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| To a Philosopher-General in Israel, Peace Is the Time to Prepare for War | To a Philosopher-General in Israel, Peace Is the Time to Prepare for War |
| (about 9 hours later) | |
| ON THE ISRAEL-LEBANON BORDER | ON THE ISRAEL-LEBANON BORDER |
| When he arrived here two years ago to command the Israel Defense Forces in the northern Galilee region, Brig. Gen. Herzl Halevi was certain that Israel’s next war with Lebanon would break out on his watch. As General Halevi prepares to leave his post on Nov. 28, he is even more convinced it will happen during his successor’s tour. | When he arrived here two years ago to command the Israel Defense Forces in the northern Galilee region, Brig. Gen. Herzl Halevi was certain that Israel’s next war with Lebanon would break out on his watch. As General Halevi prepares to leave his post on Nov. 28, he is even more convinced it will happen during his successor’s tour. |
| “I don’t think there is the war or the operation that will solve the problem,” General Halevi explained during a recent tour of the border his troops patrol. “The interesting issue is how you create a longer gap between the wars.” | “I don’t think there is the war or the operation that will solve the problem,” General Halevi explained during a recent tour of the border his troops patrol. “The interesting issue is how you create a longer gap between the wars.” |
| “It’s not going to be a simple one,” he added. “There are no simple wars. We are ready to pay this price to make a very decisive and strong war to make the gap as long as possible.” | “It’s not going to be a simple one,” he added. “There are no simple wars. We are ready to pay this price to make a very decisive and strong war to make the gap as long as possible.” |
| For all the hard-line talk from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders about the Iranian nuclear threat, the enemy that consumes the Israeli military is Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite militia with which it fought a bloody, 34-day battle in 2006. | For all the hard-line talk from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders about the Iranian nuclear threat, the enemy that consumes the Israeli military is Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite militia with which it fought a bloody, 34-day battle in 2006. |
| Hezbollah is seen as Iran’s proxy and the Palestinians’ enforcer, the boots on the ground in global terrorist attacks and the likeliest to retaliate for Israeli aggression anywhere in the world. Military officials from the chief of staff on down talk ominously in public speeches and tactically in private briefings about the group’s swelling arsenal of more than 100,000 rockets — and about Israel’s meticulous preparation for a quick, intense campaign in Lebanese cities and villages where, as one recently put it, “houses consist of a living room and a missile room.” | Hezbollah is seen as Iran’s proxy and the Palestinians’ enforcer, the boots on the ground in global terrorist attacks and the likeliest to retaliate for Israeli aggression anywhere in the world. Military officials from the chief of staff on down talk ominously in public speeches and tactically in private briefings about the group’s swelling arsenal of more than 100,000 rockets — and about Israel’s meticulous preparation for a quick, intense campaign in Lebanese cities and villages where, as one recently put it, “houses consist of a living room and a missile room.” |
| The point of that particular spear has lately been General Halevi, 45, a triathlete and father of four who said his university studies in philosophy proved more salient to military leadership than courses in business administration. Considered a top candidate to someday lead the military as chief of staff, General Halevi is a former paratrooper and commander of the elite Sayeret Matkal reconnaissance unit who last year declined an offer to become Mr. Netanyahu’s military attaché. | The point of that particular spear has lately been General Halevi, 45, a triathlete and father of four who said his university studies in philosophy proved more salient to military leadership than courses in business administration. Considered a top candidate to someday lead the military as chief of staff, General Halevi is a former paratrooper and commander of the elite Sayeret Matkal reconnaissance unit who last year declined an offer to become Mr. Netanyahu’s military attaché. |
| In 2002, during the second Palestinian intifada, the concerns General Halevi raised about a planned operation to capture Yasir Arafat, then president of the Palestinian Authority, from its headquarters in Ramallah, where Mr. Arafat was under siege, led to its cancellation. He is admired as a creative thinker and beloved for attending annual memorials for fallen soldiers. Some, though, find him aloof, square or self-righteous, with a quiet leadership style that can befuddle young recruits. | In 2002, during the second Palestinian intifada, the concerns General Halevi raised about a planned operation to capture Yasir Arafat, then president of the Palestinian Authority, from its headquarters in Ramallah, where Mr. Arafat was under siege, led to its cancellation. He is admired as a creative thinker and beloved for attending annual memorials for fallen soldiers. Some, though, find him aloof, square or self-righteous, with a quiet leadership style that can befuddle young recruits. |
| “People used to tell me that business administration is for the practical life and philosophy is for the spirit,” General Halevi said. “Through the years I found it is exactly the opposite — I used philosophy much more practically.” | “People used to tell me that business administration is for the practical life and philosophy is for the spirit,” General Halevi said. “Through the years I found it is exactly the opposite — I used philosophy much more practically.” |
| “Philosophers that spoke about how to balance, how to prioritize principles in a right way,” he added, citing Plato, Socrates and Maimonides. “This is something that I find very helpful.” | “Philosophers that spoke about how to balance, how to prioritize principles in a right way,” he added, citing Plato, Socrates and Maimonides. “This is something that I find very helpful.” |
| Standing at a border lookout on the Biranit base, his division headquarters, General Halevi pointed out Bint Jbeil, a city of perhaps 25,000 Shiites in southern Lebanon that endured some of the toughest battles in 2006, and, next to it, Maroun al-Ras, which he described as “a vacation village built by Iran” to hide a “post for monitoring what’s going on in Israel.” To the left was Ayta ash Sha’b, home to perhaps 7,000 Lebanese and “hundreds of rockets, missiles, I.E.D.s,” he said, referring to improvised explosive devices. | Standing at a border lookout on the Biranit base, his division headquarters, General Halevi pointed out Bint Jbeil, a city of perhaps 25,000 Shiites in southern Lebanon that endured some of the toughest battles in 2006, and, next to it, Maroun al-Ras, which he described as “a vacation village built by Iran” to hide a “post for monitoring what’s going on in Israel.” To the left was Ayta ash Sha’b, home to perhaps 7,000 Lebanese and “hundreds of rockets, missiles, I.E.D.s,” he said, referring to improvised explosive devices. |
| “We cannot shoot toward Ayta ash Sha’b because it is a village,” the general said. “This is a problem we somehow have to solve. The stronger the weapons, the stronger our response will be.” | “We cannot shoot toward Ayta ash Sha’b because it is a village,” the general said. “This is a problem we somehow have to solve. The stronger the weapons, the stronger our response will be.” |
| He is responsible for a 75-mile border known as the “blue line” for the color of the barrels that mark the 2,700-square-mile area that has been patrolled by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon since 1978. Israel’s side is protected by a high-tech fence and countless cameras, but is still seen as porous: Part of the adjacent road is unpaved so troops can track footprints. | He is responsible for a 75-mile border known as the “blue line” for the color of the barrels that mark the 2,700-square-mile area that has been patrolled by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon since 1978. Israel’s side is protected by a high-tech fence and countless cameras, but is still seen as porous: Part of the adjacent road is unpaved so troops can track footprints. |
| An M-16 rifle at his feet, General Halevi drove to the spot where two soldiers — Sgt. Eldad Regev and Sgt. Ehud Goldwasser — were abducted, and said simply, “July 12, 2006, 8:30 a.m.” | An M-16 rifle at his feet, General Halevi drove to the spot where two soldiers — Sgt. Eldad Regev and Sgt. Ehud Goldwasser — were abducted, and said simply, “July 12, 2006, 8:30 a.m.” |
| “Hezbollah was here on two sides, on the left in the bushes and just in front of us on that ridge,” he said. “When the patrol got to the road just beneath us, they opened fire.” | “Hezbollah was here on two sides, on the left in the bushes and just in front of us on that ridge,” he said. “When the patrol got to the road just beneath us, they opened fire.” |
| The first Israeli vehicle was attacked with machine guns, the second with a missile. Then, the general said, the enemy used explosives to blow through the fence and an iron gate. “Here started the Second Lebanon War,” he added. | The first Israeli vehicle was attacked with machine guns, the second with a missile. Then, the general said, the enemy used explosives to blow through the fence and an iron gate. “Here started the Second Lebanon War,” he added. |
| Israel’s prosecution of that war was widely panned. General Halevi, who was commanding a brigade in the West Bank at the time, said preparations for the next round began immediately afterward, with the continuous development of a thick book — he declined to share it, of course — of operational plans, though he said the chance that they would be carried out exactly was “pretty low.” | Israel’s prosecution of that war was widely panned. General Halevi, who was commanding a brigade in the West Bank at the time, said preparations for the next round began immediately afterward, with the continuous development of a thick book — he declined to share it, of course — of operational plans, though he said the chance that they would be carried out exactly was “pretty low.” |
| General Halevi was named for an uncle, also a paratrooper, who was killed the day Israel recaptured the Western Wall during the 1967 war. His mother’s family goes back 14 generations in Jerusalem; his father’s parents immigrated from Russia. He grew up religious and still attends synagogue on the Sabbath, but he no longer wears a skullcap daily. | General Halevi was named for an uncle, also a paratrooper, who was killed the day Israel recaptured the Western Wall during the 1967 war. His mother’s family goes back 14 generations in Jerusalem; his father’s parents immigrated from Russia. He grew up religious and still attends synagogue on the Sabbath, but he no longer wears a skullcap daily. |
| He did not plan a military career, but decided to stay after his mandatory service “as long as it is important for the state of Israel, as long as I think I do it in a good way, and as long as it is interesting for me.” So far, 27 years. | He did not plan a military career, but decided to stay after his mandatory service “as long as it is important for the state of Israel, as long as I think I do it in a good way, and as long as it is interesting for me.” So far, 27 years. |
| Col. Avi Bluth, one of his battalion commanders during Israel’s 2008-9 Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, said General Halevi, known as Herzi, was “smarter than most of the officers in the Israeli Army,” humble and as likely to talk about history, philosophy or the Bible as “about how to beat the enemy.” | Col. Avi Bluth, one of his battalion commanders during Israel’s 2008-9 Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, said General Halevi, known as Herzi, was “smarter than most of the officers in the Israeli Army,” humble and as likely to talk about history, philosophy or the Bible as “about how to beat the enemy.” |
| The colonel added, “He doesn’t think that all the truth is with him.” | The colonel added, “He doesn’t think that all the truth is with him.” |
| Some who have served with him say General Halevi struggles to connect with soldiers. “He’s not a man of men, he is not the center of the party, and there are voices saying that he’s too complicated,” said one former colleague, speaking on the condition of anonymity in order to do so frankly. “He is too political, too much involved with who will be nominated to where, and not all the considerations were only professional. Some of it was, ‘Does he belong to my tribe or not?’ ” | |
| Lior Lotan, a fellow squadron commander in Sayeret Matkal in the 1990s, praised General Halevi’s later warning that the proposed Arafat operation might harm or kill the Palestinian leader and cause a diplomatic disaster. “This is not easy for a commander of a unit to do because you are judged only by your manner of running forward,” noted Mr. Lotan, now a businessman and lecturer at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya. “The fact that he put it on the table, he was only a lieutenant colonel, is something which is not usual. It’s a real maturity, it’s a real risk.” | |
| Next, General Halevi will run the Staff and Command College, a must-stop for Israel’s senior officers. He will be training them in large part for the next war with Hezbollah, which he imagines could start in one of three ways: a terrorist attack like the bombing of an Israeli tour bus in Bulgaria that killed six last summer, only “something maybe a little bigger”; a deterioration in the Syrian civil war; or an Israeli strike if Hezbollah managed to smuggle chemical weapons from Syria into Lebanon. | Next, General Halevi will run the Staff and Command College, a must-stop for Israel’s senior officers. He will be training them in large part for the next war with Hezbollah, which he imagines could start in one of three ways: a terrorist attack like the bombing of an Israeli tour bus in Bulgaria that killed six last summer, only “something maybe a little bigger”; a deterioration in the Syrian civil war; or an Israeli strike if Hezbollah managed to smuggle chemical weapons from Syria into Lebanon. |
| “As a commander, our mission is not to calculate the probability,” he said. “Our mission is to understand that the probability is high enough to be prepared for very well.” | “As a commander, our mission is not to calculate the probability,” he said. “Our mission is to understand that the probability is high enough to be prepared for very well.” |
This article has been revised to reflect the following correction: | |
| Correction: November 16, 2013 | |
An earlier version of this article misspelled the name of a fellow squadron commander of Brig. Gen. Herzl Halevi’s in the 1990s who is now a businessman and lecturer at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya. He is Lior Lotan, not Lion Lator. |