Hamas goes to war – for a ceasefire

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/09/hamas-goes-to-war-gaza-israel-ceasefire

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Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth a few days ago, the Israeli analyst Alex Fishman depicted Hamas in vivid terms. The militant Islamist group was "behaving like a suicidal individual trying to drag Israel forcibly into armed conflict … believing [it] will be the one to determine the strength of the explosion," he said.

The conventional wisdom would seem to echo Fishman's view. Cut off from Egypt by the blockade imposed by the military government there, which has severed its financial lifeline, a weakened Hamas is not only isolated from many of its old backers, including Syria and Iran, but, the argument goes, would be weakened by a costly conflict after which it would struggle to re-arm.

Why then does Hamas seem determined to pursue a renewed and perhaps prolonged and bloody conflict?

"They feel like they have nothing to lose," says Mkhaimar Abusada, a political scientist at Al-Azhar University, who has studied the group. "Since the 2 June unity agreement the Palestinian Authority and Abu Mazen [President Mahmoud Abbas's nickname] have done nothing for Gaza and Hamas. It was supposed to open the crossings [to Egypt], pay the salaries of their people, who have not been paid for months. They were expecting a visit from Abu Mazen, and he has not even called.

"They calculate there will be a new ceasefire and when it happens it will improve things for Hamas."

And in some respects that is exactly what Hamas wants: to fight a war for a ceasefire.

In its demands earlier this week for ending hostilities, it asked for the ceasefire conditions from the last major round of fighting with Israel in 2012 to be reinstated, for the re-release of prisoners freed by Israel in exchange for the kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit, who were rounded up again by Israeli after the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers, later found murdered, and an end to what it says is Israeli meddling in the Palestinian unity government.

Abusada believes, however, that Hamas is being driven by other considerations as well.

"Its leaders read the Hebrew newspapers. Hamas knows that [Israel's prime minister, Binyamin] Netanyahu was reluctant to be drawn into this conflict and it knows the history of Israeli wars – that it tends to prefer short conflicts.

"It believes it can absorb the pain of a conflict and that Israel is concerned that if it brings down Hamas that its successors could be more radical factions, including Salafists. Hamas knows Israel won't go all the way against it, which would require complete reoccupation and Israeli soldiers going door to door looking for its members."

Hamas is also not the same group that fought Israel in 2008-09 and 2012 in Gaza. Its military capabilities, observers say, have been enhanced, including the longer-range rockets it has developed. Hamas has also learned from the last two conflicts, becoming – apparently – more proactive in its tactics.

In other words, far from being "suicidal", there is a strong rationale behind its current strategy, at least part of which is designed to test Israel's own appetite for escalation.

"They see the region boiling over," says Abusada. "They think maybe a conflict could push East Jerusalem and the West Bank to a third intifada."