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Who Owns France’s Republican Values? Who Owns France's Republican Values?
(about 3 hours later)
PARIS — When Roger Cukierman, president of the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France, said on a popular morning radio show on Feb. 23 that Marine Le Pen was “personally beyond reproach,” even though her party was not, he probably didn’t expect to cause the storm that followed his comments all day long. It was an embarrassing gaffe that almost spoiled the 30th annual dinner of the council that very evening. The dinner, always a big affair in French public life, was particularly watched this year, with the nation still reeling from the Paris massacres, seven weeks earlier, at a kosher supermarket and at Charlie Hebdo.PARIS — When Roger Cukierman, president of the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France, said on a popular morning radio show on Feb. 23 that Marine Le Pen was “personally beyond reproach,” even though her party was not, he probably didn’t expect to cause the storm that followed his comments all day long. It was an embarrassing gaffe that almost spoiled the 30th annual dinner of the council that very evening. The dinner, always a big affair in French public life, was particularly watched this year, with the nation still reeling from the Paris massacres, seven weeks earlier, at a kosher supermarket and at Charlie Hebdo.
But even more embarrassing, though less visible, was what it revealed about Ms. Le Pen’s strategy for the normalization of the National Front, the far-right movement that she inherited from her father. Her campaign to make the party more respectable has succeeded beyond expectations, as Mr. Cukierman unwittingly confirmed. Just a month later on March 29, the National Front drew 22.2 percent of the vote in the second round of local elections. Along with the party’s big gains in the 2014 European Parliament elections and Ms. Le Pen’s strong score in the first round of the 2012 presidential vote, the National Front has progressively managed to increase its electoral weight and to impose a three-party dynamic on a political system that was dominated for decades by a confrontation of the mainstream parties of the right and left.But even more embarrassing, though less visible, was what it revealed about Ms. Le Pen’s strategy for the normalization of the National Front, the far-right movement that she inherited from her father. Her campaign to make the party more respectable has succeeded beyond expectations, as Mr. Cukierman unwittingly confirmed. Just a month later on March 29, the National Front drew 22.2 percent of the vote in the second round of local elections. Along with the party’s big gains in the 2014 European Parliament elections and Ms. Le Pen’s strong score in the first round of the 2012 presidential vote, the National Front has progressively managed to increase its electoral weight and to impose a three-party dynamic on a political system that was dominated for decades by a confrontation of the mainstream parties of the right and left.
This is Marine Le Pen’s personal success. Her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, an openly xenophobic and anti-Semitic politician and still the party’s honorary president, had kept the National Front in the category of fringe, toxic and extremist movements. Yet her shrewd calculation of “de-demonizing” the party hides a deeper conflict within French society: the battle for the values that define France.This is Marine Le Pen’s personal success. Her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, an openly xenophobic and anti-Semitic politician and still the party’s honorary president, had kept the National Front in the category of fringe, toxic and extremist movements. Yet her shrewd calculation of “de-demonizing” the party hides a deeper conflict within French society: the battle for the values that define France.
Two political deflagrations have hit France this year.Two political deflagrations have hit France this year.
The first one was the aftermath of the terrorist attacks targeting freedom of expression and Jews. The extraordinary public reaction, unseen since the liberation of Paris in 1944, with nearly 4 million people demonstrating their solidarity in the streets of France on Jan. 11, was seen as a strong reaffirmation of the “valeurs républicaines,” those French republican values which, though a legacy of the 1789 revolution, had become more and more abstract. Liberty, equality and fraternity are the pillars of the French Republic. Now a fourth one has been quietly added: “laïcité,” the strict, very French, version of secularism.The first one was the aftermath of the terrorist attacks targeting freedom of expression and Jews. The extraordinary public reaction, unseen since the liberation of Paris in 1944, with nearly 4 million people demonstrating their solidarity in the streets of France on Jan. 11, was seen as a strong reaffirmation of the “valeurs républicaines,” those French republican values which, though a legacy of the 1789 revolution, had become more and more abstract. Liberty, equality and fraternity are the pillars of the French Republic. Now a fourth one has been quietly added: “laïcité,” the strict, very French, version of secularism.
But it soon turned out that those millions of people who rallied behind a newfound patriotic fervor and shared values did not necessarily represent the whole nation. For various reasons, many French people refused to “be Charlie” and made it known. Does it mean that they reject republican values? This was certainly a frightening hypothesis. Most politicians preferred to interpret this defiance as a gesture of frustration by those who find liberty, equality, fraternity and laïcité too unevenly enforced. As if in an attempt to ward off the specter of division, “republican values” have remained at the center of the mainstream French political discourse ever since those dark January days.But it soon turned out that those millions of people who rallied behind a newfound patriotic fervor and shared values did not necessarily represent the whole nation. For various reasons, many French people refused to “be Charlie” and made it known. Does it mean that they reject republican values? This was certainly a frightening hypothesis. Most politicians preferred to interpret this defiance as a gesture of frustration by those who find liberty, equality, fraternity and laïcité too unevenly enforced. As if in an attempt to ward off the specter of division, “republican values” have remained at the center of the mainstream French political discourse ever since those dark January days.
The second deflagration was the National Front’s score in last month’s local elections. Interestingly, Ms. Le Pen was mostly absent from the first deflagration: She failed to catch the popular mood and did not take part in the big national communion, choosing instead to hold a separate National Front rally in one of her strongholds. When pre-election polls predicted a 30 percent share of the vote for her party, Prime Minister Manuel Valls, a Socialist, launched a scathing offensive against the far-right populist movement. And the angle of attack he chose was, again, republican values, which he accused Ms. Le Pen’s party of denying. “You are neither the Republic nor France,” Mr. Valls proclaimed recently in a riposte to the youngest National Front member of Parliament, Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, 25, granddaughter of the founder.The second deflagration was the National Front’s score in last month’s local elections. Interestingly, Ms. Le Pen was mostly absent from the first deflagration: She failed to catch the popular mood and did not take part in the big national communion, choosing instead to hold a separate National Front rally in one of her strongholds. When pre-election polls predicted a 30 percent share of the vote for her party, Prime Minister Manuel Valls, a Socialist, launched a scathing offensive against the far-right populist movement. And the angle of attack he chose was, again, republican values, which he accused Ms. Le Pen’s party of denying. “You are neither the Republic nor France,” Mr. Valls proclaimed recently in a riposte to the youngest National Front member of Parliament, Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, 25, granddaughter of the founder.
Yet if Marine Le Pen seldom uses the word “values,” she has very adroitly steered her party back to the semantics of “the Republic” in order to broaden its appeal. Not only does she professes the ideals of liberty and equality, but she has turned herself into a champion of laïcité, a principle that had traditionally been the hallmark of the left. She feels so strongly about secularism that any mention of “fraternity,” associated with the Catholic Church in French culture, is carefully avoided. Ms. Le Pen’s laïcité, however, subtly differs from the common understanding of it, which stems from the 1905 law separating church and state. Whenever she refers to laïcité, it relates to Muslim religious practices: the veil, halal food, public prayers. Yet if Marine Le Pen seldom uses the word “values,” she has very adroitly steered her party back to the semantics of “the Republic” in order to broaden its appeal. Not only does she profess the ideals of liberty and equality, but she has turned herself into a champion of laïcité, a principle that had traditionally been the hallmark of the left. She feels so strongly about secularism that any mention of “fraternity,” associated with the Catholic Church in French culture, is carefully avoided. Ms. Le Pen’s laïcité, however, subtly differs from the common understanding of it, which stems from the 1905 law separating church and state. Whenever she refers to laïcité, it relates to Muslim religious practices: the veil, halal food, public prayers.
For Ms. Le Pen, laïcité is “a weapon against Muslim communitarianism” and “no mentions of the Catholic or Jewish communities are made,” says Cécile Alduy, an associate professor of French at Stanford and co-author of a revealing book about the role of semantics in Marine Le Pen’s makeover of the National Front.For Ms. Le Pen, laïcité is “a weapon against Muslim communitarianism” and “no mentions of the Catholic or Jewish communities are made,” says Cécile Alduy, an associate professor of French at Stanford and co-author of a revealing book about the role of semantics in Marine Le Pen’s makeover of the National Front.
To Ms. Alduy, the fact that Ms. Le Pen feels compelled to wrap herself in the mantra of the French Republic, just as mainstream politicians do, is a sign of the strength of these ideals and the enduring legacy of the Enlightenment. But clearly those values have different interpretations today: While mainstream political parties see secularism as a tool allowing religions and cultures to coexist peacefully, laïcité à la Le Pen is seen by many as Islamophobia in disguise. Not surprisingly, disenfranchised minorities in the suburbs see it as a way of limiting their religious freedom and as another discriminating factor, which explains the “Je ne suis pas Charlie” reaction.To Ms. Alduy, the fact that Ms. Le Pen feels compelled to wrap herself in the mantra of the French Republic, just as mainstream politicians do, is a sign of the strength of these ideals and the enduring legacy of the Enlightenment. But clearly those values have different interpretations today: While mainstream political parties see secularism as a tool allowing religions and cultures to coexist peacefully, laïcité à la Le Pen is seen by many as Islamophobia in disguise. Not surprisingly, disenfranchised minorities in the suburbs see it as a way of limiting their religious freedom and as another discriminating factor, which explains the “Je ne suis pas Charlie” reaction.
Who represents the Republic in this troubled new political landscape? Who owns France’s republican values? And maybe, more pointedly, what are these values? Rephrasing solidarity as the modern version of fraternity may be nice, but it won’t be enough: If moderate political parties want to get back the values that the National Front is cynically trying to steal, they have to redefine them and fight for them — seriously.Who represents the Republic in this troubled new political landscape? Who owns France’s republican values? And maybe, more pointedly, what are these values? Rephrasing solidarity as the modern version of fraternity may be nice, but it won’t be enough: If moderate political parties want to get back the values that the National Front is cynically trying to steal, they have to redefine them and fight for them — seriously.
Sylvie Kauffmann is the editorial director and a former editor in chief of Le Monde.Sylvie Kauffmann is the editorial director and a former editor in chief of Le Monde.