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| Does the U.S. Still Have the Will to Lead? | Does the U.S. Still Have the Will to Lead? |
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| WASHINGTON — When you leave a city after living there for over 15 years, you suddenly see it with different eyes. You recognize how special some things are, things that you never really noticed as such and took for granted. | |
| In the weeks before I moved to Washington from Berlin this summer, I found myself wandering around, appreciating it anew, for all the things I was leaving behind: Affordable housing right in the city center. Sprawling sidewalk cafes and restaurants. A public transportation network so dense that, combined with the city’s bike-friendly design, my wife and I were able to raise two children without owning a car. | In the weeks before I moved to Washington from Berlin this summer, I found myself wandering around, appreciating it anew, for all the things I was leaving behind: Affordable housing right in the city center. Sprawling sidewalk cafes and restaurants. A public transportation network so dense that, combined with the city’s bike-friendly design, my wife and I were able to raise two children without owning a car. |
| Of course, Washington has a lot of things that Berlin lacks — particularly for a journalist like me. The German capital is, for instance, still quite provincial when it comes to foreign policy, my area of expertise. Oddly, despite Germany’s growing global role, since the end of the Cold War the number of avowed foreign experts in the German Parliament has steadily declined, and stands now at a historic low. | Of course, Washington has a lot of things that Berlin lacks — particularly for a journalist like me. The German capital is, for instance, still quite provincial when it comes to foreign policy, my area of expertise. Oddly, despite Germany’s growing global role, since the end of the Cold War the number of avowed foreign experts in the German Parliament has steadily declined, and stands now at a historic low. |
| Things couldn’t be more different in Washington. Despite all the talk about a historic decline in American power and influence, the city is awash in foreign-policy think tanks, international institutions and university programs. Washington feels like the center of the global policy conversation — and, at least for now, it sees itself that way. | Things couldn’t be more different in Washington. Despite all the talk about a historic decline in American power and influence, the city is awash in foreign-policy think tanks, international institutions and university programs. Washington feels like the center of the global policy conversation — and, at least for now, it sees itself that way. |
| In Berlin — or Paris, or Tokyo — the first response among commentators and policy makers to a crisis is not “What should we do about it?” But here in Washington, “What should America do?” is always the first point of debate. | In Berlin — or Paris, or Tokyo — the first response among commentators and policy makers to a crisis is not “What should we do about it?” But here in Washington, “What should America do?” is always the first point of debate. |
| Some people — including many of my fellow Germans — criticize this tendency as proof of American hubris, of a sense of exceptionalism that leads Washington to see itself always at the center of the world. I find it, instead, a laudable feeling of responsibility to maintain world order. | Some people — including many of my fellow Germans — criticize this tendency as proof of American hubris, of a sense of exceptionalism that leads Washington to see itself always at the center of the world. I find it, instead, a laudable feeling of responsibility to maintain world order. |
| Indeed, when most Europeans think about world problems, despite their resentment of American power, they still usually look first to the United States for action, instead of imploring their own countries to act (with a few exceptions, like France and Britain, depending upon the region where a crisis breaks out). | Indeed, when most Europeans think about world problems, despite their resentment of American power, they still usually look first to the United States for action, instead of imploring their own countries to act (with a few exceptions, like France and Britain, depending upon the region where a crisis breaks out). |
| Of course, America will not always do something about a crisis, or it will look for other nations to help, or it will employ only a limited set of instruments that are not enough to resolve a conflict. Still, it is the attitude that counts, which is a reflection of real power on the global stage, of the outstanding means, diplomatic and military, that the United States has at its disposal. | Of course, America will not always do something about a crisis, or it will look for other nations to help, or it will employ only a limited set of instruments that are not enough to resolve a conflict. Still, it is the attitude that counts, which is a reflection of real power on the global stage, of the outstanding means, diplomatic and military, that the United States has at its disposal. |
| But it is also a function of elite education, and not only in politics. Since the end of World War II, the American elites have held a shared idea about America’s place on the globe, and have agreed that the country’s power is necessary to defend the free world and maintain some sort of world order. We saw the same thing in Britain, and to a lesser extent in France. In its centuries of world dominion, the British empire educated its political, administrative and media elites to see themselves as shapers of world affairs. France, though it had a smaller empire, trained its elite to carry on the “mission civilisatrice,” or civilizing mission, in Africa and Asia. | But it is also a function of elite education, and not only in politics. Since the end of World War II, the American elites have held a shared idea about America’s place on the globe, and have agreed that the country’s power is necessary to defend the free world and maintain some sort of world order. We saw the same thing in Britain, and to a lesser extent in France. In its centuries of world dominion, the British empire educated its political, administrative and media elites to see themselves as shapers of world affairs. France, though it had a smaller empire, trained its elite to carry on the “mission civilisatrice,” or civilizing mission, in Africa and Asia. |
| That attitude of feeling responsible for the global order prevailed for decades after the two colonial empires were lost and Britain and France were reduced to the status of regional powers. Indeed, even recently the two have kept punching way above their weight internationally, because their respective governing classes believed that that was the role their countries should play. Exerting power in foreign policy is thus not only a function of military and economic might, but also of political will and worldview. | That attitude of feeling responsible for the global order prevailed for decades after the two colonial empires were lost and Britain and France were reduced to the status of regional powers. Indeed, even recently the two have kept punching way above their weight internationally, because their respective governing classes believed that that was the role their countries should play. Exerting power in foreign policy is thus not only a function of military and economic might, but also of political will and worldview. |
| What I fear is not so much that the United States may take a pause in its engagement, but that the elite consensus about the country’s role in world affairs could crumble. That’s why, as a European, I find the attack of the Tea Party movement on the elite understanding of America’s global role so dangerous — for the West, and for the world in general. | What I fear is not so much that the United States may take a pause in its engagement, but that the elite consensus about the country’s role in world affairs could crumble. That’s why, as a European, I find the attack of the Tea Party movement on the elite understanding of America’s global role so dangerous — for the West, and for the world in general. |
| Is this the end of an era? Is America’s “empire by consent” really crumbling? It is difficult for us, now, to say. Some pivotal moments are fairly obvious, like 9/11, or the erection of the Iron Curtain. Others, like the slow decline of empires, are much clearer to see in hindsight. | Is this the end of an era? Is America’s “empire by consent” really crumbling? It is difficult for us, now, to say. Some pivotal moments are fairly obvious, like 9/11, or the erection of the Iron Curtain. Others, like the slow decline of empires, are much clearer to see in hindsight. |
| Today we can point to trends in either direction — America’s allies, particularly those in Asia and some in the Middle East, seem to be hedging their bets and preparing for a post-American world; on the other hand, America’s recent intervention in Iraq was something that it, at least for the moment, was uniquely capable of doing. | Today we can point to trends in either direction — America’s allies, particularly those in Asia and some in the Middle East, seem to be hedging their bets and preparing for a post-American world; on the other hand, America’s recent intervention in Iraq was something that it, at least for the moment, was uniquely capable of doing. |
| But if empires of the past are any indicator of the future, the real determinant of America’s future role will be the will and consensus of its elite to continue to engage globally. And much of that consensus will be decided, or demolished, in the coming years right here in Washington. | But if empires of the past are any indicator of the future, the real determinant of America’s future role will be the will and consensus of its elite to continue to engage globally. And much of that consensus will be decided, or demolished, in the coming years right here in Washington. |
| As much as I will miss the sidewalk cafes and car-optional lifestyle of Berlin, I wouldn’t want to be anywhere else. | As much as I will miss the sidewalk cafes and car-optional lifestyle of Berlin, I wouldn’t want to be anywhere else. |
| Clemens Wergin is the Washington bureau chief for the newspaper group Die Welt and the author of the blog Flatworld. | Clemens Wergin is the Washington bureau chief for the newspaper group Die Welt and the author of the blog Flatworld. |