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Forget Facebook, Bring Back Samizdat Forget Facebook, Bring Back Samizdat
(about 17 hours later)
Russia’s opposition activists are a dejected and fractured lot these days.Russia’s opposition activists are a dejected and fractured lot these days.
In February, Vladimir V. Putin passed a law making it possible to shut down any website at will — snuffing out the online presence of Alexei Navalny, the Kremlin’s biggest foe, overnight. Last week, Mr. Putin approved legislation that takes aim at all future Navalnys. The “Bloggers Law” forces the owners of any website receiving more than 3,000 visitors per day to register with the government, forfeit anonymity, and become legally responsible for the factual accuracy of their content.In February, Vladimir V. Putin passed a law making it possible to shut down any website at will — snuffing out the online presence of Alexei Navalny, the Kremlin’s biggest foe, overnight. Last week, Mr. Putin approved legislation that takes aim at all future Navalnys. The “Bloggers Law” forces the owners of any website receiving more than 3,000 visitors per day to register with the government, forfeit anonymity, and become legally responsible for the factual accuracy of their content.
It looks as if the Internet — one of the country’s last remaining enclaves for free speech — isn’t going to be available for much longer.It looks as if the Internet — one of the country’s last remaining enclaves for free speech — isn’t going to be available for much longer.
Political debate in Russia has found a home on Western-owned and run platforms like Facebook and Twitter. But these sites function at Mr. Putin’s pleasure and the new law also mandates that they maintain electronic records on Russian soil of everything posted over the previous six months, presumably so the government can peruse them. The Russian Internet may well be headed the way of China’s.Political debate in Russia has found a home on Western-owned and run platforms like Facebook and Twitter. But these sites function at Mr. Putin’s pleasure and the new law also mandates that they maintain electronic records on Russian soil of everything posted over the previous six months, presumably so the government can peruse them. The Russian Internet may well be headed the way of China’s.
But the history of Russian dissidence is long, and if the Internet ceases to be an open and uncensored space, there is another medium that activists can and should look back to for inspiration and perhaps a more effective alternative: samizdat.But the history of Russian dissidence is long, and if the Internet ceases to be an open and uncensored space, there is another medium that activists can and should look back to for inspiration and perhaps a more effective alternative: samizdat.
This decidedly pre-digital form flourished during the last 20 years of the Cold War, acting as the connective tissue that held together dissidents in Moscow, Leningrad and far-flung parts of the Soviet Union. From subversive writing to reprinted material from the West, it was hand-typed on carbon paper, disseminated by hand and then copied out again.This decidedly pre-digital form flourished during the last 20 years of the Cold War, acting as the connective tissue that held together dissidents in Moscow, Leningrad and far-flung parts of the Soviet Union. From subversive writing to reprinted material from the West, it was hand-typed on carbon paper, disseminated by hand and then copied out again.
As a medium, the Internet dwarfs samizdat’s scale and speed. But because it was more discrete, samizdat was much harder for the government to shut down. And being more difficult to produce and disseminate it fostered a dissident community that was smaller but more cohesive and resilient. As a medium, the Internet dwarfs samizdat’s scale and speed. But because it was more discreet, samizdat was much harder for the government to shut down. And being more difficult to produce and disseminate it fostered a dissident community that was smaller but more cohesive and resilient.
Take the example of the Chronicle of Current Events (or Khronika in Russian), one of the most important samizdat journals. Started in 1968 by a group of Moscow dissidents, it survived for 15 years and 64 issues despite the serial arrests of its editors. It quickly became a wide-ranging regular catalogue of human and civil rights violations across the Soviet Union.Take the example of the Chronicle of Current Events (or Khronika in Russian), one of the most important samizdat journals. Started in 1968 by a group of Moscow dissidents, it survived for 15 years and 64 issues despite the serial arrests of its editors. It quickly became a wide-ranging regular catalogue of human and civil rights violations across the Soviet Union.
Khronika always had one editor in Moscow – the first was Natalya Gorbanevskaya until she was arrested in 1969 and sent to a psychiatric institution. That editor acted as the hub of a giant network with circuits spreading throughout the Soviet Union. Each new issue consisted of several typed out copies that would then pass from person to person, with new copies made along the way. But the network did not just disseminate information. It also funneled news back to Moscow.Khronika always had one editor in Moscow – the first was Natalya Gorbanevskaya until she was arrested in 1969 and sent to a psychiatric institution. That editor acted as the hub of a giant network with circuits spreading throughout the Soviet Union. Each new issue consisted of several typed out copies that would then pass from person to person, with new copies made along the way. But the network did not just disseminate information. It also funneled news back to Moscow.
In the fifth issue of Khronika, in late 1968, Ms. Gorbanevskaya added this anonymous note: “Anybody who is interested in seeing that the Soviet public is informed about what goes on in the country may easily pass on information to the editors of Khronika. Simply tell it to the person from whom you received Khronika, and he will tell the person from whom he received Khronika, and so on. But do not try to trace back the whole chain of communication yourself, or else you will be taken for a police informer.”In the fifth issue of Khronika, in late 1968, Ms. Gorbanevskaya added this anonymous note: “Anybody who is interested in seeing that the Soviet public is informed about what goes on in the country may easily pass on information to the editors of Khronika. Simply tell it to the person from whom you received Khronika, and he will tell the person from whom he received Khronika, and so on. But do not try to trace back the whole chain of communication yourself, or else you will be taken for a police informer.”
Khronika became a pastiche of material, arriving from as far as Simferopol and Perm, and covering small incidents like teachers being fired for assigning a banned book to reproducing clandestine transcripts from political trials. Like today’s encryption software — Tor comes to mind — every person in the chain knew only the person who gave the information to him and the person to whom he was passing it along. Though the K.G.B. frequently caught editors by tracing back typed documents to the typewriters that produced them, the individual nodes in the network were fairly protected, making it almost impossible to follow any particular violation to its source.Khronika became a pastiche of material, arriving from as far as Simferopol and Perm, and covering small incidents like teachers being fired for assigning a banned book to reproducing clandestine transcripts from political trials. Like today’s encryption software — Tor comes to mind — every person in the chain knew only the person who gave the information to him and the person to whom he was passing it along. Though the K.G.B. frequently caught editors by tracing back typed documents to the typewriters that produced them, the individual nodes in the network were fairly protected, making it almost impossible to follow any particular violation to its source.
Samizdat demanded discipline. Putting together an issue of Khronika was tedious and dangerous work. But it was a process that in itself helped form citizens with the confidence to hold their government accountable in a country in which such challenges to power were almost unheard of.Samizdat demanded discipline. Putting together an issue of Khronika was tedious and dangerous work. But it was a process that in itself helped form citizens with the confidence to hold their government accountable in a country in which such challenges to power were almost unheard of.
Of course, in 2014, it’s hard to imagine activists switching from Facebook and blog posts to stapled together sheaves of paper. Doing so would be to engage in pointless nostalgia — for one thing you’d need lots of computers that had never been connected to the Internet.Of course, in 2014, it’s hard to imagine activists switching from Facebook and blog posts to stapled together sheaves of paper. Doing so would be to engage in pointless nostalgia — for one thing you’d need lots of computers that had never been connected to the Internet.
But there are ways to recreate the closed, smaller, more secure networks that characterized samizdat using today’s technology. Activists from China to Syria have long mastered the use of encryption software and Virtual Private Networks that bounce IP addresses all over the world in order to mask Internet activity. These VPNs can also be used to create protected forums for conversation. Applications like Cryptocat and Off-the-Record Messaging allow for groups to communicate privately through the use of authentication and encryption software. And then there’s the creative use of external hard drives and USB sticks, in which a drive is “dead dropped” in a secret location and individuals can surreptitiously upload or download information.But there are ways to recreate the closed, smaller, more secure networks that characterized samizdat using today’s technology. Activists from China to Syria have long mastered the use of encryption software and Virtual Private Networks that bounce IP addresses all over the world in order to mask Internet activity. These VPNs can also be used to create protected forums for conversation. Applications like Cryptocat and Off-the-Record Messaging allow for groups to communicate privately through the use of authentication and encryption software. And then there’s the creative use of external hard drives and USB sticks, in which a drive is “dead dropped” in a secret location and individuals can surreptitiously upload or download information.
But is there anything to be gained by setting aside the megaphone of the open Internet for the whispered conversation of the underground? The question demands first that we understand what social media is good for when it comes to political change. The popular perception is that platforms like Facebook or websites like Mr. Navalny’s are primarily tools that allow for coordinating protest on a massive scale — and they certainly are. It’s this capacity of the Internet that clearly worries Mr. Putin most.But is there anything to be gained by setting aside the megaphone of the open Internet for the whispered conversation of the underground? The question demands first that we understand what social media is good for when it comes to political change. The popular perception is that platforms like Facebook or websites like Mr. Navalny’s are primarily tools that allow for coordinating protest on a massive scale — and they certainly are. It’s this capacity of the Internet that clearly worries Mr. Putin most.
But social media can also play a critical role in a lower-profile process: incubation. It can be a space for individuals, sometimes anonymously, to egg each other on and test out oppositional identities and ideas. It’s where new ways and habits of thinking are formed. This is exactly what Khronika did. It allowed a form of participatory citizenship to incubate under an authoritarian regime.But social media can also play a critical role in a lower-profile process: incubation. It can be a space for individuals, sometimes anonymously, to egg each other on and test out oppositional identities and ideas. It’s where new ways and habits of thinking are formed. This is exactly what Khronika did. It allowed a form of participatory citizenship to incubate under an authoritarian regime.
Mr. Putin wants to shut down this incubation function, too. But as Soviet dissidents showed, incubation didn’t need the open Internet. It can happen through samizdat or letters or zines – and also when activists create private networks where they can talk with one another more discretely. Soon, today’s dissidents might not have a choice about how they communicate — and these constraints may even be good for them.Mr. Putin wants to shut down this incubation function, too. But as Soviet dissidents showed, incubation didn’t need the open Internet. It can happen through samizdat or letters or zines – and also when activists create private networks where they can talk with one another more discretely. Soon, today’s dissidents might not have a choice about how they communicate — and these constraints may even be good for them.
Switching from a medium that facilitates staging huge protests to one that allows an opposition to build strength and develop a viable alternative might be just what’s needed. And for that, it’s worth remembering what typewriters and paper can do.Switching from a medium that facilitates staging huge protests to one that allows an opposition to build strength and develop a viable alternative might be just what’s needed. And for that, it’s worth remembering what typewriters and paper can do.
Gal Beckerman is the author of “When They Come for Us, We’ll Be Gone: The Epic Struggle to Save Soviet Jewry,” and is currently working on a history of social media before the Internet.Gal Beckerman is the author of “When They Come for Us, We’ll Be Gone: The Epic Struggle to Save Soviet Jewry,” and is currently working on a history of social media before the Internet.