assert that the definition of “core interests” is clear now, but it was murky for about five years. |
| China’s initial definition was obvious — starting around 2004, Chinese officials, scholars and state-run news organizations increasingly used it to refer to sovereignty issues, according to a paper published in 2010 by Michael D. Swaine, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The first references were to Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing wants to bring under Communist Party rule. But around 2006, official use of the term began encompassing Tibet and Xinjiang in China’s west. | China’s initial definition was obvious — starting around 2004, Chinese officials, scholars and state-run news organizations increasingly used it to refer to sovereignty issues, according to a paper published in 2010 by Michael D. Swaine, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The first references were to Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing wants to bring under Communist Party rule. But around 2006, official use of the term began encompassing Tibet and Xinjiang in China’s west. |
| That remained the case until July 2009, when Dai Bingguo, the top Chinese foreign policy official at the time, advanced a much wider definition in closing remarks at a session of the annual United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. A 2011 policy paper from China formally laid it out. It was the same definition that Ms. Zheng emphasized on Wednesday — one that she said was enshrined in Article Two of the new national security law, though the law does not explicitly mention the term. | That remained the case until July 2009, when Dai Bingguo, the top Chinese foreign policy official at the time, advanced a much wider definition in closing remarks at a session of the annual United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. A 2011 policy paper from China formally laid it out. It was the same definition that Ms. Zheng emphasized on Wednesday — one that she said was enshrined in Article Two of the new national security law, though the law does not explicitly mention the term. |
| Since 2009, foreign officials have been asking themselves and their Chinese counterparts whether “core interests” still referred only to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, or whether it encompassed the larger, holistic issues that Mr. Dai and other Chinese officials were mentioning with growing frequency. | Since 2009, foreign officials have been asking themselves and their Chinese counterparts whether “core interests” still referred only to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, or whether it encompassed the larger, holistic issues that Mr. Dai and other Chinese officials were mentioning with growing frequency. |
| In 2010, Chinese and foreign officials and scholars began debating whether the South China Sea was now a core interest. Under the new definition, as stated by Mr. Dai and reiterated by Ms. Zheng, the term does encompass the South China Sea and any other sovereignty issues of importance to China (think Arunachal Pradesh in India, and the islands in the East China Sea that Japan calls the Senkaku and China calls the Diaoyu). | In 2010, Chinese and foreign officials and scholars began debating whether the South China Sea was now a core interest. Under the new definition, as stated by Mr. Dai and reiterated by Ms. Zheng, the term does encompass the South China Sea and any other sovereignty issues of importance to China (think Arunachal Pradesh in India, and the islands in the East China Sea that Japan calls the Senkaku and China calls the Diaoyu). |
| China’s increasingly broad use of the term was discussed in a 2013 paper by four researchers at the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which is overseen by the United States Congress. They wrote that “stating core interests broadly provides Chinese policy makers with the flexibility to highlight specific issues — including but not limited to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang — as they become salient.” | China’s increasingly broad use of the term was discussed in a 2013 paper by four researchers at the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which is overseen by the United States Congress. They wrote that “stating core interests broadly provides Chinese policy makers with the flexibility to highlight specific issues — including but not limited to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang — as they become salient.” |
| The authors said Chinese officials had invoked the term in talks with their American counterparts to “attempt to pressure U.S. officials to publicly acknowledge China’s core interests and elicit U.S. commitments to support, or at least not oppose, certain Chinese policies.” | The authors said Chinese officials had invoked the term in talks with their American counterparts to “attempt to pressure U.S. officials to publicly acknowledge China’s core interests and elicit U.S. commitments to support, or at least not oppose, certain Chinese policies.” |
| Some scholars say that the much wider, more abstract definition cited by Ms. Zheng has made the term increasingly meaningless in diplomatic talks. | Some scholars say that the much wider, more abstract definition cited by Ms. Zheng has made the term increasingly meaningless in diplomatic talks. |
| “ ‘Core interests’ is no longer a diplomatic term anymore,” said Zhu Feng, a foreign policy scholar at Nanjing University. “It is very vague, actually.” | “ ‘Core interests’ is no longer a diplomatic term anymore,” said Zhu Feng, a foreign policy scholar at Nanjing University. “It is very vague, actually.” |
| He added that Chinese officials were now using the terms “important interests” and “core interests” interchangeably, which he said diminishes the weight of the latter. | He added that Chinese officials were now using the terms “important interests” and “core interests” interchangeably, which he said diminishes the weight of the latter. |
| The government and main political parties in Taiwan, China’s original core interest, expressed concern on Wednesday about references to the island in the new national security law. One clause says that preserving “national sovereignty and territorial integrity is a shared obligation of all the Chinese people, including compatriots from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.” | |
| Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, the body that handles the government’s interactions with China, said the new law “doesn’t squarely face up to the separate governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait or respect Taiwan people’s insistence on maintaining the status quo in the strait.” | Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, the body that handles the government’s interactions with China, said the new law “doesn’t squarely face up to the separate governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait or respect Taiwan people’s insistence on maintaining the status quo in the strait.” |
| The “mainland’s unilateral decision cannot change the fact that the Republic of China is a sovereign country,” the council said, using Taiwan’s formal name. | The “mainland’s unilateral decision cannot change the fact that the Republic of China is a sovereign country,” the council said, using Taiwan’s formal name. |
| Taiwan’s two largest political parties, the governing Kuomintang and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, or D.P.P., also protested the inclusion of Taiwan in the law. | Taiwan’s two largest political parties, the governing Kuomintang and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, or D.P.P., also protested the inclusion of Taiwan in the law. |
| “Beijing’s course of action doesn’t respect the feelings of Taiwan’s people,” said the D.P.P. spokesman Cheng Yun-peng. He called on Taiwan’s government to respond sternly to “defend the national interest and dignity.” | “Beijing’s course of action doesn’t respect the feelings of Taiwan’s people,” said the D.P.P. spokesman Cheng Yun-peng. He called on Taiwan’s government to respond sternly to “defend the national interest and dignity.” |
| The Kuomintang issued a statement saying that “it holds fast to the Republic of China’s sovereignty and that under the framework of the Constitution, the future of the R.O.C. will be decided by its 23 million people,” according to Taiwan’s Central News Agency. | The Kuomintang issued a statement saying that “it holds fast to the Republic of China’s sovereignty and that under the framework of the Constitution, the future of the R.O.C. will be decided by its 23 million people,” according to Taiwan’s Central News Agency. |