Germanwings crash raises questions about cockpit security
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Version 0 of 1. The discovery that a Germanwings co-pilot deliberately crashed a plane full of people into the French Alps as the captain attempted to gain access to the cockpit will raise serious questions about post-9/11 flight deck security. Since the 2001 attacks, when terrorists took control of four aircraft with the loss of thousands of lives, cockpit doors have been designed to resist gunfire and grenades. But in the case of flight 9525, the defences appear to have stopped the senior pilot on the plane from regaining control of the Airbus A320. Airbus cockpit doors have a sophisticated locking system that allows pilots to block anyone from attacking the flight deck, but questions will be raised as to how the 28-year-old Andreas Lubitz came to be alone in the cockpit – according to the French prosecutor, the captain had left to “satisfy natural needs” – and then able to prevent anyone else gaining access. ‘Rule of two’ Several airlines have strict rules that there must always be two people in the cockpit. Germanwings however has no “rule of two” in place, stipulating that another member of staff must be in the cockpit if one of the pilots needs to step out temporarily. Protocols and standard procedures around what happens when a pilot leaves the cockpit mid-flight vary according to country and airline. A flight attendant taking the seat of an absent pilot to ensure there are always two people in the cockpit are often seen on US flights, but rarely in Europe. Procedures for the CLDS – the controlled door locking system – which vary the time delays on latches also vary for different airlines. In the Germanwings case, the time delays may allowed Lubitz to seize control and crash the plane, killing himself and 149 others. Cockpit locks A video released by Airbus shows the complex safety mechanisms built into cockpit doors to prevent terrorist attack, but which are likely to have also prevented the captain from taking control of the A320 and bringing it out of its dive. Under normal situations, pilots can open the door from inside, to allow crew to bring them drinks and food on long flights. The pilots have a switch which can be held at “unlock”, “norm” or “lock” positions. When a flight attendant is bringing food, for example, the purser taps the # button on a keypad by the door and – after checking a video feed – the pilot moves the toggle-switch to “unlock”. In the case of a terrorist attack, pilots would be able to defend the cockpit by moving the toggle-switch to “lock”. In this case, a red light flashes on the cockpit door and it locks for five minutes. There is an emergency code to gain enter the cockpit when the pilots are believed to be incapacitated, but a conscious pilot would be able to override it – in order to guard against the code being surrendered under duress to terrorists. A buzzer sounds for 30 seconds and the door will only open if the pilot makes no attempt to stop the process. David Gleave, an aviation expert, said that the Germanwings crash would cause serious difficulties for the industry. “What will happen is that they will have to look at always having another crew member in with the pilots, but even then, there could be problems,” he said. “It’s very difficult to overcome this sort of thing.” Deliberate downing There have been several cases of presumed pilot suicide in recent years. In 1999, an EgyptAir plane crashed into the Atlantic shortly after leaving JFK airport in New York. In that case, American investigators concluded that co-pilot Gamil el-Batouty had deliberately flown the plane into the sea, killing all 217 people on board. Batouty ordered a junior colleague out of the cockpit before he put the plane into a dive. In 2013, LAM Mozambique Airlines Flight 470 crashed in Namibia, killing 27 passengers and six crew members. In that case, the cockpit voice recorder revealed that the captain was alone as the plane crashed, and there were sounds that could have been someone banging on the door in the background. Cockpit security was strengthened less than a month after the September 11 attacks, when the US Federal Aviation Authority began publishing regulations “to expedite modification of cockpit doors in the US fleet”. |