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Menezes police 'poorly briefed' Menezes police 'poorly briefed'
(about 3 hours later)
Firearms officers who shot Jean Charles de Menezes thought he had to be stopped "at any cost" because they were not properly briefed, a court has heard.Firearms officers who shot Jean Charles de Menezes thought he had to be stopped "at any cost" because they were not properly briefed, a court has heard.
An Old Bailey jury heard the Brazilian died because of "obvious confusion" between police tracking him in 2005.An Old Bailey jury heard the Brazilian died because of "obvious confusion" between police tracking him in 2005.
Clare Montgomery, prosecuting, said commanders did "too little, much, much too late" to brief armed officers.Clare Montgomery, prosecuting, said commanders did "too little, much, much too late" to brief armed officers.
But the Met's defence lawyer said the prosecution had misunderstood "the whole situation".
The Metropolitan Police denies breaking health and safety laws when it mistook Mr de Menezes for a suicide bomber.The Metropolitan Police denies breaking health and safety laws when it mistook Mr de Menezes for a suicide bomber.
Completing the prosecution's opening statement in the unprecedented trial, Ms Montgomery said there was evidence that the firearms teams assumed that whoever was followed would be their target.Completing the prosecution's opening statement in the unprecedented trial, Ms Montgomery said there was evidence that the firearms teams assumed that whoever was followed would be their target.
She said this meant that as they approached Mr de Menezes in the Tube carriage at Stockwell station on 22 July, they were prepared to shoot because of the risk they understood him to pose.She said this meant that as they approached Mr de Menezes in the Tube carriage at Stockwell station on 22 July, they were prepared to shoot because of the risk they understood him to pose.
In fact, she told the court, inconsistent and unconfirmed reports combined with confusion in the control room meant that nobody knew the identity of Jean Charles de Menezes.In fact, she told the court, inconsistent and unconfirmed reports combined with confusion in the control room meant that nobody knew the identity of Jean Charles de Menezes.
'Up for it''Up for it'
On the opening day of the trial, the jury heard that police investigating the failed suicide attacks of 21 July had linked one of the bombers, Hussain Osman, to the same block of flats where Mr de Menezes lived.On the opening day of the trial, the jury heard that police investigating the failed suicide attacks of 21 July had linked one of the bombers, Hussain Osman, to the same block of flats where Mr de Menezes lived.
All that stood between London and the bombers thought to be at 21 Scotia Road were the untrained and sometimes unarmed surveillance officers Clare Montgomery, prosecutingAll that stood between London and the bombers thought to be at 21 Scotia Road were the untrained and sometimes unarmed surveillance officers Clare Montgomery, prosecuting
But the court was told that when Mr de Menezes set off the following morning, surveillance officers could not confirm if he was their target or simply an innocent commuter.But the court was told that when Mr de Menezes set off the following morning, surveillance officers could not confirm if he was their target or simply an innocent commuter.
At the same time, firearms officers had been separately told they should expect to find a suspect bomber "up for it" and would need to deploy "unusual tactics", lawyers said.At the same time, firearms officers had been separately told they should expect to find a suspect bomber "up for it" and would need to deploy "unusual tactics", lawyers said.
The court heard that officers understood the suspect, once identified and followed, had to be stopped "at any cost" from entering the public transport system.The court heard that officers understood the suspect, once identified and followed, had to be stopped "at any cost" from entering the public transport system.
And they took this briefing to mean they would need to consider killing the suspect on sight, rather than use standard tactics to wound or corner a suspect.And they took this briefing to mean they would need to consider killing the suspect on sight, rather than use standard tactics to wound or corner a suspect.
Ms Montgomery told the court that despite a clear strategy having been decided by a Scotland Yard commander and written up clearly on the operations room's white board, this was not properly passed on to either the surveillance or firearms teams.Ms Montgomery told the court that despite a clear strategy having been decided by a Scotland Yard commander and written up clearly on the operations room's white board, this was not properly passed on to either the surveillance or firearms teams.
The firearms officers appeared to be even more in the dark because of a "simply inexplicable" four-hour delay between the plan being launched and their teams reaching the location, she said.The firearms officers appeared to be even more in the dark because of a "simply inexplicable" four-hour delay between the plan being launched and their teams reaching the location, she said.
"There was obvious confusion from the outset between the three groups of officers - those in the operations room, the surveillance officers and the firearms officers," said Ms Montgomery."There was obvious confusion from the outset between the three groups of officers - those in the operations room, the surveillance officers and the firearms officers," said Ms Montgomery.
When one of the surveillance officers tried to clarify what they should do if forced to "contain" the suspect, "all he got was a shrug of the shoulders", she said.When one of the surveillance officers tried to clarify what they should do if forced to "contain" the suspect, "all he got was a shrug of the shoulders", she said.
"All that stood between London and the bombers thought to be at 21 Scotia Road were the untrained and sometimes unarmed surveillance officers."
'Head bobbing''Head bobbing'
Ms Montgomery said that such was the confusion in the station that one firearms officer, codenamed William, chased the Tube driver into the tunnel.Ms Montgomery said that such was the confusion in the station that one firearms officer, codenamed William, chased the Tube driver into the tunnel.
"He saw a figure running away and thought it was a second member of the cell," Ms Montgomery told the court. "He went after him and shouted 'armed police'. He put a light on and could see his head bobbing about. He had his finger on the trigger," Ms Montgomery told the court.
"He went after him and shouted 'armed police'. He put a light on and could see his head bobbing about. He had his finger on the trigger.
"The figure moved out and put his hands up. The driver explained he had nearly electrocuted himself and would never drive again.""The figure moved out and put his hands up. The driver explained he had nearly electrocuted himself and would never drive again."
In his opening defence statement Ronald Thwaites QC said death was a serious mistake, but not a crime.
The prosecution have started with the benefit of hindsight - and hindsight turns everyone into a brilliant problem solver Ronald Thwaites QC
He described the prosecution case as relying on the benefit of hindsight.
The reality, he said, was that police chasing the 21 July suicide bombers were facing unprecedented challenges.
The prosecution completely failed to understand these challenges, Mr Thwaites said.
"The prosecution are attempting to dictate to the police how they should be doing their job and they are doing so from a position of near ignorance.
"It would have the effect of putting handcuffs on the police and seriously impede their effectiveness in combating serious crime."
Crisis situation
Mr Thwaites said in the days after the 7 July suicide bombings police were facing an unprecedented threat to London.
Scotland Yard's terrorism hotline had received 3,900 tip-offs in a "rapidly developing" picture, he added.
This meant that when commanders had linked the bombers to the block of flats, the very best they could have done had been to outline "preliminary" tactics rather than fixed rules of how to apprehend such dangerous people, said Mr Thwaites.
"The prosecution have misconstrued the whole situation and misunderstood it.
"The prosecution have started with the benefit of hindsight - and hindsight turns everyone into a brilliant problem solver."
Unpredictable actions
Mr Thwaites said none of the commanders, surveillance teams and armed units could have predicted how a potential suicide bomber would act.
So when Mr de Menezes had been labelled a suspect, officers had feared an immediate arrest could alert other bombers still inside, leading them to blow up the entire block.
"A serious mistake was made in shooting him," said Mr Thwaites. "But not every mistake is a crime."
The case continues.The case continues.