Ukraine must provoke Nato shake-up

http://www.theguardian.com/world/defence-and-security-blog/2014/jul/23/nato-ukraine-putin

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The UN wrings its hands over what's happening in Gaza, Nato wrings its hands over Putin and Ukraine.

Officials at the UN are used to talking but not acting. Officials at the world's most powerful military alliance are getting increasingly used to it, it seems.

They are now giving up their summer holidays to prepare for the Nato summit in Newport, Wales, on 4 and 5 September.

It is being billed as the most important Nato summit since the end of the cold war. There are those who quietly thanked Putin for giving the Atlantic Alliance a new lease of life by annexing Crimea and intervening in east Ukraine. Now, they are not quite so sure.

The patent lack of cohesion in the EU seems to be mirrored in Nato. Few member states have any intention of increasing their defence budgets, despite US pressure.

Independent analysis suggests that the UK's military expenditure will fall below 2% of the size of the country's economy by 2017. 2% is Nato's target and is met now only by the US and Britain. (In classic Whitehall speak, the UK Ministry of Defence said: "We don't recognise these figures").

The real issue is what the money earmarked for defence is spent on. British ministers are fond of repeating that £160bn will be spent on the equipment budget over the next 10 years. But much of it will be spent on huge items such as the two largest aircraft carriers ever built for the navy and the most expensive planes (the F35 Lighting II) ever produced, and a new fleet of Trident nuclear missile submarines.

That may leave little left for manpower and other more relevant items – such as transport and reconnaissance aircraft, drones, and intelligence-gathering kit. With the health budget ring-fenced, defence spending is likely to be cut further in real terms after next year's general election.

But who needs much "hard power" these days, decision-makers may be asked? Putin knows better than to risk triggering Nato's key Article 5, whereby "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all" and Nato will take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force..."

There are genuine concerns, however, about whether Putin will encourage Russian-speaking communities in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania to agitate, destabilising those new Nato countries in the Baltic.

Defence analysts refer to a new period of "hybrid warfare" – a combination of cyber attacks, electronic propaganda and eavesdropping, the use of proxy militias – which are difficult for liberal democracies to combat.

It is difficult, but it will be interesting, to see how Nato's leaders can come up with a coherent response to the perceived new threats in Europe.

Meanwhile, I will pick out some quotes from the latest issue ot the Journal of the London-based Royal United Services Institute:

• "Russia and the West now exist in a relationship of economic interdependence that would challenge classical deterrence and containment theories, or at least magnify their costs" (James Bergeron, chief political advisor to allied maritime command, Northwood, UK);

• "Perhaps the most painful lesson to emerge from the war in Afghanistan is simply that, absent genuine existential threats, states may prefer to muddle through a crisis rather than to don the straightjacket of an overarching grand strategy" (professor Antulio Echevarria II, Elihu Root chair of military studies at the US army war college);

• "There can be no doubt that the idea of a Greater Russia is central to Putinism. However, beneath the bluster and manipulation, fear lurks in Moscow. The Kremlin is afraid that the many contradictions that plague Russia will coalesce to accelerate the country's decline, with pressure growing on Russia's western, southern, and eastern. borders. Such a loss of face, power and prestige, would probably, over time, mark the end of Putinism" (Julian Lindley-French, senior fellow, Statecraft).