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| A question of trust? Anderson report lays out tests for surveillance laws | A question of trust? Anderson report lays out tests for surveillance laws |
| (about 1 hour later) | |
| The key official report on the future of Britain’s surveillance laws clears the way for the introduction of the “snooper’s charter” – the unwarranted bulk collection of personal communications data that tracks everyone’s use of their phones, the web and social media. | The key official report on the future of Britain’s surveillance laws clears the way for the introduction of the “snooper’s charter” – the unwarranted bulk collection of personal communications data that tracks everyone’s use of their phones, the web and social media. |
| It is true, David Anderson’s report insists the security agencies need to make out a “detailed operational case” before any further extension of their mass surveillance data powers to the collection of everyone’s personal web browsing history, for example. | It is true, David Anderson’s report insists the security agencies need to make out a “detailed operational case” before any further extension of their mass surveillance data powers to the collection of everyone’s personal web browsing history, for example. |
| But the home secretary, Theresa May, will be encouraged by his key finding that the power to require internet and phone companies to retain everyone’s communications data – bulk data collection – should continue to exist. Anderson, the official reviewer of the terror laws, reaches this conclusion even though, as he rightly points out, such data “can be quite revealing of personal habits and characteristics”. | But the home secretary, Theresa May, will be encouraged by his key finding that the power to require internet and phone companies to retain everyone’s communications data – bulk data collection – should continue to exist. Anderson, the official reviewer of the terror laws, reaches this conclusion even though, as he rightly points out, such data “can be quite revealing of personal habits and characteristics”. |
| May will be more than satisfied with this. Anderson makes clear that he is not keen on the “snooper’s charter”. He demands that the security agencies also make a “rigorous assessment” of the intrusiveness, effectiveness, cost and legality of extended snooping powers before they can go ahead. | May will be more than satisfied with this. Anderson makes clear that he is not keen on the “snooper’s charter”. He demands that the security agencies also make a “rigorous assessment” of the intrusiveness, effectiveness, cost and legality of extended snooping powers before they can go ahead. |
| Related: UK intelligence agencies should keep mass surveillance powers, report says | Related: UK intelligence agencies should keep mass surveillance powers, report says |
| Privacy campaign groups regard this as a high hurdle to clear, but the Home Office, which has revised its proposals since 2012, appears confident it will meet these tests when the proposals are published this autumn. | Privacy campaign groups regard this as a high hurdle to clear, but the Home Office, which has revised its proposals since 2012, appears confident it will meet these tests when the proposals are published this autumn. |
| Anderson makes clear the crucial issue of securing the cooperation of US technology companies, such as Google and Facebook, on handing over their customers’ communications data to British police and security services in what is known as “retention of third party data” is unresolved. | |
| He recommends the compulsory retention of this data – ordering UK internet companies to seize it as it passes through their servers – should only happen when a compelling case is made. He says “the decisive voice here will be that of Sir Nigel Sheinwald, the former British ambassador to the US, who is the PM’s special envoy” on this matter. | He recommends the compulsory retention of this data – ordering UK internet companies to seize it as it passes through their servers – should only happen when a compelling case is made. He says “the decisive voice here will be that of Sir Nigel Sheinwald, the former British ambassador to the US, who is the PM’s special envoy” on this matter. |
| As the Guardian has revealed, Sheinwald has secretly recommended that a new international treaty needs to be negotiated to secure cooperation. | As the Guardian has revealed, Sheinwald has secretly recommended that a new international treaty needs to be negotiated to secure cooperation. |
| Some parts of Anderson’s report are refreshing. He warns against scaremongering over the nature of the terrorist threat, pointing out that it is not unprecedented. He even quotes evidence from the uncle of murdered drummer Lee Rigby to remind us that mass casualty events are a feature of every age and that the Black Death killed a third of the British population, in an attempt to keep a sense of proportion. | Some parts of Anderson’s report are refreshing. He warns against scaremongering over the nature of the terrorist threat, pointing out that it is not unprecedented. He even quotes evidence from the uncle of murdered drummer Lee Rigby to remind us that mass casualty events are a feature of every age and that the Black Death killed a third of the British population, in an attempt to keep a sense of proportion. |
| Related: Banning all encryption won't make us safer, no matter what David Cameron says | Trevor Timm | |
| His is also the second major report – parliament’s intelligence and security committee made the same point – to state clearly that the current framework of surveillance laws – “incomprehensible to all but a tiny band of initiates” – needs to be swept away. | |
| Like the ISC, he says that “each intrusive power must be shown to be necessary, clearly spelled out in law, limited in accordance with international human rights standards and subject to demanding safeguards”. The security services may well be willing to spell out their general powers, as they have done recently with computer hacking and snooping on lawyers, but they won’t detail their Prism or Tempora programmes on the face of any bill. | Like the ISC, he says that “each intrusive power must be shown to be necessary, clearly spelled out in law, limited in accordance with international human rights standards and subject to demanding safeguards”. The security services may well be willing to spell out their general powers, as they have done recently with computer hacking and snooping on lawyers, but they won’t detail their Prism or Tempora programmes on the face of any bill. |
| On the very vexed question of encryption of the net – which David Cameron has vowed to ban in 2016 – Anderson says that companies should hand over the keys only after properly authorised requests but says that a master key held by the state or ideas for all data to be held locally in a unencrypted form are non-starters. | On the very vexed question of encryption of the net – which David Cameron has vowed to ban in 2016 – Anderson says that companies should hand over the keys only after properly authorised requests but says that a master key held by the state or ideas for all data to be held locally in a unencrypted form are non-starters. |
| His main proposal to require the judicial rather than ministerial authorisation of individual, targeted intercept warrants will be welcomed by many. | His main proposal to require the judicial rather than ministerial authorisation of individual, targeted intercept warrants will be welcomed by many. |
| But while the home secretary held her tongue in her immediate response to this key proposal, the official position is likely to end up reflecting the view of Sir David Omand, the ex-head of GCHQ, who said on Thursday it would be “unconscionable for a judge to authorise a very sensitive intelligence operation where the political risk, if it went wrong, fell on the home secretary, or overseas the foreign secretary, who would know nothing about it and wouldn’t have approved it”. | But while the home secretary held her tongue in her immediate response to this key proposal, the official position is likely to end up reflecting the view of Sir David Omand, the ex-head of GCHQ, who said on Thursday it would be “unconscionable for a judge to authorise a very sensitive intelligence operation where the political risk, if it went wrong, fell on the home secretary, or overseas the foreign secretary, who would know nothing about it and wouldn’t have approved it”. |
| Some of Anderson’s other proposals appeared to muddy the waters a little between the bulk collection of communications data with or without a judicial warrant. He proposes a new judicial warrant for communications data to be obtained in bulk, for example, for specific operations or missions such as preventing attack planning by Islamic State. | Some of Anderson’s other proposals appeared to muddy the waters a little between the bulk collection of communications data with or without a judicial warrant. He proposes a new judicial warrant for communications data to be obtained in bulk, for example, for specific operations or missions such as preventing attack planning by Islamic State. |
| However, in paragraph 14.74 Anderson makes clear that this additional power by warrant “is not intended to replace the existing Ripa powers for law enforcement agencies to obtain large volumes of data directly from communication service providers for cell-site analysis when it is necessary and proportionate to do so, for example when searching for or tracking the movements of a suspect.” This pretty much covers what is already going on. | However, in paragraph 14.74 Anderson makes clear that this additional power by warrant “is not intended to replace the existing Ripa powers for law enforcement agencies to obtain large volumes of data directly from communication service providers for cell-site analysis when it is necessary and proportionate to do so, for example when searching for or tracking the movements of a suspect.” This pretty much covers what is already going on. |
| He also recommends a new judicial authorisation for “novel and contentious requests” for communications data, such as privileged emails involving lawyers or journalists, but as he makes clear, this is not intended to be a routine event or apply to the mass collection of communications data. | He also recommends a new judicial authorisation for “novel and contentious requests” for communications data, such as privileged emails involving lawyers or journalists, but as he makes clear, this is not intended to be a routine event or apply to the mass collection of communications data. |
| Anderson’s report is significant because he has clearly laid down the tests the government will have to pass when it drafts legislation this summer to build the next stage of the surveillance state. Perhaps that is why he called it A Question of Trust. | Anderson’s report is significant because he has clearly laid down the tests the government will have to pass when it drafts legislation this summer to build the next stage of the surveillance state. Perhaps that is why he called it A Question of Trust. |
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