This article is from the source 'guardian' and was first published or seen on . It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.

You can find the current article at its original source at http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/mar/26/happy-birthday-to-the-bioweapons-convention

The article has changed 2 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.

Version 0 Version 1
Happy birthday to the bioweapons convention Happy birthday to the bioweapons convention
(about 1 hour later)
Today marks the 40th anniversary of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which entered into force on 26 March 1975. This disarmament agreement, which now binds 173 countries, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling acquisition or retention of biological and toxin weapons.Today marks the 40th anniversary of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which entered into force on 26 March 1975. This disarmament agreement, which now binds 173 countries, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling acquisition or retention of biological and toxin weapons.
The convention is an imperfect tool, rushed and gutted in its creation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and devoid of any mechanism to assess compliance. But it remains important in averting the hostile exploitation of biology in the future, serving both as a geographically representative, multilateral forum for ongoing discussion and action on issues related to biological disarmament; and also as the bedrock of a regime prohibiting an entire category of weapons that are judged by the international community as “repugnant to the conscience of [hu]mankind”.The convention is an imperfect tool, rushed and gutted in its creation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and devoid of any mechanism to assess compliance. But it remains important in averting the hostile exploitation of biology in the future, serving both as a geographically representative, multilateral forum for ongoing discussion and action on issues related to biological disarmament; and also as the bedrock of a regime prohibiting an entire category of weapons that are judged by the international community as “repugnant to the conscience of [hu]mankind”.
Related: Remembering an overlooked treaty
From this perspective, it was intriguing to read the remarks of Seth Baum, the Executive Director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute who, writing recently in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, suggests that non-contagious biological weapons could work well as an alternative to nuclear weapons “if deterrence requires threatening large human populations.”From this perspective, it was intriguing to read the remarks of Seth Baum, the Executive Director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute who, writing recently in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, suggests that non-contagious biological weapons could work well as an alternative to nuclear weapons “if deterrence requires threatening large human populations.”
Baum’s argument has provoked a lively debate, which has focused on the ethical and legal problems with reneging on a multilaterally negotiated agreement, and pursuing afresh the development of biological weapons. Given the general disdain for weapons that operate by destroying the body from within, it seems unlikely such weapons could be rendered “politically acceptable” in the foreseeable future, without the countries seeking to pursue this option exposing themselves to vilification and charges of gross hypocrisy.Baum’s argument has provoked a lively debate, which has focused on the ethical and legal problems with reneging on a multilaterally negotiated agreement, and pursuing afresh the development of biological weapons. Given the general disdain for weapons that operate by destroying the body from within, it seems unlikely such weapons could be rendered “politically acceptable” in the foreseeable future, without the countries seeking to pursue this option exposing themselves to vilification and charges of gross hypocrisy.
Yet beyond the ethical, legal and political arguments, as a practical tool of deterrence, biological weapons would also be expensive, complex and capricious. Militaries have historically tended to prefer weapons that are predictable and offer immediate effect, rather than weapons with a relatively short usable life span, which have delayed effects and are vulnerable to external variables such as atmospheric conditions, terrain, weather and the extent of enemy protection. In the words of one influential analysis, these factors leave “confidence in the overall outcome of a [biological weapons] attack … the prerogative only of the ignorant”.Yet beyond the ethical, legal and political arguments, as a practical tool of deterrence, biological weapons would also be expensive, complex and capricious. Militaries have historically tended to prefer weapons that are predictable and offer immediate effect, rather than weapons with a relatively short usable life span, which have delayed effects and are vulnerable to external variables such as atmospheric conditions, terrain, weather and the extent of enemy protection. In the words of one influential analysis, these factors leave “confidence in the overall outcome of a [biological weapons] attack … the prerogative only of the ignorant”.
The science and technology relevant to biological warfare has changed dramatically since the Cold War, with new areas of peaceful scientific research aspiring to make biological systems more predictable and manageable. Despite such progress, difficulties remain in generating systems that are predictable enough to act as the basis of the defence of a nation. It is particularly difficult if the defence requires indications of a credible threat; an act which is likely to trigger defensive measures and public health preparations, which could render any biodeterrence tool ineffective.The science and technology relevant to biological warfare has changed dramatically since the Cold War, with new areas of peaceful scientific research aspiring to make biological systems more predictable and manageable. Despite such progress, difficulties remain in generating systems that are predictable enough to act as the basis of the defence of a nation. It is particularly difficult if the defence requires indications of a credible threat; an act which is likely to trigger defensive measures and public health preparations, which could render any biodeterrence tool ineffective.
The notion of biological deterrence might be superficially attractive at first glance, in offering a weapon that is hypothetically preferable to nuclear weapons in terms of human damage, but without the structural carnage. However, if the deterrent is rendered impotent under certain conditions, and has a usable life span which is little longer than that of Viagra, it might be better to move beyond the absurd and outmoded concept of deterrence entirely.The notion of biological deterrence might be superficially attractive at first glance, in offering a weapon that is hypothetically preferable to nuclear weapons in terms of human damage, but without the structural carnage. However, if the deterrent is rendered impotent under certain conditions, and has a usable life span which is little longer than that of Viagra, it might be better to move beyond the absurd and outmoded concept of deterrence entirely.
Seth Baum’s proposals for biological deterrence are unlikely to spoil the BWC’s birthday party. But while biological weapons may be ill-suited to deterrence, Baum’s remarks serve as a cogent reminder of the need to guard against the creeping legitimization of biological warfare, and to continue to nurture the BWC, imperfections and all.Seth Baum’s proposals for biological deterrence are unlikely to spoil the BWC’s birthday party. But while biological weapons may be ill-suited to deterrence, Baum’s remarks serve as a cogent reminder of the need to guard against the creeping legitimization of biological warfare, and to continue to nurture the BWC, imperfections and all.
James Revill is a research fellow & Caitríona McLeish a senior research fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program at the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex. They research public policy on issues involving biological and chemical weapons. The views here are not necessarily those of HSP or SPRU.James Revill is a research fellow & Caitríona McLeish a senior research fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program at the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex. They research public policy on issues involving biological and chemical weapons. The views here are not necessarily those of HSP or SPRU.