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Hillsborough: evidence 'does not support claims that fans had no tickets' Hillsborough: evidence 'does not support claims that fans had no tickets'
(35 minutes later)
The suggestion that many people without tickets entered the Hillsborough football ground when 96 Liverpool supporters died there in 1989 is not borne out by the evidence, the inquest into the disaster has heard.The suggestion that many people without tickets entered the Hillsborough football ground when 96 Liverpool supporters died there in 1989 is not borne out by the evidence, the inquest into the disaster has heard.
John Cutlack, a structural engineer appearing as an expert witness on stadium safety, has calculated the number of spectators in the ground, and said this did not exceed the number who should have been there according to Sheffield Wednesday's safety certificate. John Cutlack, a structural engineer appearing as an expert witness on stadium safety, calculated the number of spectators in the ground, and said it did not exceed the number who should have been there according to Sheffield Wednesday's safety certificate.
Pete Weatherby QC, representing 22 families whose relatives died at the FA Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest on 15 April 1989, asked Cutlack: "From your best estimates, there is no objective basis to say that a large number of people without tickets got into the ground?"Pete Weatherby QC, representing 22 families whose relatives died at the FA Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest on 15 April 1989, asked Cutlack: "From your best estimates, there is no objective basis to say that a large number of people without tickets got into the ground?"
Cutlack replied: "It definitely does show to me there certainly were not more people in the ground than were on the safety certificate."Cutlack replied: "It definitely does show to me there certainly were not more people in the ground than were on the safety certificate."
The jury of seven women and four men were told, however, that the number of spectators legitimately allowed by Sheffield Wednesday's safety certificate on to the Leppings Lane terrace seriously exceeded a safe capacity limit. The club also had no "dedicated" system to monitor the numbers of people admitted to the enclosed "pens" created in 1981 and 1985 by building metal railing fences up the terrace. This meant, Cutlack said, that supporters who had tickets for that part of the ground in the 1980s were in "real danger". The jury of seven women and four men were told, however, that the number of spectators legitimately allowed by Sheffield Wednesday's safety certificate on to the Leppings Lane terrace exceeded a safe capacity limit. The club also had no dedicated system to monitor the number of people admitted to the enclosed pens created in 1981 and 1985 by building metal railing fences up the terrace. This meant, Cutlack said, that supporters who had tickets for that part of the ground in the 1980s were in "real danger".
On the day the 96 Liverpool supporters were killed by the lethal crush in central pens 3 and 4, Cutlack has said the pens were full far beyond their safe capacity. He has calculated 678 as the safe limit of people for pen 3, but on the day of the disaster, 1,296 people, almost double, were in there. On the day the 96 Liverpool supporters were killed by the crush in central pens 3 and 4, Cutlack has said the pens were full far beyond their safe capacity. He has calculated 678 as the safe limit of people for pen 3, but on the day of the disaster, 1,296 were in there.
The total capacity for the Leppings Lane terrace had been calculated for Sheffield Wednesday's safety certificate in 1979 at 10,100, which Cutlack said was itself "substantially" excessive, yet it was never changed, even after the construction of pens and other changes to that end of the ground in the 1980s that reduced safe capacity. Cutlack has told the inquest the correct safe figure should have been 7,247 people, 2,853 fewer. The total capacity for the Leppings Lane terrace had been calculated for Sheffield Wednesday's safety certificate in 1979 at 10,100, which Cutlack said was itself "substantially" excessive, yet it was never changed, even after the construction of pens and other changes to that end of the ground in the 80s that reduced safe capacity. Cutlack has told the inquest the correct safe figure should have been 7,247 people, 2,853 fewer.
He said he considered the overstating of the safe capacity to have been "a remarkable failure" by Sheffield Wednesday's consultant engineer, Dr Wilfred Eastwood, who was also a shareholder in the club and represented it on safety matters.He said he considered the overstating of the safe capacity to have been "a remarkable failure" by Sheffield Wednesday's consultant engineer, Dr Wilfred Eastwood, who was also a shareholder in the club and represented it on safety matters.
Asked by Michael Mansfield QC, representing 75 of the families whose relatives died at Hillsborough, whether the overstated safe capacity, and lack of system to monitor numbers in each pen, was "in itself creating a real danger on the Leppings Lane terrace", Cutlack answered: "Yes."Asked by Michael Mansfield QC, representing 75 of the families whose relatives died at Hillsborough, whether the overstated safe capacity, and lack of system to monitor numbers in each pen, was "in itself creating a real danger on the Leppings Lane terrace", Cutlack answered: "Yes."
He said: "If you are consciously admitting [the permitted number of] 1,000 people into pen 3, and the figure which should have been calculated is 678, then that must mean the level of safety is less than it should have been and risks could occur to people's safety."He said: "If you are consciously admitting [the permitted number of] 1,000 people into pen 3, and the figure which should have been calculated is 678, then that must mean the level of safety is less than it should have been and risks could occur to people's safety."
Cutlack agreed that the safe capacity figure of 10,100 for the Leppings Lane terrace stated by Sheffield Wednesday in 1979 was "a substantial miscalculation". Then, throughout the 1980s, there was "a failure to identify that error" and re-calculate the figure, he said. The error remained uncorrected, and the 10,100 figure unchanged, despite the division of the terrace into "pens" bounded by metal railing fences, and other structural changes including the removal of crush barriers, which did not comply with the official "green Guide" on safety at sports grounds. Cutlack agreed that the safe capacity figure of 10,100 for the Leppings Lane terrace stated by Sheffield Wednesday in 1979 was "a substantial miscalculation". Then, throughout the 1980s, there was "a failure to identify that error" and recalculate the figure, he said. The error remained uncorrected, and the 10,100 figure unchanged, despite the division of the terrace into pens and other structural changes, including the removal of crush barriers, which did not comply with the official "Green Guide" on safety at sports grounds.
Together with the absence of a dedicated system for counting the numbers admitted to the individual pens, Cutlack agreed with Mansfield that this created "a serious risk of danger on the Leppings Lane terraces at Hillsborough".Together with the absence of a dedicated system for counting the numbers admitted to the individual pens, Cutlack agreed with Mansfield that this created "a serious risk of danger on the Leppings Lane terraces at Hillsborough".
Weatherby asked Cutlack whether allowing in crowds that exceeded the ground's safe capacity meant "you are creating the conditions for a calamity such as happened in April 1989".Weatherby asked Cutlack whether allowing in crowds that exceeded the ground's safe capacity meant "you are creating the conditions for a calamity such as happened in April 1989".
"Potentially, yes," Cutlack replied."Potentially, yes," Cutlack replied.
Weatherby asked if it was acceptable, on the part of those responsible, to respond to that danger by considering that it was safe because no disaster had yet happened.Weatherby asked if it was acceptable, on the part of those responsible, to respond to that danger by considering that it was safe because no disaster had yet happened.
"'We got away with it last time' is not an answer to the safety concerns?" Weatherby asked."'We got away with it last time' is not an answer to the safety concerns?" Weatherby asked.
"No," Cutlack replied, "because it could have been happenstance that you did get away with it.""No," Cutlack replied, "because it could have been happenstance that you did get away with it."
The inquest heard that at 2.40pm on the day of the 1989 FA Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest, which kicked off at 3pm, just over 5,000 supporters had been counted in to the Leppings Lane terrace in total, so around 5,000 were building up outside, still awaiting admission. Only seven turnstiles were in operation to admit them, which Cutlack said was insufficient. The jury has already heard evidence from club and police witnesses that the majority of football supporters arrived to matches in the last 20 minutes. The inquest heard that at 2.40pm on the day of the match, which kicked off at 3pm, just over 5,000 supporters had been counted in to the Leppings Lane terrace, so about 5,000 were building up outside, still awaiting admission. Only seven turnstiles were in operation to admit them, which Cutlack said was insufficient. The jury has already heard evidence from club and police witnesses that the majority of football supporters arrived to matches in the last 20 minutes.
The Leppings Lane terrace had a 3-metre-high reinforced mesh fence at the front, to prevent supporters getting on to the pitch; Cutlack said these were not mandatory and some football clubs took the view that they should not have perimeter fences because they were "inherently unsafe".The Leppings Lane terrace had a 3-metre-high reinforced mesh fence at the front, to prevent supporters getting on to the pitch; Cutlack said these were not mandatory and some football clubs took the view that they should not have perimeter fences because they were "inherently unsafe".
Pens 3 and 4 had gates within the fences, which Eastwood had judged could be opened, only from the outside, to enable spectators to be evacuated quickly in an emergency. Cutlack said he disagreed with that view. Both gates were narrower than the minimum 1.1-metre width recommended by the official Home Office Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, known as the Green Guide. Both fences had steps in front of them; the one in pen 4 was 76% higher than the recommended height of steps in the Green Guide, which Cutlack said made it "more of a hindrance than a help" for fans to get through the gate.Pens 3 and 4 had gates within the fences, which Eastwood had judged could be opened, only from the outside, to enable spectators to be evacuated quickly in an emergency. Cutlack said he disagreed with that view. Both gates were narrower than the minimum 1.1-metre width recommended by the official Home Office Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, known as the Green Guide. Both fences had steps in front of them; the one in pen 4 was 76% higher than the recommended height of steps in the Green Guide, which Cutlack said made it "more of a hindrance than a help" for fans to get through the gate.
"People on the terrace, whether in pen 3 or 4, faced very considerable difficulties using these gates to get out of there, didn't they?" Cutlack was asked by Stephen Simblet, another barrister representing 75 of the families."People on the terrace, whether in pen 3 or 4, faced very considerable difficulties using these gates to get out of there, didn't they?" Cutlack was asked by Stephen Simblet, another barrister representing 75 of the families.
"Yes," Cutlack said, "they did.""Yes," Cutlack said, "they did."
After the disaster, in May 1989, the jury were told, Eastwood backdated safety inspection certificates for 1986 and 1987 which he had previously failed to produce, and sent these to the club. Eastwood wrote to the club's secretary that he had not realised it was a condition of the club's safety certificate for a structural engineer to carry out a safety inspection every year with a council representative, then send a certificate to the council. After the disaster, in May 1989, the jury were told, Eastwood backdated safety inspection certificates for 1986 and 1987 that he had previously failed to produce, and sent these to the club. Eastwood wrote to the club's secretary that he had not realised it was a condition of the club's safety certificate for a structural engineer to carry out a safety inspection every year with a council representative, then send a certificate to the council.
Eastwood therefore produced "retrospective" safety inspection certificates for 1986 and 1987, which were "simply backdated", and included them with his letter, said Terry Munyard, representing three families.Eastwood therefore produced "retrospective" safety inspection certificates for 1986 and 1987, which were "simply backdated", and included them with his letter, said Terry Munyard, representing three families.
"I have to say that is a fairly horrifying letter, from a professional perspective," Cutlack said."I have to say that is a fairly horrifying letter, from a professional perspective," Cutlack said.
The inquest continues.The inquest continues.