The Guardian view on Islamic State’s attempt to disrupt the links between the monarchy and Jordan’s tribes
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Version 0 of 1. Terror is a double-edged weapon in war. It can intimidate and undermine the enemy, but it can also reinforce an opponent’s resolve. Morality aside, the question raised by the killing of Lieutenant Muath al-Kasasbeh is whether Islamic State (Isis) has any kind of coherent strategy in the Middle East. Cruelty is not a strategy, murder is not politics. Consider the impact on Jordan had Isis shown a degree of clemency after the capture of the pilot, sparing his life and showing a real rather than, as it now appears, a spurious readiness to trade him for one or more of their own people in Jordanian hands. That part of Jordanian public opinion which has some sympathy for Isis’s purposes, if not its methods, as well as the broader group which sees involvement in the anti-Isis coalition as too risky and dangerous, would have been impressed. Showing mercy, in other words, would have been more likely to dilute Jordan’s commitment to the fight than the revenge that Isis exacted. Jordan undoubtedly has weaknesses. It has jihadist currents, demonstrated by the fact that it is the third largest contributor of foreign fighters to Isis forces. It also has, beneath a surface stability, major social problems of unemployment and marginalisation, which now touch even the relatively privileged regions and tribes which have traditionally been the most loyal supporters of the monarchy, and from which the armed forces draw most of their officer class. It is also, for good reason, a prime target for Isis. Jordanian intelligence is a key asset of the American-led coalition. Perhaps assisted by agents among the Jordanians in Syria and Iraq, the Jordanians have been in the forefront of intelligence-gathering on what is happening inside Isis territory. For example, it is believed to have been the Jordanians who provided the intelligence that enabled the Americans to track and kill Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, the precursor of Isis, in 2006. Jordan also provides space and facilities for the training of non-jihadist Syrian rebels. The capture of Lieutenant al-Kasasbeh thus provided Isis with an unexpected opportunity to pick at Jordan’s internal divisions. When the Hashemites arrived in Jordan in the 1920s from the Hejaz, they found most support among tribal groups, some of whom came with them – support that continued to be vital after the arrival of Palestinian refugees and the later loss of the West Bank brought in new subjects who had only an expedient view of the kingdom. So discontent among the tribes must be especially disturbing for King Abdullah. Jordan’s execution of two Iraqi jihadists in retaliation is to be deplored. Although the two had been found guilty of terrible crimes and the moratorium on the death penalty has recently been lifted, it nonetheless represents a reversion to retributive justice. But its popularity, and the unexpectedly warm welcome for the king on his return from Washington, suggests that outrage at the killing of the pilot, at least for the moment, outweighs criticism of the government for putting him in harm’s way. |