Lee Rigby report: spies, police and government – who knew what?

http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/25/lee-rigby-spy-agencies-police-government

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The long-awaited intelligence committee report into the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby essentially clears the intelligence agencies of blame in failing to prevent the attack by two Islamist jihadist killers but throws up controversial issues, especially the role of internet companies.

The report is the first major investigation carried out by the cross-party committee, a mixture of MPs and peers headed by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, the former foreign secretary, which was set up in the wake of Rigby’s murder in May 2013 to establish whether MI5, MI6 and GCHQ could prevented it.

The committee interviewed the intelligence agencies, the Metropolitan police and Theresa May, the home secretary, and read hundreds of classified documents to put together the report, which runs to almost 200 pages. Some of the information was withheld from the version made public, citing national security.

The report praises the intelligence agencies for protecting the UK from terrorist plots, averaging about one or two serious ones a year.

“Nevertheless, when there is a terrorist attack, it is essential that there is a thorough investigation to establish whether mistakes have been made and to ensure that any lessons are learned,” the report says, alongside its verdicts on the main players in events.

MI5

As the main domestic surveillance agency, MI5 had responsibility for keeping tabs on Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, the two killers who were sentenced to jail last December.

Adebolajo, viewed as more of a priority than Adebowale, was caught up in five MI5 investigations, beginning with Operation Ash from May to September 2008, after his contact with a network suspected of terrorist links.

Adebolajoalso figured in Operation Beech, Operation Cedar, Operation Dogwood and Operation Elm before the attack.

Adebowale was investigated by MI5 twice, during Operation Fir from August 2011 to June 2012, which looked at links between UK-based individuals with an interest in extremist media, and Operation Gum, from January 2012, which investigated his extremist rhetoric and potential dissemination of extremist media.

MI5 made various errors, such as failing to follow up on recommendations to gather more information about Adebolajo. The committee expressed surprise that MI5 had not placed one or both of the men under surveillance or increased existing surveillance.

The report acknowledged that MI5 had limited resources and had to prioritise its investigations. Adebowale was regarded as low priority and, as a result, there were significant and unacceptable delays in investigating him, according to the report.

“Whilst we have concluded that the errors identified would not, individually, have affected the outcome, we have also considered whether there was a cumulative effect – i.e. whether, taken together, they might have made a difference. We do know that they would have led to different investigative decisions,” the report says.

“However, it is impossible to conclude that those changes – all dependent on one another – would have resulted in MI5 discovering evidence of attack planning. We do not consider that, given what the agencies knew at the time, they were in a position to prevent the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby.”

It adds: “There are those who feel that the intelligence and security agencies have too much power to intrude into an individual’s privacy. However, when a terrorist attack happens, the question often asked is why the agencies did not do more to prevent it. The balance between these two concerns is one that we are considering further in our separate inquiry into privacy and security issues.”

The internet companies

While the committee opted against placing blame on the intelligence agencies, it had no such reservations with regard to one internet company – unnamed in the report but subsequently identified as Facebook – which is the object of scathing criticism.

“We have found only one issue which could have been decisive. That was the exchange – not seen until after the attack – between Adebowale and an individual overseas (Foxtrot) in December 2012. In this exchange, Adebowale told Foxtrot that he intended to murder a soldier.

“Had MI5 access to this exchange, their investigation into Adebowale would have become top priority. It is difficult to speculate on the outcome but there is a significant possibility that MI5 would then have been able to prevent the attack.”

The committee concludes that the agencies could not have obtained access to this information as Adebowale was not under active investigation at the time.

“The party which could have made a difference was the company on whose platform the exchange took place. However, this company does not appear to regard itself as under any obligation to ensure that its systems identify such exchanges, or to take action or notify the authorities when its communications services appear to be used by terrorists. There is therefore a risk that, however unintentionally, it provides a safe haven for terrorists to communicate within,” the report says.

In a further twist that seeks to shift responsibility to the internet companies, the report says that US internet providers do not feel compelled to comply with UK warrants seeking data.

The exact nature of the exchange of information between US and UK intelligence agencies is a matter of debate.

The committee acknowledges that the UK agencies, which work closely with the US intelligence agencies, can still get access. The fact that US internet provides “do recognise the jurisdiction of the US courts means that the UK agencies or law enforcement can, in certain limited circumstances, ask their US partners to apply to the US courts for authorisation to obtain and share the relevant material with the UK.

“However, in practice this is limited by the US courts to high priority investigations where there is a known threat to life.”The implication is that MI5 would not have been able to get information in what in this case was regarded as low-priority.

MI6 and the Kenya connection

One of the most intriguing aspects of the case is the role of the overseas intelligence agency MI6, referred to in the report as SIS (the Secret Intelligence Service), and a trip made by Adebolajo to Kenya, when he was arrested by Kenyan police while apparently heading with five Kenyan youths to join al-Shabaab, an Islamist extremist group in Somalia.

MI6 said it was notified of the arrest on 22 November 2010 but did not seek to interview him or ask to sit in on the Kenyan interviews or to put questions to him. Nor did it seek further information.

The report says MI6’s “minimal involvement is surprising” and “it is difficult to understand their passive approach to Adebolajo’s arrest”.

The committee also expressed concern at a discrepancy between evidence from MI6 and a British police counter-terrorism unit over when MI6 was first informed of the arrest.

“In any case concerning a British national suspected of involvement in terrorism (whether in the UK or overseas) it is essential that all information – whether corroborated or not – should be properly recorded. That failed to happen on this occasion,” the report says.

Adebolajo and his friends and family have claimed he was mistreated while in custody and harrassed by MI5 who wanted to turn him into an informer on his return but no evidence was presented to the committee in support of this.

Government counter-terrorism strategy

The report expresses scepticism about the government’s counter-terrorism strategy. It is concerned that the government does not place enough value on Prevent programmes aimed at tackling the problem of those attracted by radical Islamist and terrorist ideologies.

“We have seen in recent months the numbers of young British men and women who have travelled to Syria and Iraq to engage in terrorism, driven by a warped understanding of Islam,” the committee’s report says. “The scale of the problem indicates that the government’s counter-radicalisation programmes are not working.”

The London Olympics

At several points in the report, the 2012 Olympics and the Paralympic Games are cited as stretching the resources of MI5, putting it under significant pressure.

MI5 carried out background checks on 1 million accreditation applications, creating a backlog of annual leave taken later in the year. “The impact of these resource adjustments was primarily on low priority cases such as Adebowale’s,” the report says. Casework that was regarded as non-urgent was formally suspended during this time.

In spite of this, MI5 said the the pressures as a result of the Olympics were not as great as had been expected and, anyway, it was not uncommon for low priority cases to be delayed.

GCHQ

The surveillance arm of British intelligence, normally credited as the biggest source of intelligence, GCHQ first found data on Adebowale in 2011. GCHQ sent intelligence to MI5 showing that an unknown individual had shown interest in extremist media online which it sent to MI5. MI5 investigated to see if Adebowale posed a threat.

The committee report says that, while counter-terrorism operations involving overseas elements are the biggest task facing GCHQ’s, they only amount to a third of its total effort, so MI5 has to prioritise requests for help.

They would not normally become involved in low-risk operations, especially ones that did not have an overseas element.

The Metropolitan police

The report considers there has been insufficient co-ordination between MI5 and police investigators.

“Disruption based on criminal activities offers a potential opportunity to reduce the threat posed by extremists. MI5 and the police must improve both the process and the level of communication,” the report says.

Theresa May

The home secretary told the committee that the distinction between GCHQ’s overseas interception and MI5’s work on domestic terrorism was not as clear as it once was and that the role of GCHQ had “been changing”.

May also said she recognised there was a problem with proscribed organisations and this was something that was being looked at – to see whether there could be a category below proscribed but which could include banning orders and the use of other punitive measures.

Edward Snowden

The disclosures of the US National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden about bulk data collection by agencies in the US and the UK came to light in June last year and onwards – after Rigby’s murder.

The report notes that internet and other companies are introducing encryption. The revelations from the Snowden files have accelerated up this process, the committee says, but it would have happened anyway. “One of the effects of the Snowden disclosures has been to accelerate the use of default encryption by the internet companies … which was coming anyway.”