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| How Imperial Ambitions Stirred a Pot That’s Now Boiling Over | How Imperial Ambitions Stirred a Pot That’s Now Boiling Over |
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| Scott Anderson’s fine, sophisticated, richly detailed “Lawrence in Arabia” is filled with invaluably complex and fine-tuned information. This demanding but eminently readable account of the Middle East during World War I is certainly no hagiographic T. E. Lawrence biography, as the tiny nuance (“in,” not “of”) coloring its title makes clear. | Scott Anderson’s fine, sophisticated, richly detailed “Lawrence in Arabia” is filled with invaluably complex and fine-tuned information. This demanding but eminently readable account of the Middle East during World War I is certainly no hagiographic T. E. Lawrence biography, as the tiny nuance (“in,” not “of”) coloring its title makes clear. |
| Mr. Anderson does not filter the tricky history of a crucially important era through any individual’s perspective. Nor does he see Lawrence as the only schemer trying to manipulate Arab destiny; this book has an assortment of principal players, only one of whom managed to become so famous. As to why such acclaim elevated one renegade Briton and his feat of creating a guerrilla Bedouin army, Mr. Anderson writes that the short answer may seem anticlimactic. His reason: This was a time when the seed was planted for the Arab world “to define itself less by what it aspires to become than what it is opposed to: colonialism, Zionism, Western imperialism in its many forms.” | Mr. Anderson does not filter the tricky history of a crucially important era through any individual’s perspective. Nor does he see Lawrence as the only schemer trying to manipulate Arab destiny; this book has an assortment of principal players, only one of whom managed to become so famous. As to why such acclaim elevated one renegade Briton and his feat of creating a guerrilla Bedouin army, Mr. Anderson writes that the short answer may seem anticlimactic. His reason: This was a time when the seed was planted for the Arab world “to define itself less by what it aspires to become than what it is opposed to: colonialism, Zionism, Western imperialism in its many forms.” |
| Clarity was hard to find, and so, after such wanton loss of life, were victors. But heroes were needed, and here was a shoo-in. According to the book, “Lawrence was able to become ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ because no one was paying much attention.” | Clarity was hard to find, and so, after such wanton loss of life, were victors. But heroes were needed, and here was a shoo-in. According to the book, “Lawrence was able to become ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ because no one was paying much attention.” |
| That does not make Mr. Anderson’s account a debunking. For those already fascinated by Lawrence’s exploits and familiar with his written accounts of them, Mr. Anderson’s thoughtful, big-picture version only enriches the story it tells. “Lawrence in Arabia” emphasizes the Gordian difficulties facing any strategist from any of the numerous contingents involved either in fighting for Arab freedom from the Ottoman Empire or looking to carve up Arab land once the fighting was over. He illustrates how difficult it was to have any foresight at all, let along to see clearly, and he reserves his greatest interest for players whose imaginations were most fertile. Lawrence was the best and most eloquent of these manipulators, but he was by no means alone. | That does not make Mr. Anderson’s account a debunking. For those already fascinated by Lawrence’s exploits and familiar with his written accounts of them, Mr. Anderson’s thoughtful, big-picture version only enriches the story it tells. “Lawrence in Arabia” emphasizes the Gordian difficulties facing any strategist from any of the numerous contingents involved either in fighting for Arab freedom from the Ottoman Empire or looking to carve up Arab land once the fighting was over. He illustrates how difficult it was to have any foresight at all, let along to see clearly, and he reserves his greatest interest for players whose imaginations were most fertile. Lawrence was the best and most eloquent of these manipulators, but he was by no means alone. |
| The book is careful to acknowledge aspects of Lawrence’s skill that are not always done justice. Mr. Anderson is especially illuminating about Lawrence’s purely political gifts: his way of anticipating the fallout from strategic or military maneuvers, his “peculiar skill at polite belligerence,” his no-nonsense powers of description. | The book is careful to acknowledge aspects of Lawrence’s skill that are not always done justice. Mr. Anderson is especially illuminating about Lawrence’s purely political gifts: his way of anticipating the fallout from strategic or military maneuvers, his “peculiar skill at polite belligerence,” his no-nonsense powers of description. |
| Drawing from the vast body of Lawrence’s writing, Mr. Anderson finds this bit of irreverence: “Jerusalem is a dirty town which all Semitic religions have made holy. ... In it the united forces of the past are so strong that the city fails to have a present; its people, with the rarest exceptions, are characterless as hotel servants, living on the crowd of visitors passing through.” | Drawing from the vast body of Lawrence’s writing, Mr. Anderson finds this bit of irreverence: “Jerusalem is a dirty town which all Semitic religions have made holy. ... In it the united forces of the past are so strong that the city fails to have a present; its people, with the rarest exceptions, are characterless as hotel servants, living on the crowd of visitors passing through.” |
| Beyond having a keen ear for memorable wording, Mr. Anderson has a gift for piecing together the conflicting interests of warring parties. His account of the grisly British debacle at Gallipoli and the bad decisions leading up to it display this book’s analytic powers at their best. He explains why Alexandretta, now called Iskenderun, on the Mediterranean near the Turkish-Syrian border, looked to Lawrence and others like the Ottoman Empire’s most vulnerable point. It describes the 1914 incident in which a British warship, the Doris, managed almost accidentally to expose how weakly defended the area was. | |
| But “throughout history,” he adds, “there have been occasions when a vastly superior military force has managed, against all odds, to snatch defeat from all but certain victory.” Though Lawrence imagined the Syrian and Armenian uprisings that might further undermine Ottoman control of the Alexandretta region, the British looked westward, designating the Dardanelles as the place to send wave after wave of troops. Fully exposed to the enemy as they made their naval landing, they were massacred to no strategic effect at all. Lawrence believed that Britain’s decision had been influenced by the desire of its ally France to keep Syria stable — and lay claim to it after the war. | |
| As “Lawrence in Arabia” lays out Lawrence’s career, and his delicate negotiations to unite the sons of King Hussein to create an Arab revolt against the Turks, it also follows other diplomatic efforts. One of the book’s startling revelations about Curt Prüfer, a German diplomat in Cairo with espionage connections, is that he deployed Minna Weizmann — a seldom-mentioned sister of Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president — as a pro-German spy. Also involved in espionage was Aaron Aaronsohn, a Zionist and agronomist, who worked his way into the good graces of the Ottoman regime. | As “Lawrence in Arabia” lays out Lawrence’s career, and his delicate negotiations to unite the sons of King Hussein to create an Arab revolt against the Turks, it also follows other diplomatic efforts. One of the book’s startling revelations about Curt Prüfer, a German diplomat in Cairo with espionage connections, is that he deployed Minna Weizmann — a seldom-mentioned sister of Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president — as a pro-German spy. Also involved in espionage was Aaron Aaronsohn, a Zionist and agronomist, who worked his way into the good graces of the Ottoman regime. |
| The book also follows the track of the American William Yale, roaming the region to do the bidding of Standard Oil of New York, known as Socony. He was instrumental in helping the company lay claims in Palestine, “except there was a key detail in all this that Socony saw no reason to trouble the Turks with,” Mr. Anderson writes. Drilling for oil could have helped the Turkish war effort, but Yale’s employers had no intention of doing so until the war was over. | The book also follows the track of the American William Yale, roaming the region to do the bidding of Standard Oil of New York, known as Socony. He was instrumental in helping the company lay claims in Palestine, “except there was a key detail in all this that Socony saw no reason to trouble the Turks with,” Mr. Anderson writes. Drilling for oil could have helped the Turkish war effort, but Yale’s employers had no intention of doing so until the war was over. |
| “Lawrence in Arabia” is a fascinating book, the best work of military history in recent memory and an illuminating analysis of issues that still loom large today. It’s a big book in every sense, with a huge amount of terrain to cover. So it is perhaps understandable that Mr. Anderson makes only passing and none too flattering reference to David Lean’s magnificent film about Lawrence. | “Lawrence in Arabia” is a fascinating book, the best work of military history in recent memory and an illuminating analysis of issues that still loom large today. It’s a big book in every sense, with a huge amount of terrain to cover. So it is perhaps understandable that Mr. Anderson makes only passing and none too flattering reference to David Lean’s magnificent film about Lawrence. |
| But readers who know the movie are apt to summon it more than he does. Yes, it was history à la Hollywood, with moments of clear exaggeration. But its effort to depict Lawrence, his military raids, the tribal leaders with whom he dealt, the inept British military effort and the sly French diplomatic one are all shown by this book to be unusually faithful to the facts. It’s high praise for both the visually grand film and this grandly ambitious book to say that they do have a lot in common. | But readers who know the movie are apt to summon it more than he does. Yes, it was history à la Hollywood, with moments of clear exaggeration. But its effort to depict Lawrence, his military raids, the tribal leaders with whom he dealt, the inept British military effort and the sly French diplomatic one are all shown by this book to be unusually faithful to the facts. It’s high praise for both the visually grand film and this grandly ambitious book to say that they do have a lot in common. |
This article has been revised to reflect the following correction: | |
| Correction: September 10, 2013 | |
An earlier version of this review misstated the location of the Dardanelles in relation to Alexandretta (now called Iskenderun). It is to west, not the east. |