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| Trainers Intended as Lift, but Quick Iraq Turnaround Is Unlikely | Trainers Intended as Lift, but Quick Iraq Turnaround Is Unlikely |
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| WASHINGTON — President Obama’s decision to open a new base for an additional 450 American military trainers and other personnel in Anbar Province in Iraq is designed to give a badly needed lift to the Sunni tribes and Iraqi troops who have been struggling to hold their own against the Islamic State. | WASHINGTON — President Obama’s decision to open a new base for an additional 450 American military trainers and other personnel in Anbar Province in Iraq is designed to give a badly needed lift to the Sunni tribes and Iraqi troops who have been struggling to hold their own against the Islamic State. |
| But Mr. Obama’s plan for Anbar — its provincial capital of Ramadi is less than 70 miles from Baghdad — is unlikely to begin a speedy turnaround in a conflict in which Islamic State militants have seized the initiative from the American-led coalition. | But Mr. Obama’s plan for Anbar — its provincial capital of Ramadi is less than 70 miles from Baghdad — is unlikely to begin a speedy turnaround in a conflict in which Islamic State militants have seized the initiative from the American-led coalition. |
| Mr. Obama’s plan does not call for small teams of American troops to accompany Iraqi fighters onto the battlefield, to call in airstrikes or advise on combat operations. Nor is it likely to significantly intensify an air campaign in which American warplanes have been able to locate and bomb their targets only about a quarter of the time. | Mr. Obama’s plan does not call for small teams of American troops to accompany Iraqi fighters onto the battlefield, to call in airstrikes or advise on combat operations. Nor is it likely to significantly intensify an air campaign in which American warplanes have been able to locate and bomb their targets only about a quarter of the time. |
| “This alone is not going to do it,” said Michèle A. Flournoy, who was the senior policy official in the Pentagon during Mr. Obama’s first term. “It is a great first step, but it should be the first in a series of steps.” | “This alone is not going to do it,” said Michèle A. Flournoy, who was the senior policy official in the Pentagon during Mr. Obama’s first term. “It is a great first step, but it should be the first in a series of steps.” |
| But the plan does have several benefits that Ms. Flournoy and other former defense and intelligence officials said were long overdue. | But the plan does have several benefits that Ms. Flournoy and other former defense and intelligence officials said were long overdue. |
| First, the plan puts American advisers close to the tribal and Iraqi units who are to lead the fight to retake Ramadi, which fell to Islamic State militants last month. An alliance with Sunni tribes was critical to United States gains when the American military battled Al Qaeda of Iraq in 2007 and 2008. | First, the plan puts American advisers close to the tribal and Iraqi units who are to lead the fight to retake Ramadi, which fell to Islamic State militants last month. An alliance with Sunni tribes was critical to United States gains when the American military battled Al Qaeda of Iraq in 2007 and 2008. |
| Second, it gives the United States the option of deploying aircraft at Al Taqqadum, a base in Anbar, meaning they will be closer to the anticipated battle to recapture Ramadi. “I think this will greatly improve our ability to turn around airstrikes in a pretty fast clip,” said Brett H. McGurk, a senior State Department official. | Second, it gives the United States the option of deploying aircraft at Al Taqqadum, a base in Anbar, meaning they will be closer to the anticipated battle to recapture Ramadi. “I think this will greatly improve our ability to turn around airstrikes in a pretty fast clip,” said Brett H. McGurk, a senior State Department official. |
| Third, the plan aims to encourage Iraqis to recruit Sunnis from Anbar to serve in the Iraqi Army’s Shiite-dominated 7th and 8th divisions. | Third, the plan aims to encourage Iraqis to recruit Sunnis from Anbar to serve in the Iraqi Army’s Shiite-dominated 7th and 8th divisions. |
| The American personnel will also advise Iraq’s military operations center, which is at Al Taqqadum, and train the 8th Iraqi Army Division, which is located nearby at Habbaniya. Only a quarter of the 450 troops — some 110 — will be directly involved in training and advising. The remainder will be security and support personnel. | |
| Elissa D. Slotkin, a senior Pentagon official, said on Wednesday that the goal in sending American trainers to Al Taqqadum was “to provide personnel to assist with planning, integration, logistics and support to the Iraqi security forces and tribal forces as they fight to retake Ramadi and Falluja, and ultimately all throughout Anbar.” | Elissa D. Slotkin, a senior Pentagon official, said on Wednesday that the goal in sending American trainers to Al Taqqadum was “to provide personnel to assist with planning, integration, logistics and support to the Iraqi security forces and tribal forces as they fight to retake Ramadi and Falluja, and ultimately all throughout Anbar.” |
| By all accounts, that will be a formidable undertaking. The goal of the American-led coalition is to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. But in recent weeks, the struggle against the terrorist group appears to be more of a stalemate. | By all accounts, that will be a formidable undertaking. The goal of the American-led coalition is to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. But in recent weeks, the struggle against the terrorist group appears to be more of a stalemate. |
| The first anniversary of the Islamic State’s capture of Mosul in northern Iraq was this week. With the fall of Ramadi, the Islamic State now controls two of Iraq’s provincial capitals. Falluja, another city in Anbar some 40 miles west of Baghdad, has been controlled by the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, for nearly 18 months. | The first anniversary of the Islamic State’s capture of Mosul in northern Iraq was this week. With the fall of Ramadi, the Islamic State now controls two of Iraq’s provincial capitals. Falluja, another city in Anbar some 40 miles west of Baghdad, has been controlled by the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, for nearly 18 months. |
| Antony J. Blinken, the deputy secretary of state, asserted recently that more than 10,000 Islamic State fighters had been killed since the start of the campaign. But the use of such metrics, which harkens back to the body counts of the Vietnam War, is not generally regarded by military officials as a major measure of success, especially since the ranks of the Islamic State are rapidly being replenished by thousands of volunteers. | Antony J. Blinken, the deputy secretary of state, asserted recently that more than 10,000 Islamic State fighters had been killed since the start of the campaign. But the use of such metrics, which harkens back to the body counts of the Vietnam War, is not generally regarded by military officials as a major measure of success, especially since the ranks of the Islamic State are rapidly being replenished by thousands of volunteers. |
| Former defense and intelligence officials said that if the goal was to decisively defeat the Islamic State, the plan needed to be more aggressive. The United States learned during the Iraqi Army’s operation against Shiite militias in the city of Basra in 2008 that mentoring Iraq’s forces works best when it is done in the field. That operation was stymied until small teams of American troops were brought in to call in airstrikes and advise Iraqi troops. | Former defense and intelligence officials said that if the goal was to decisively defeat the Islamic State, the plan needed to be more aggressive. The United States learned during the Iraqi Army’s operation against Shiite militias in the city of Basra in 2008 that mentoring Iraq’s forces works best when it is done in the field. That operation was stymied until small teams of American troops were brought in to call in airstrikes and advise Iraqi troops. |
| Richard D. Welch, who served in Iraq as a colonel in the United States Special Forces for nearly seven years, said that the American advisers should accompany Iraqi forces on the battlefield, which White House officials have ruled out for now. | Richard D. Welch, who served in Iraq as a colonel in the United States Special Forces for nearly seven years, said that the American advisers should accompany Iraqi forces on the battlefield, which White House officials have ruled out for now. |
| “I think they are drawing the line too narrowly,” he said, echoing a point also made by Ms. Flournoy. “We don’t have observers who can help pinpoint targeting. Prohibiting the advisers from going outside the wire is not allowing them to advise the units when they are actually engaged in operations, when everything seems to fall apart.” | “I think they are drawing the line too narrowly,” he said, echoing a point also made by Ms. Flournoy. “We don’t have observers who can help pinpoint targeting. Prohibiting the advisers from going outside the wire is not allowing them to advise the units when they are actually engaged in operations, when everything seems to fall apart.” |
| Derek Harvey, a retired Army colonel and former intelligence officer who served in Iraq, also said that keeping all of the advisers within the confines of Al Taqqadum would limit their effectiveness. | Derek Harvey, a retired Army colonel and former intelligence officer who served in Iraq, also said that keeping all of the advisers within the confines of Al Taqqadum would limit their effectiveness. |
| “We are so risk averse, we are not putting the enablers where we need them,” he said. | “We are so risk averse, we are not putting the enablers where we need them,” he said. |
| But White House officials said their strategy struck the right balance. | But White House officials said their strategy struck the right balance. |
| “The president hasn’t ruled out any additional steps,” said Benjamin J. Rhodes, the deputy national security adviser. “He’s always open to considering refinements to the strategy. But I think we’ve been guided by a belief that the best way for Iraqis to take back those portions of their country that have fallen to ISIL is for them to be in the lead.” | “The president hasn’t ruled out any additional steps,” said Benjamin J. Rhodes, the deputy national security adviser. “He’s always open to considering refinements to the strategy. But I think we’ve been guided by a belief that the best way for Iraqis to take back those portions of their country that have fallen to ISIL is for them to be in the lead.” |
| On Wednesday, the White House was reluctant to say when it thought Ramadi might be retaken, or even if it expected that to occur before the end of the year. “I wouldn’t put any sort of timeline on it,” said Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary. | On Wednesday, the White House was reluctant to say when it thought Ramadi might be retaken, or even if it expected that to occur before the end of the year. “I wouldn’t put any sort of timeline on it,” said Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary. |