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CIA chief: ‘Unknowable’ whether ordinary interrogation would bring same intel gains | CIA chief: ‘Unknowable’ whether ordinary interrogation would bring same intel gains |
(about 2 hours later) | |
CIA Director John Brennan on Thursday moved to defend an agency battered by a devastating report released this week on the use of harsh interrogation techniques while acknowledging what he called “abhorrent” methods that were “outside of the bounds” of approved policy. | |
In rare televised remarks from the agency’s marble lobby before two dozen senior CIA leaders, Brennan said that valuable information was obtained from detainees subjected to the measures, which included waterboarding and “rectal rehydration.” But, he said, it remains “unknowable” whether conventional questioning alone could have yielded the same intelligence gains. | |
“Let me be clear,” he said in his first public comments since Tuesday’s release of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on the CIA detention program. “The cause-and-effect relationship between the use of [harsh tactics] and useful information subsequently provided by the detainee is, in my view, unknowable.” | |
Brennan defended the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” as the “right” response at a time when the agency believed al-Qaeda was intent on preparing another wave of terrorism in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. | |
He also acknowledged the agency made mistakes, saying its officers were “unprepared” to conduct such a program and in a “limited number” of cases used techniques that were not authorized and “rightly should be repudiated by all.” | |
He admitted the agency “fell short” in failing to hold some officers accountable for their mistakes. But he strongly denied that the agency had “repeatedly, systemically and intentionally” misled top U.S. officials about the program. | |
The 528-page document described in searing detail techniques aimed at obtaining information from several dozen detainees held in secret CIA prisons around the world. They included sleep deprivation, slams against cell walls, simulated drowning and stuffing detainees into coffin-sized boxes. | |
The Senate document, an executive summary of a still-classified report that exceeds 6,000 pages, concluded that such techniques were not effective in cases in which the CIA claimed otherwise, including in the hunt for al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. | |
While he asserted that the efficacy of such tactics was unknowable, Brennan also continued to take issue with the Senate report’s central conclusion, saying it was “a point on which we disagree.” | |
“Detainees who were subjected to EITs at some point during the confinement subsequently provided information that our experts found to be useful and valuable in our counterterrorism efforts,” Brennan said, using the acronym for enhanced interrogation techniques. “For someone to say that there was no intelligence of value . . . that came from those detainees once they were subjected to EITs, I think . . . lacks any foundation at all.” | |
Adam Goldman contributed to this report. | |