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Apprehension of Ahmed Abu Khattala May Begin to Answer Questions on Assault Apprehension of Ahmed Abu Khattala May Begin to Answer Questions on Assault
(about 4 hours later)
CAIRO — Ahmed Abu Khattala was always open about his animosity toward the United States, and even about his conviction that Muslims and Christians were locked in an intractable religious war. “There is always hostility between the religions,” he said in an interview. “That is the nature of religions.”CAIRO — Ahmed Abu Khattala was always open about his animosity toward the United States, and even about his conviction that Muslims and Christians were locked in an intractable religious war. “There is always hostility between the religions,” he said in an interview. “That is the nature of religions.”
During the assault on the American diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, on the night of Sept. 11, 2012, Mr. Abu Khattala was a flamboyant presence. Witnesses saw him directing the swarming attackers who ultimately killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. During the assault on the American diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, on the night of Sept. 11, 2012, Mr. Abu Khattala was a vivid presence. Witnesses saw him directing the swarming attackers who ultimately killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans.
Even after the attack, he offered only vague and contradictory denials that he had played a role, while apparently enjoying the notoriety it brought him. He sat for repeated interviews with Western journalists and even invited a correspondent for tea in the modest home where he lived openly, with his mother, in the Benghazi neighborhood of el-Leithi. Afterward, he offered contradictory denials of his role, sometimes trying to say that he did not do it but strongly approved. He appeared to enjoy his notoriety.
But for all his brazenness, Mr. Abu Khattala also holds many tantalizing secrets for the Americans investigating and debating the attack. Even after President Obama vowed to hunt down the attackers, Mr. Abu Khattala sat for repeated interviews with Western journalists and even invited a correspondent for tea in the modest home where he lived openly, with his mother, in the Benghazi neighborhood of el-Leithi.
His apprehension by United States military commandos and law enforcement agents may finally begin to address some of the persistent questions about who carried out the attack and why. Those questions have spawned a small industry of conspiracy theories, political scandals, talk radio broadcasts, and a continuing congressional investigation. But for all his brazenness, Mr. Abu Khattala also holds many tantalizing secrets for the Americans still investigating and debating the attack.
Despite extensive speculation about the role of Al Qaeda in directing the attack in Libya, Mr. Abu Khattala is a local Islamist militant, with no known connections to international terrorist groups, according to American officials briefed on the criminal investigation and intelligence reporting, as well as other Benghazi Islamists who know him. Captured by military commandos and law enforcement agents over the weekend, Mr. Abu Khattala may now help address some of the persistent questions about the identity and motives of the attackers. The thriving industry of conspiracy theories, political scandals, talk show chatter and congressional hearings may now confront the man federal investigators say played the central role in the attack.
In interviews, Mr. Abu Khattala professed his admiration for Osama bin Laden and blamed American foreign policy for the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. But he remained a distant admirer, having spent most of his adult life jailed for his extremism under Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. Despite extensive speculation about the possible role of Al Qaeda in directing the attack, Mr. Abu Khattala is a local, small-time Islamist militant. He has no known connections to international terrorist groups, say American officials briefed on the criminal investigation and intelligence reporting, and other Benghazi Islamists and militia leaders who have known him for many years.
During the uprising against Colonel Qaddafi, Mr. Abu Khattala formed his own militia, which played a small role in the NATO-backed uprising. But within a few months, he had pulled his small band back from the front, deeming most of his fellow Islamists insufficiently committed to establishing a puritanical theocracy and too close to the West. In several hours of interviews since the attack, Mr. Abu Khattala was happy to profess his admiration for Osama bin Laden and other leaders of Al Qaeda. He insisted that American foreign policy alone was to blame for the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. But he remained a distant admirer of Mr. Bin Laden’s organization, having spent most of his adult life in and out of jail for his extremism under Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi.
After Colonel Qaddafi fell, Mr. Abu Khattala was one of the disgruntled veterans of the uprising who kept Benghazi on edge. Though he had friends among the militia leaders of the city who were close to American and British diplomats who took residence in the city, he kept his distance from foreign diplomats and rallied his own supporters to protest what he viewed as foreign interference in Libya’s affairs. Even by the standards of Benghazi jihadists — and even among many of his friends — Mr. Abu Khattala stands out as both erratic and extremist. “Even in prison, he was always alone,” said Sheikh Mohamed Abu Sidra, an Islamist member of Parliament from Benghazi who spent several years in prison with Mr. Abu Khattala.
What he did in the period just before the attack has remained unclear. But Mr. Abu Khattala told other Libyans in private conversations during the night of the attack that he was moved to attack the diplomatic mission to take revenge for an insult to Islam in an American-made online video. “He is sincere, but he is very ignorant, and I don’t think he is 100 percent mentally fit,” Mr. Abu Sidra said. “I always ask myself, how did he become a leader?”
An earlier demonstration venting anger over the video outside the American Embassy in Cairo had culminated in a breach of its walls, and it dominated Arab news coverage. Mr. Abu Khattala told both fellow Islamist fighters and others that the attack in Benghazi was retaliation for the same insulting video, according to people who heard him. When the revolt against Colonel Qaddafi broke out in February 2011, however, Mr. Abu Khattala’s years in the prison were an attractive credential to the young men looking for tough-talking “sheikhs” to follow into battle.
In an interview days after the attack, he pointedly declined to say whether he believed an offense such as the anti-Islamic video might indeed warrant the destruction of the diplomatic mission or the killing of the ambassador. “From a religious point of view, it is hard to say whether it is good or bad,” he said. He formed a militia of perhaps two dozen fighters, naming it Obeida Ibn Al Jarra for an early Islamic general. But by the summer, Mr. Abu Khattala and his band had become notorious across Benghazi.
Several witnesses to the attack later said that Mr. Abu Khattala’s presence and leadership were evident from the start. He initially hung back, standing near the crowd at Venezia Road, several witnesses said. But a procession of fighters hurried to him out of the smoke and gunfire, addressed him as “sheikh,” and then gave him reports or took his orders before plunging back into the compound. A group of Islamist militia leaders decided to “arrest” and investigate the main rebel commander, Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes, who had also become NATO’s preferred partner among the rebel leaders. His captors held him overnight in the headquarters of Mr. Abu Khattala’s brigade, and General Younes’s body was found the next day on a roadside, riddled with bullets.
Viewing him as the central figure in the attack, a local official, Anwar el-Dos, approached Mr. Abu Khattala for help in entering the compound. The two men drove into the mission together in Mr. Abu Khattala’s pickup truck, witnesses said. As the men moved forward, the fighters parted to let them pass. Mr. Abu Khattala “became a boogeyman” across Benghazi, said Mohamed al-Gharabi, the Islamist leader of the Rafallah al-Sehati Brigade. “People started to fear him,” he said.
Mr. Abu Khattala appeared to enjoy his new infamy. When the Islamist-dominated militias reorganized into a centralized coalition, he rejected it as insufficiently Islamist. Complaining that the coalition supported the Western-backed provisional government instead of demanding a theocracy, he pulled back from the front.
“He thinks he owns God and everyone else is an infidel,” said Fawzi Bukatef, the coalition’s former leader.
In the period preceding the attack, Mr. Abu Khattala was living in el-Leithi, known for its high concentration of militant extremists. He made his living as a building contractor in blue Dickies coveralls. But he was still active with a small, part-time militia, which at certain times over the last two years controlled at least one checkpoint on a highway near Benghazi.
On the day of the attack, Islamists in Cairo had staged a demonstration outside the United States Embassy there to protest an American-made online video mocking Islam, and the protest culminated in a breach of its walls — images that flashed through news coverage around the Arab world.
As the attack in Benghazi was unfolding a few hours later, Mr. Abu Khattala told both fellow Islamist fighters and others that the assault was retaliation for the same insulting video, according to people who heard him.
In an interview a few days later, he pointedly declined to say whether an offensive online video might indeed warrant the destruction of the diplomatic mission or the killing of the ambassador. “From a religious point of view, it is hard to say whether it is good or bad,” he said.
Several witnesses to the attack later said that Mr. Abu Khattala’s presence and leadership were conspicuous from the start. He initially hung back, standing near the crowd at Venezia Road, several witnesses said. But a procession of fighters hurried to him out of the smoke and gunfire, addressed him as “sheikh,” and then gave him reports or took his orders before plunging back into the compound.
Spotting him as the central figure in the attack, a local official, Anwar el-Dos, approached Mr. Abu Khattala for help in entering the compound. The two men drove into the mission together in Mr. Abu Khattala’s pickup truck, witnesses said. As the men moved forward, the fighters parted to let them pass.
When the truck doors opened inside the walls, witnesses said, Mr. Dos dived to the ground to avoid gunfire ringing all around. But Mr. Abu Khattala strolled coolly through the chaos.When the truck doors opened inside the walls, witnesses said, Mr. Dos dived to the ground to avoid gunfire ringing all around. But Mr. Abu Khattala strolled coolly through the chaos.
“He was just calm as could be,” a young Islamist who had joined the pillaging said, speaking on the condition of anonymity for fear of retribution. Mr. Abu Khattala showed up on internal security cameras at about 11:30 p.m., according to United States officials who have viewed the footage.“He was just calm as could be,” a young Islamist who had joined the pillaging said, speaking on the condition of anonymity for fear of retribution. Mr. Abu Khattala showed up on internal security cameras at about 11:30 p.m., according to United States officials who have viewed the footage.
A short time later, Mr. Abu Khattala drove to the headquarters of Ansar al-Shariah, a local Benghazi militia whose members, witnesses said, played a prominent role in the attack. One of the young fighters with him instructed another not to keep a looted electronic device for fear that the Americans might trace it, according to a Libyan who was present for the conversation. A short time later, Mr. Abu Khattala drove to the headquarters of Ansar al-Shariah, a local Benghazi militia whose members, witnesses said, also played a prominent role in the attack.
At one point, a fighter asked Mr. Abu Khattala what to do with the remains of the compound. “Flatten it,” he said. Although widely seen at the attack, Mr. Abu Khattala made no attempt to flee. The safest place for him may have been Benghazi, where Libya’s weak central government feared exerting its authority because of the superior power of the local Islamist militias.
Later that night, Mr. Abu Khattala appeared to prepare for another phase of the attack. One young fighter with him told another to “cleanse” himself for another battle — an apparent reference to a subsequent attack on the separate C.I.A. facility in Benghazi. The attackers who staged the initial assault had apparently learned of the facility’s location by following American vehicles fleeing the diplomatic mission. Mr. Abu Khattala’s neighbors and other residents of Benghazi were apparently unaware of his capture, perhaps because they assumed he was caught up in other fighting in the city. A renegade general has been waging a local campaign against Islamist militants such as those in Ansar al-Shariah and Mr. Abu Khattala.
Although widely seen at the scene of the attack, Mr. Abu Khattala made no attempt to flee even after President Obama vowed to bring swift justice to the perpetrators. Mr. Abu Khattala may have reckoned that nowhere was as safe for him as Benghazi, where Libya’s weak central government feared exerting its authority because of the superior power of the local Islamist militias. In interviews after the news emerged, two Benghazi residents said they had last seen Mr. Abu Khattala on Sunday. A neighbor in the el-Leithi district said he saw Mr. Abu Khattala leaving his house alone in an Afghan-style jallabiya, with a Kalashnikov rifle slung over one shoulder and a Belgian FN rifle over the other.
His neighborhood, in particular, is known for a high concentration of like-minded Islamist militants. When false rumors of an imminent American attempt to capture Mr. Abu Khattala sprung up in recent months, his neighbors took to the streets with Kalashnikovs, rocket-propelled grenades and truck-mounted artillery to defend him. “Then he walked deep into el-Leithi,” the neighbor said. “We haven’t seen him since.”
Mr. Abu Khattala himself went back to his day job, as a construction contractor in blue Dickies overalls.
Some local militia leaders sought to provide alibis for him. One prominent commander, Wisam Bin Hamid, sought to corroborate Mr. Abu Khattala’s story that he was merely trying to break up a traffic jam outside the compound after the attack occurred. In early 2013, when Mr. Bin Hamid was widely regarded as Benghazi’s most powerful militia leader, he said that he offered to make Mr. Abu Khattala a kind of local judge to settle real estate disputes.
“That made him happy,” Mr. Bin Hamid said.
But even Mr. Bin Hamid and other friends also volunteered that they found Mr. Abu Khattala erratic, with some suggesting that he suffered from the psychological effects of long years in Colonel Qaddafi’s prisons.
“Even in prison, he was always alone,” said Sheikh Mohamed Abu Sidra, an Islamist parliamentarian from Benghazi who spent several years in prison with Mr. Abu Khattala under Colonel Qaddafi.
“He is sincere, but he is very ignorant, and I don’t think he is 100 percent mentally fit,” Mr. Abu Sidra said. “I always ask myself, how did he become a leader?”
But when the revolt against Colonel Qaddafi broke out in Benghazi, Mr. Abu Khattala’s years in the prison, known as Abu Salim, became an attractive credential. Young men raced to find tough-talking “sheikhs” they could follow into battle.
He formed his own militia of perhaps two dozen fighters, naming it Obeida Ibn Al Jarra for an early Islamic general. And he stood out for his fearlessness in the early days of the uprising against Colonel Qaddafi in the spring of 2011,helping to defend the rebel-held city of Ajdabiya just as the United States, Britain, France and other NATO countries were weighing steps to support the rebels.
But Mr. Abu Khattala became notorious across Benghazi that summer when a group of Islamist militia leaders decided to “arrest” and investigate Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes, the main commander of the rebel movement, who had become NATO’s preferred partner.
His captors held him overnight in the headquarters of Mr. Abu Khattala’s brigade. The bodies of General Younes and two of his aides were found on a roadside the next day, riddled with bullets.
Mr. Abu Khattala “became a boogeyman” across Benghazi, said Mohamed al-Gharabi, the leader of the Rafallah al-Sehati Brigade. “People started to fear him,” he said.
Instead of trying to dispute the charges or dispel the fears, Mr. Abu Khattala appeared to enjoy his infamy. When the Islamist-dominated militias reorganized into a centralized coalition, he rejected it as insufficiently Islamist, because it supported the secular, Western-backed provisional government instead of demanding a theocracy. So he pulled back from the front.
“He thinks he owns God and everyone else is an infidel,” said Fawzi Bukatef, the leader of the broader rebel coalition.
Mr. Abu Khattala’s neighbors and other residents of Benghazi were apparently unaware of his capture until the United States disclosed it, perhaps because of the fighting in the city.
In recent weeks in Benghazi, a renegade general has been waging a local campaign against Islamist militias such as Ansar al-Shariah, and fighters like Mr. Abu Khattala have been scrambling to fight back.
In interviews after the news of his apprehension, two Benghazi residents said they had last seen Mr. Abu Khattala on Sunday. A neighbor in the el-Leithi district said he saw Mr. Abu Khattala leaving his house alone, wearing an Afghan-style jallabiya, with a Kalashnikov over one shoulder and a Belgian FN rifle over the other, evidently to go fight the general.
“Then he walked deep into el-Leithi, and we haven’t seen him since,” the neighbor said.