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| Home insulation inquiry: Mark Arbib refuses to say scheme was 'rushed' | Home insulation inquiry: Mark Arbib refuses to say scheme was 'rushed' |
| (33 minutes later) | |
| Former parliamentary secretary Mark Arbib has refused to accept the government rushed the launch of the home insulation scheme, while being cross-examined on Tuesday at the royal commission into the program. | Former parliamentary secretary Mark Arbib has refused to accept the government rushed the launch of the home insulation scheme, while being cross-examined on Tuesday at the royal commission into the program. |
| The inquiry is examining the roll-out of the $2.8bn scheme, which was rushed through under pressure from former prime minister, Kevin Rudd's tight deadline as part of the government's economic stimulus package to ward off the effects of the global financial crisis. | The inquiry is examining the roll-out of the $2.8bn scheme, which was rushed through under pressure from former prime minister, Kevin Rudd's tight deadline as part of the government's economic stimulus package to ward off the effects of the global financial crisis. |
| The industry was flooded with workers, many of whom operated unsupervised, after training requirements were eased before the scheme started. More than 200 house fires occurred and four men died while installing insulation – Matthew Fuller, Rueben Barnes and Mitchell Sweeney from Queensland, and Marcus Wilson from New South Wales. Three of the men were electrocuted. | |
| Counsel assisting Keith Wilson suggested the program was fundamentally flawed from the beginning because a large amount of money was being spent which might attract unscrupulous or dishonest people into an industry the government did not properly understand. | |
| He put it to Arbib that it was operated on an unrealistic timescale without adequate precautions such as mandatory training, and was administered by an inexperienced department with the inevitable consequence that it destroyed the very industry the money was being targeted at. | |
| Arbib said that, in hindsight, that assessment was correct. | |
| Bill Potts, representing the family of Barnes, put it to Arbib that the scheme was rushed out as fast as possible because of the global economic climate. | Bill Potts, representing the family of Barnes, put it to Arbib that the scheme was rushed out as fast as possible because of the global economic climate. |
| "We were certainly challenged by this," said Arbib, refusing to accept Potts' suggestion. "The timelines were tight." | "We were certainly challenged by this," said Arbib, refusing to accept Potts' suggestion. "The timelines were tight." |
| “That’s means rushed, doesn’t it?” Potts retorted. | “That’s means rushed, doesn’t it?” Potts retorted. |
| Throughout questioning, Arbib refused to use the word “rushed”, only describing it as “challenging and difficult”, but conceded not enough attention was paid to training and supervision, and that the scheme was rolled out too quickly. | Throughout questioning, Arbib refused to use the word “rushed”, only describing it as “challenging and difficult”, but conceded not enough attention was paid to training and supervision, and that the scheme was rolled out too quickly. |
| Arbib had earlier told the commission the decision to launch the scheme so quickly was "set by the cabinet". Arbib clarified that by saying he meant the prime minister. | Arbib had earlier told the commission the decision to launch the scheme so quickly was "set by the cabinet". Arbib clarified that by saying he meant the prime minister. |
| He laid the blame for his ignorance of key safety concerns at the feet of public servants. | He laid the blame for his ignorance of key safety concerns at the feet of public servants. |
| Arbib said the deaths of the four young men were the first inkling he had of the potential for danger. | Arbib said the deaths of the four young men were the first inkling he had of the potential for danger. |
| "Is it the fault of the public service for not telling you, your fault for not asking, or a combination of both?" Potts asked. | "Is it the fault of the public service for not telling you, your fault for not asking, or a combination of both?" Potts asked. |
| Arbib replied he was not an expert on electrical installations, and had not had an in-depth meeting on the issue. | Arbib replied he was not an expert on electrical installations, and had not had an in-depth meeting on the issue. |
| He said the government was relying on advice from the office of the co-ordinator general and the environment department. | He said the government was relying on advice from the office of the co-ordinator general and the environment department. |
| "We should have been advised about electrocution …" | "We should have been advised about electrocution …" |
| "Their fault?" interjected Potts. | "Their fault?" interjected Potts. |
| "We should have been advised, yes,” said Arbib. | "We should have been advised, yes,” said Arbib. |
| Family members of a number of the young men killed were in the Brisbane magistrate’s court. | Family members of a number of the young men killed were in the Brisbane magistrate’s court. |
| "When did you first discover that this policy was killing people?" asked Potts. | "When did you first discover that this policy was killing people?" asked Potts. |
| Arbib replied: "After the first death. | Arbib replied: "After the first death. |
| "I checked with my staff what was the next step, what was the government going to do, and I was informed that [the former environment minister Peter] Garrett had already spoken to the prime minister and they were working on the issue." | "I checked with my staff what was the next step, what was the government going to do, and I was informed that [the former environment minister Peter] Garrett had already spoken to the prime minister and they were working on the issue." |
| When asked why he didn't question being left out of the loop, Arbib said they were "all in shock at the time". | When asked why he didn't question being left out of the loop, Arbib said they were "all in shock at the time". |
| Arbib's cross-examination on Tuesday continued from a full day of questioning on Monday, when he told the commission he had never been warned of the dangers of the scheme, and did not have decision-making powers. | Arbib's cross-examination on Tuesday continued from a full day of questioning on Monday, when he told the commission he had never been warned of the dangers of the scheme, and did not have decision-making powers. |
| Arbib said Garrett was in charge of the scheme, and his role was simply to sell it. | Arbib said Garrett was in charge of the scheme, and his role was simply to sell it. |
| "I didn't have any decision-making role in terms of the HIP [home insulation program]," Arbib said. "I was working with the co-ordinator general's office." | "I didn't have any decision-making role in terms of the HIP [home insulation program]," Arbib said. "I was working with the co-ordinator general's office." |
| Arbib told the commission he had little contact with Garrett, but did have occasional phone calls with Rudd during the early stages of the scheme. | Arbib told the commission he had little contact with Garrett, but did have occasional phone calls with Rudd during the early stages of the scheme. |
| Five months before the roll-out, an industry meeting – reportedly attended by members of the department of prime minister and cabinet and the environment department – raised the deaths of three New Zealanders in similar circumstances in 2007. | Five months before the roll-out, an industry meeting – reportedly attended by members of the department of prime minister and cabinet and the environment department – raised the deaths of three New Zealanders in similar circumstances in 2007. |
| Arbib told the commission he was never aware of the deaths, and "if I had been advised I would have been ringing alarm bells". | Arbib told the commission he was never aware of the deaths, and "if I had been advised I would have been ringing alarm bells". |
| However, when asked if he rang alarm bells after the death of Fuller just months into the scheme, Arbib admitted he did not, instead telling the commission he understood Garrett and Rudd were dealing with it. | However, when asked if he rang alarm bells after the death of Fuller just months into the scheme, Arbib admitted he did not, instead telling the commission he understood Garrett and Rudd were dealing with it. |
| He said the prospect of deaths or injuries was never mentioned in the lead-up to the scheme, but "there was definitely a need for some sort of OH&S training". | He said the prospect of deaths or injuries was never mentioned in the lead-up to the scheme, but "there was definitely a need for some sort of OH&S training". |
| Counsel suggested each of the matters were known at the time and should have been considered in the first half of 2009. Arbib said a number of them were considered but the measures put in place were not adequate. | |
| Garrett was due to appear on Tuesday afternoon. | Garrett was due to appear on Tuesday afternoon. |
| Garrett was demoted and had his portfolio taken from him amid calls for his resignation after the roll-out. | Garrett was demoted and had his portfolio taken from him amid calls for his resignation after the roll-out. |
| Rudd is slated to appear on Wednesday. The commission continues in Brisbane. | Rudd is slated to appear on Wednesday. The commission continues in Brisbane. |