The west’s assurances to Soviet ministers on eastward expansion of Nato
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Version 0 of 1. Christopher Clark and Kristina Spohr say correctly (Moscow’s false memory syndrome, 25 May) that no written or oral assurances about Nato enlargement were given during the negotiations for German reunification in 1990. Touching that hot potato could indeed have derailed the talks entirely. But that was far from all. After Germany reunited, Václav Havel, the Czech president, called for Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary to enter Nato. The British prime minister and foreign secretary assured Soviet ministers that there was no such intention. Nato’s secretary general added that enlargement would damage relations with the Soviet Union. All that was true at the time. But then the intentions changed. Russian officials lament that Mikhail Gorbachev, then Soviet president, failed to get these oral assurances in writing. Not surprisingly, the Russians nevertheless believe that they were misled: imagine our reaction if the position were reversed. Historians will argue for generations how far that accounts for the subsequent deterioration in Russia’s relations with the west. The authors cite Russia’s defeat by Japan in 1905 to claim that Russian foreign policy is coloured by what they imply is a peculiarly Russian “tendency to remember past debacles as humiliations”. But past debacles have badly affected other countries too. Downplaying Russians’ genuine sense of humiliation after the Soviet collapse merely makes it harder to understand Russia today. And no, understanding Russia does not mean condoning present Russian policies.Rodric BraithwaiteLondon • The claim that the west gave no guarantees against Nato expanding eastwards may be literally true but is nevertheless misleading. As Clark and Spohr write, “these developments belonged to a future that was not yet in sight”. Having freed eastern Europe and dissolved the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet leadership trusted that the west would reciprocate by respecting Russian interests, and was repeatedly reassured by western leaders in this respect. As a member of the European parliament delegation to the Supreme Soviet in 1989, I witnessed this trust and later the increasing bewilderment of the Soviet/Russian participants in various conferences at the arrogant triumphalism of Nato and even EU speakers. “But I thought communism had lost and we had all won?” complained one. Many Soviet leaders responsible for the “miracle of 1990” – like the former Soviet ambassador to Bonn, Valentin Falin – have complained bitterly that Mikhail Gorbachev naively trusted the west and gave away so much for so little. So the attitude of the revived Russia of today should not come as a surprise.Jakob von UexkullFormer MEP, German Greens |