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| 40 Years After War, Israel Weighs Remaining Risks | |
| (35 minutes later) | |
| JERUSALEM — It was 1 p.m. on Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973, the day of Yom Kippur, the holiest in the Jewish calendar, and Israel’s military intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Eli Zeira, had called in the country’s top military journalists for an urgent briefing. | JERUSALEM — It was 1 p.m. on Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973, the day of Yom Kippur, the holiest in the Jewish calendar, and Israel’s military intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Eli Zeira, had called in the country’s top military journalists for an urgent briefing. |
| “He told us that war would break out at sundown, about 6 p.m.,” said Nachman Shai, who was then the military affairs correspondent for Israel’s public television channel and is now a Labor member of Parliament. “Forty minutes later he was handed a note and said, ‘Gentlemen, the war broke out,’ and he left the room.” | “He told us that war would break out at sundown, about 6 p.m.,” said Nachman Shai, who was then the military affairs correspondent for Israel’s public television channel and is now a Labor member of Parliament. “Forty minutes later he was handed a note and said, ‘Gentlemen, the war broke out,’ and he left the room.” |
| Moments before that note arrived, according to someone else who was at that meeting, General Zeira had been carefully peeling almonds in a bowl of ice water. | Moments before that note arrived, according to someone else who was at that meeting, General Zeira had been carefully peeling almonds in a bowl of ice water. |
| The coordinated attack by Egypt and Syria, which were bent on regaining strategic territories and pride lost to Israel in the 1967 war, surprised and traumatized Israel. For months, its leaders misread the signals and wrongly assumed that Israel’s enemies were not ready to attack. | The coordinated attack by Egypt and Syria, which were bent on regaining strategic territories and pride lost to Israel in the 1967 war, surprised and traumatized Israel. For months, its leaders misread the signals and wrongly assumed that Israel’s enemies were not ready to attack. |
| Even in those final hours, when the signs were unmistakable that a conflict was imminent, Israel was misled by false intelligence about when it would start. As the country’s military hurriedly called up its reserves and struggled for days to contain, then repel, the joint assault, a sense of doom spread through the country. Many feared a catastrophe. | Even in those final hours, when the signs were unmistakable that a conflict was imminent, Israel was misled by false intelligence about when it would start. As the country’s military hurriedly called up its reserves and struggled for days to contain, then repel, the joint assault, a sense of doom spread through the country. Many feared a catastrophe. |
| Forty years later, Israel is again marking Yom Kippur, which falls on Saturday, the anniversary of the 1973 war according to the Hebrew calendar. This year the holy day comes in the shadow of new regional tensions and a decision by the United States to opt, at least for now, for a diplomatic agreement rather than a military strike against Syria in response to a deadly chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on Aug. 21. | Forty years later, Israel is again marking Yom Kippur, which falls on Saturday, the anniversary of the 1973 war according to the Hebrew calendar. This year the holy day comes in the shadow of new regional tensions and a decision by the United States to opt, at least for now, for a diplomatic agreement rather than a military strike against Syria in response to a deadly chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on Aug. 21. |
| Israeli newspapers and television and radio programs have been filled with recollections of the 1973 war, even as the country’s leaders have insisted that the probability of any new Israeli entanglement remains low and that the population should carry on as normal. For some people here, though, the echoes of the past have stirred latent questions about the reliability of intelligence assessments and the risks of another surprise attack. | Israeli newspapers and television and radio programs have been filled with recollections of the 1973 war, even as the country’s leaders have insisted that the probability of any new Israeli entanglement remains low and that the population should carry on as normal. For some people here, though, the echoes of the past have stirred latent questions about the reliability of intelligence assessments and the risks of another surprise attack. |
| “Any Israeli with a 40-year perspective will have doubts,” said Mr. Shai, who was the military’s chief spokesman during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, when Israelis huddled in sealed rooms and donned gas masks, shocked once again as Iraqi Scud missiles slammed into the heart of Tel Aviv. | “Any Israeli with a 40-year perspective will have doubts,” said Mr. Shai, who was the military’s chief spokesman during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, when Israelis huddled in sealed rooms and donned gas masks, shocked once again as Iraqi Scud missiles slammed into the heart of Tel Aviv. |
| Coming after the euphoria of Israel’s victory in the 1967 war, when six days of fighting against the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian Armies left Israel in control of the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, the conflicts of 1973, 1991 and later years have scarred the national psyche. | Coming after the euphoria of Israel’s victory in the 1967 war, when six days of fighting against the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian Armies left Israel in control of the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, the conflicts of 1973, 1991 and later years have scarred the national psyche. |
| But several former security officials and analysts said that while the risks now may be similar to those of past years in some respects, there are also major differences. | But several former security officials and analysts said that while the risks now may be similar to those of past years in some respects, there are also major differences. |
| In 1991, for example, the United States responded to the Iraqi attack by hastily redeploying some Patriot antimissile batteries to Israel from Europe, but the batteries failed to intercept a single Iraqi Scud, tracking them instead — and following them to the ground with a thud. | In 1991, for example, the United States responded to the Iraqi attack by hastily redeploying some Patriot antimissile batteries to Israel from Europe, but the batteries failed to intercept a single Iraqi Scud, tracking them instead — and following them to the ground with a thud. |
| Since then, Israel and the United States have invested billions of dollars in Israel’s air defenses, with the Arrow, Patriot and Iron Dome systems now honed to intercept short-, medium- and longer-range rockets and missiles. | Since then, Israel and the United States have invested billions of dollars in Israel’s air defenses, with the Arrow, Patriot and Iron Dome systems now honed to intercept short-, medium- and longer-range rockets and missiles. |
| Israelis, conditioned by subsequent conflicts with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza and by numerous domestic drills, have become accustomed to the wail of sirens and the idea of rocket attacks. | Israelis, conditioned by subsequent conflicts with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza and by numerous domestic drills, have become accustomed to the wail of sirens and the idea of rocket attacks. |
| But the country is less prepared for a major chemical attack, even though chemical weapons were used across its northern frontier, in Syria, less than a month ago, which led to a run on gas masks at distribution centers here. In what some people see as a new sign of government complacency at best and downright failure at worst, officials say there are enough protective kits for only 60 percent of the population, and supplies are dwindling fast. | But the country is less prepared for a major chemical attack, even though chemical weapons were used across its northern frontier, in Syria, less than a month ago, which led to a run on gas masks at distribution centers here. In what some people see as a new sign of government complacency at best and downright failure at worst, officials say there are enough protective kits for only 60 percent of the population, and supplies are dwindling fast. |
| Israeli security assessments rate the probability of any attack on Israel as low, and the chances of a chemical attack as next to zero. | Israeli security assessments rate the probability of any attack on Israel as low, and the chances of a chemical attack as next to zero. |
| In 1973, the failure of intelligence assessments about Egypt and Syria was twofold. They misjudged the countries’ intentions and miscalculated their military capabilities. | In 1973, the failure of intelligence assessments about Egypt and Syria was twofold. They misjudged the countries’ intentions and miscalculated their military capabilities. |
| “Our coverage — human intelligence, signals intelligence and other sorts — was second to none,” said Efraim Halevy, a former chief of Mossad, Israel’s national intelligence agency. “We thought we could initially contain any attack or repulse it within a couple of days. We wrongly assessed the capabilities of the Egyptians and the Syrians. In my opinion, that was the crucial failure.” | “Our coverage — human intelligence, signals intelligence and other sorts — was second to none,” said Efraim Halevy, a former chief of Mossad, Israel’s national intelligence agency. “We thought we could initially contain any attack or repulse it within a couple of days. We wrongly assessed the capabilities of the Egyptians and the Syrians. In my opinion, that was the crucial failure.” |
| Israel is in a different situation today, Mr. Halevy said. | Israel is in a different situation today, Mr. Halevy said. |
| The Syrian armed forces are depleted and focused on fighting their domestic battles, he said. The Egyptian Army is busy dealing with its internal turmoil, including a campaign against Islamic militants in Sinai. Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group, is heavily involved in aiding President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, while the Iranians, Mr. Halevy said, are not likely to want to give Israel a reason to strike them, “not as the aggressor but as a victim of an Iranian attack.” | The Syrian armed forces are depleted and focused on fighting their domestic battles, he said. The Egyptian Army is busy dealing with its internal turmoil, including a campaign against Islamic militants in Sinai. Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group, is heavily involved in aiding President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, while the Iranians, Mr. Halevy said, are not likely to want to give Israel a reason to strike them, “not as the aggressor but as a victim of an Iranian attack.” |
| Israel is also much less likely to suffer such a colossal failure in assessment, Mr. Halevy said. “We have plurality in the intelligence community, and people have learned to speak up,” he said. “The danger of a mistaken concept is still there, because we are human. But it is much more remote than before.” | Israel is also much less likely to suffer such a colossal failure in assessment, Mr. Halevy said. “We have plurality in the intelligence community, and people have learned to speak up,” he said. “The danger of a mistaken concept is still there, because we are human. But it is much more remote than before.” |
| Many analysts have attributed the failure of 1973 to arrogance. | Many analysts have attributed the failure of 1973 to arrogance. |
| “There was a disregarding of intelligence,” said Shlomo Avineri, a political scientist at Hebrew University and a director general of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the mid-1970s. | “There was a disregarding of intelligence,” said Shlomo Avineri, a political scientist at Hebrew University and a director general of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the mid-1970s. |
| “War is a maximization of uncertainties,” he said, adding that things never happen the same way twice, and that wars never end the way they are expected to. | “War is a maximization of uncertainties,” he said, adding that things never happen the same way twice, and that wars never end the way they are expected to. |
| Like most countries, Israel has been surprised by many events in recent years. The two Palestinian uprisings broke out unexpectedly, as did the Arab Spring and the two revolutions in Egypt. | Like most countries, Israel has been surprised by many events in recent years. The two Palestinian uprisings broke out unexpectedly, as did the Arab Spring and the two revolutions in Egypt. |
| “In 1973, logic said that Egypt and Syria would not attack, and for good reasons,” said Ephraim Kam, a strategic intelligence expert at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University who served for more than 20 years in military intelligence. “But there are always things we do not know.” | “In 1973, logic said that Egypt and Syria would not attack, and for good reasons,” said Ephraim Kam, a strategic intelligence expert at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University who served for more than 20 years in military intelligence. “But there are always things we do not know.” |
| Intelligence is always partial, Mr. Kam said, its gaps filled by logic and assessment. The problem, he said, is that “you cannot guarantee that the logic will fit with reality.” | Intelligence is always partial, Mr. Kam said, its gaps filled by logic and assessment. The problem, he said, is that “you cannot guarantee that the logic will fit with reality.” |
| In his recently published diaries from 1973, Uzi Eilam, a retired general, recalled the sounding of sirens at 2 p.m. on Yom Kippur and his rushing to the war headquarters. “Eli Zeira passed me, pale-faced,” he wrote, referring to the military intelligence chief, “and he said: ‘So it is starting after all. They are putting up planes.’ A fleeting glance told me that this was no longer the Eli Zeira who was so self-assured.” | In his recently published diaries from 1973, Uzi Eilam, a retired general, recalled the sounding of sirens at 2 p.m. on Yom Kippur and his rushing to the war headquarters. “Eli Zeira passed me, pale-faced,” he wrote, referring to the military intelligence chief, “and he said: ‘So it is starting after all. They are putting up planes.’ A fleeting glance told me that this was no longer the Eli Zeira who was so self-assured.” |