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Lessons learnt from Afghanistan, insists UK defence minister, but what? Lessons learnt from Afghanistan, insists UK defence minister, but what?
(5 months later)
"I think the generals have been clear that mistakes were made. Mistakes were made militarily and mistakes were made by the politicians at the time."I think the generals have been clear that mistakes were made. Mistakes were made militarily and mistakes were made by the politicians at the time.
"Clearly the numbers weren't there at the beginning, the equipment wasn't quite good enough at the beginning, and we have learnt an awful lot from the campaign.""Clearly the numbers weren't there at the beginning, the equipment wasn't quite good enough at the beginning, and we have learnt an awful lot from the campaign."
Britain's defence secretary, Michael Fallon, confessed on BBC1's Andrew Marr show on Sunday as the Union Jack was lowered for the last time at Camp Bastion, the huge British base in Afghanistan's Helmand province.Britain's defence secretary, Michael Fallon, confessed on BBC1's Andrew Marr show on Sunday as the Union Jack was lowered for the last time at Camp Bastion, the huge British base in Afghanistan's Helmand province.
Some of us were castigated at the time by defence ministers and officials for suggesting too few, ill-equipped, troops were being deployed to Helmand given the role they were being told to undertake. Some of us were castigated at the time by defence ministers and officials for suggesting too few, ill-equipped, troops were being deployed to Helmand given the role they were being told to undertake.
We were simply passing on the views of increasingly angry and frustated commanders of British forces in Helmand. Commanders of both regiments and brigades complained to the top brass in the Ministry of Defence. We were simply passing on the views of increasingly angry and frustated commanders of British forces in Helmand. Commanders of both regiments and brigades complained to the top brass in the Ministry of Defence.
However, the armed forces chiefs seemed too frightened to tell their political masters even though it was painfully obvious that British forces were already severely stretched in Basra in southern Iraq. However, the armed forces chiefs seemed too frightened to tell their political masters even though it was painfully obvious that British forces were already severely stretched in Basra in southern Iraq.
Defence chiefs in London were worried that their "can do" approach would be undermined if they complained to civil servants or to their political masters.Defence chiefs in London were worried that their "can do" approach would be undermined if they complained to civil servants or to their political masters.
They were even concerned that they would be told their role in any future military operations would be diminished, and their budgets would be slashed.They were even concerned that they would be told their role in any future military operations would be diminished, and their budgets would be slashed.
Better then to keep quiet, despite the risks involved, not least to the troops sent out on dangerous patrols in Helmand vulnerable to an underestimated and misunderstood enemy.Better then to keep quiet, despite the risks involved, not least to the troops sent out on dangerous patrols in Helmand vulnerable to an underestimated and misunderstood enemy.
General Sir Nick Houghton, the current chief of defence staff, told the Commons defence committee that he did raise questions about the resources available to British troops when he held the post of chief of joint operatons in 2006. But he emphasised the political imperative to deploy thousands more Nato-backed troops to Afghanistan.General Sir Nick Houghton, the current chief of defence staff, told the Commons defence committee that he did raise questions about the resources available to British troops when he held the post of chief of joint operatons in 2006. But he emphasised the political imperative to deploy thousands more Nato-backed troops to Afghanistan.
As for Fallon's "lessons learnt", the government is doing its best to stifle debate. So much so that Sir Hew Strachan, Chichele professor of the history of war at Oxford University, last year accused the MoD of putting the lives of British soldiers at risk by preventing generals from publicly expressing their views on the conduct of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.As for Fallon's "lessons learnt", the government is doing its best to stifle debate. So much so that Sir Hew Strachan, Chichele professor of the history of war at Oxford University, last year accused the MoD of putting the lives of British soldiers at risk by preventing generals from publicly expressing their views on the conduct of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
He blamed the decision to suppress their views on "official paranoia" and "fear of reputational damage and political controversy".He blamed the decision to suppress their views on "official paranoia" and "fear of reputational damage and political controversy".
His comments appeared in a series of essays, British Generals in Blair's Wars, which contains devastating criticism from senior officers who have recently retired, but none from those still serving.His comments appeared in a series of essays, British Generals in Blair's Wars, which contains devastating criticism from senior officers who have recently retired, but none from those still serving.
Generals prevented from publishing their views include Houghton, and Sir Richard Shirreff, who recently retired as Nato's deputy supreme commander. Shirreff, a former commander of British troops in Basra, told the Chilcot inquiry that the failure to provide troops with the resources they needed "beggars belief".Generals prevented from publishing their views include Houghton, and Sir Richard Shirreff, who recently retired as Nato's deputy supreme commander. Shirreff, a former commander of British troops in Basra, told the Chilcot inquiry that the failure to provide troops with the resources they needed "beggars belief".
The Chilcot inquiry will have much to say about the failure to consider the consequences of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 - and any lessons learned - will not be published until next year, normally very reliable sources have told me, and may not now before the general election in May.The Chilcot inquiry will have much to say about the failure to consider the consequences of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 - and any lessons learned - will not be published until next year, normally very reliable sources have told me, and may not now before the general election in May.
"We have learnt an awful lot", said Fallon. It would be good to know what."We have learnt an awful lot", said Fallon. It would be good to know what.