Eastern front plays greater role than D-day in German memories

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/05/eastern-front-greater-role-d-day-german-memories

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When Angela Merkel joins world leaders to gather on the beaches of Normandy , few will remember that her predecessor's attendance was considered controversial.

Helmut Kohl had rejected invitations in 1984 and 1994, arguing that "for a German chancellor, there is no reason to celebrate when others mark their victory in a battle in which tens of thousands of Germans died a miserable death".

Gerhard Schröder became the first German chancellor to attend the commemorations in 2004. In his speech, he called D-day "not a victory over Germany, but a victory for Germany", in bringing the war to a close and the Third Reich to an end. He made a point of not laying a wreath at the German cemetery, La Cambe, in case it could be interpreted as honouring the SS soldiers buried there. Instead, he attended the Commonwealth cemetery of Ranville, where 133 German soldiers were laid to rest. Merkel will follow his example on Friday.

But in Germany, the ceremony is unlikely to register much with the wider public. Few other countries have actively engaged as much with the crimes of their past as the second world war's chief aggressor, but in a year in which the first world war, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the attempted assassination of Adolf Hitler are commemorated, D-day has inevitably been marginalised.

Even without other anniversaries to compete against, the Normandy landings fail to have the same symbolic resonance in Germany as they have in Anglo-American memory.

According to the military historian Peter Lieb, whose book on the landings was published this month, the main reason for this is the overpowering role in German memory played by the eastern front: "Between 1940 and 1943, all eyes in Germany were on the Soviet Union," Lieb said.

By May 1944, 1.85 million German soldiers had died or been captured – historians put the balance of total military losses between east and west at nine to one.

Towards the end of 1943, Hitler had issued a decree for Germans to face the threat of an allied invasion from the west, but even on the day, it didn't feel like a turning point: the German leader reportedly enjoyed a lie-in at his holiday home in Berghof, and when he heard the news at 10am, he welcomed it, announcing that he was "absolutely certain" the Wehrmacht would smash the enemy.

After the end of the war, as news spread of the Wehrmacht's war crimes in Russia, the significance of the key battles on the western front paled in comparison. In the public imagination, Liebe said, "Germany lost not just the war, but also its morality on the eastern front".

Academically, too, D-day has mostly been the domain of American and British historians – Lieb's book is only the third serious work on the subject in German – and the most widely known version of events may be slightly skewed as a result.

"After the war, the Allies certainly ironed out the D-day narrative: it was a heroic story about the free world winning out against the Nazis … Broadly speaking, of course, that is precisely what happened. But the Allies didn't always behave like angels."