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Obama's 'pass the buck' policy on Syria Obama's 'pass the buck' policy on Syria
(12 days later)
The decision of Senate foreign relations committee to endorse a strike against Syria will be interpreted as a victory for the White House, but in practice, it represents the triumph of politics over strategy. President Obama has centered his case to strike Syria on the need for moral clarity in the face of the chemical weapons attack, but his policies have been directed more towards appeasing a restive Congress, and inoculating himself against the toxic political fallout of a strike, than influencing the calculations of Bashar al-Assad.The decision of Senate foreign relations committee to endorse a strike against Syria will be interpreted as a victory for the White House, but in practice, it represents the triumph of politics over strategy. President Obama has centered his case to strike Syria on the need for moral clarity in the face of the chemical weapons attack, but his policies have been directed more towards appeasing a restive Congress, and inoculating himself against the toxic political fallout of a strike, than influencing the calculations of Bashar al-Assad.
This is a shame because, in principle, the decision to put the strike on Syria to the approval of Congress is a good one. The US constitution grants the Congress, not the president, the right to make war, yet, over the last 20 years, presidents have increasingly sidelined Congress over decisions on the use of force. Like his predecessor, President Obama has embraced an expansive notion of executive powers that gives him the exclusive right to use force without congressional approval for small, dirty wars (such as Libya) and for drone strikes in places like Pakistan and Yemen.This is a shame because, in principle, the decision to put the strike on Syria to the approval of Congress is a good one. The US constitution grants the Congress, not the president, the right to make war, yet, over the last 20 years, presidents have increasingly sidelined Congress over decisions on the use of force. Like his predecessor, President Obama has embraced an expansive notion of executive powers that gives him the exclusive right to use force without congressional approval for small, dirty wars (such as Libya) and for drone strikes in places like Pakistan and Yemen.
In this case, however, his decision to turn to Congress for a green light in Syria does not reflect a sudden realization of the limits of his war powers. Rather, Obama is attempting to shift the blame back to members of Congress in case the strike produces adverse consequences. He knows that this strike is unpopular, so he wants Congress to shoulder its share of the blame ahead of when the voters next go to the polls, in 2014.In this case, however, his decision to turn to Congress for a green light in Syria does not reflect a sudden realization of the limits of his war powers. Rather, Obama is attempting to shift the blame back to members of Congress in case the strike produces adverse consequences. He knows that this strike is unpopular, so he wants Congress to shoulder its share of the blame ahead of when the voters next go to the polls, in 2014.
The president has cloaked this decision in virtuous language, but the motive is pure politics: an attempt to insulate himself and preserve his domestic political capital from whatever unpredictable consequences will follow an American strike.The president has cloaked this decision in virtuous language, but the motive is pure politics: an attempt to insulate himself and preserve his domestic political capital from whatever unpredictable consequences will follow an American strike.
The larger problem with handing the Syria operation back to Congress at this point is that the goals of the operation – which have never been clearly articulated by the White House – will be further muddied by amendments, interpretations and restrictions imposed by different constituencies in Congress. At present, two groups in Congress are vying to affect the language of the authorization. Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, both of whom never met a war they didn't like, are pushing to add language that requires that American operations decisively tilt the balance of the war towards the rebels.The larger problem with handing the Syria operation back to Congress at this point is that the goals of the operation – which have never been clearly articulated by the White House – will be further muddied by amendments, interpretations and restrictions imposed by different constituencies in Congress. At present, two groups in Congress are vying to affect the language of the authorization. Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, both of whom never met a war they didn't like, are pushing to add language that requires that American operations decisively tilt the balance of the war towards the rebels.
The irony here is rich: two stalwart Republicans who rallied to Bush's call to defend civilization against al-Qaida and the forces of global terrorism are now pushing a Democratic president to fight with rebels whose ranks are infested with al-Qaida-affiliated fighters.The irony here is rich: two stalwart Republicans who rallied to Bush's call to defend civilization against al-Qaida and the forces of global terrorism are now pushing a Democratic president to fight with rebels whose ranks are infested with al-Qaida-affiliated fighters.
At the same time, a number of Democrats are anxious to apply limitations on the types of operations, and on the timing of the strike, to avoid another costly war. It is possible that rebellious Democrats and Republicans hostile to the president may vote down the authorization in the House of Representatives. But even a successful vote in both the House and the Senate will leave the US with no more clarity about what its ultimate objectives in Syria are.At the same time, a number of Democrats are anxious to apply limitations on the types of operations, and on the timing of the strike, to avoid another costly war. It is possible that rebellious Democrats and Republicans hostile to the president may vote down the authorization in the House of Representatives. But even a successful vote in both the House and the Senate will leave the US with no more clarity about what its ultimate objectives in Syria are.
To satisfy both factions and get a passable authorization, the Congress will probably produce a text that is an incoherent mess, full of caveats and conflicting interpretations, and which provides no clear steer of what the goals of the American operation should be. This is disastrous, because the Obama administration itself has never been clear on its ultimate purposes in Syria (punishment? norm enforcement? changing the balance of the civil war?), and the involvement of the Congress at this point will only make things worse.To satisfy both factions and get a passable authorization, the Congress will probably produce a text that is an incoherent mess, full of caveats and conflicting interpretations, and which provides no clear steer of what the goals of the American operation should be. This is disastrous, because the Obama administration itself has never been clear on its ultimate purposes in Syria (punishment? norm enforcement? changing the balance of the civil war?), and the involvement of the Congress at this point will only make things worse.
Knowing that it may not get a text of an authorization that it can live with, the Obama administration has already begun to signal that it does not really need a congressional authorization and that it might ignore a "no" vote anyway. This has given the entire process the air of a farce – which was clearly evident when Senator McCain was caught playing poker on his phone during the Senate hearing.Knowing that it may not get a text of an authorization that it can live with, the Obama administration has already begun to signal that it does not really need a congressional authorization and that it might ignore a "no" vote anyway. This has given the entire process the air of a farce – which was clearly evident when Senator McCain was caught playing poker on his phone during the Senate hearing.
Beyond the politics of the matter, the decision to turn to Congress for authorization will have a number of negative strategic consequences.Beyond the politics of the matter, the decision to turn to Congress for authorization will have a number of negative strategic consequences.
On the most basic level, the cost will be measured in time: Assad will have had over three weeks to prepare his defenses and hide assets before Congress will even votes on the measure. Every day that passes makes the chances of a successful strike even more remote. At this point, it may be possible to degrade some of his key assets, and even destroy some of his missiles or aircraft; but the element of surprise, so crucial to effective military operations, has been lost.On the most basic level, the cost will be measured in time: Assad will have had over three weeks to prepare his defenses and hide assets before Congress will even votes on the measure. Every day that passes makes the chances of a successful strike even more remote. At this point, it may be possible to degrade some of his key assets, and even destroy some of his missiles or aircraft; but the element of surprise, so crucial to effective military operations, has been lost.
Moreover, this delay has given Assad's allies, such as Iran and Hezbollah, time to decide what reprisals they will use against the US or its allies in the event of a strike. It has also given time for some of Assad's backers, such as Russia, to launch a public relations campaign designed to damage the US and blunt the political impact of the strike.Moreover, this delay has given Assad's allies, such as Iran and Hezbollah, time to decide what reprisals they will use against the US or its allies in the event of a strike. It has also given time for some of Assad's backers, such as Russia, to launch a public relations campaign designed to damage the US and blunt the political impact of the strike.
Second, the delay is strengthening Assad's sense of resolve and convincing him that he can withstand whatever the US chooses to do. For this reason, he has stepped up his rhetoric against the United States, and begun to privately tell his allies that it will be nothing but a cosmetic strike. All the normal requirements of an effective act of coercion – a sense of urgency, a signal of credibility or resolve, and a willingness to escalate – are absent from the administration's proposal to strike. Assad can be certain that the Obama administration is not contemplating regime change and will not put "boots on the ground" in Syria.Second, the delay is strengthening Assad's sense of resolve and convincing him that he can withstand whatever the US chooses to do. For this reason, he has stepped up his rhetoric against the United States, and begun to privately tell his allies that it will be nothing but a cosmetic strike. All the normal requirements of an effective act of coercion – a sense of urgency, a signal of credibility or resolve, and a willingness to escalate – are absent from the administration's proposal to strike. Assad can be certain that the Obama administration is not contemplating regime change and will not put "boots on the ground" in Syria.
If the administration launches a limited, three-day strike campaign, similar to the "Desert Fox" operation against Iraq in 1998, Assad can wait it out, bluster that he remains unbowed when it finishes, and continue the war against the rebels in the days that follow. Like Saddam Hussein after Desert Fox, Assad may even emerge temporarily stronger in the region for having stood up to the United States in the face of its indecision, rather than being humbled by the scale of the punitive strikes.If the administration launches a limited, three-day strike campaign, similar to the "Desert Fox" operation against Iraq in 1998, Assad can wait it out, bluster that he remains unbowed when it finishes, and continue the war against the rebels in the days that follow. Like Saddam Hussein after Desert Fox, Assad may even emerge temporarily stronger in the region for having stood up to the United States in the face of its indecision, rather than being humbled by the scale of the punitive strikes.
Third, the frantic politicking in Congress has effectively signaled to the enemies of the United States that the country is war-weary and reluctant to use force. This is, doubtless, true, and the caution of the American people is warranted – especially given the history of Afghanistan and Iraq. But a strategic ambiguity about what you might do, and what cost you might bear, is always a good idea for a great power facing a range of different enemies, from terrorist groups to rising regional powers.Third, the frantic politicking in Congress has effectively signaled to the enemies of the United States that the country is war-weary and reluctant to use force. This is, doubtless, true, and the caution of the American people is warranted – especially given the history of Afghanistan and Iraq. But a strategic ambiguity about what you might do, and what cost you might bear, is always a good idea for a great power facing a range of different enemies, from terrorist groups to rising regional powers.
This is something that Putin knows well, which is why he has offered only the cryptic "we have our plans" when asked how Russia will respond. Yet, the Obama administration has ignored this consideration by repeatedly signaling to the American people its war-weariness and reluctance to act. The result is that current and future opponents of the United States will now have a measure of its intentions and of its unwillingness to bear costs, and they will behave accordingly – either in thwarting its plans (as Russia and China are seeking to do today) or testing other "red lines" in the future.This is something that Putin knows well, which is why he has offered only the cryptic "we have our plans" when asked how Russia will respond. Yet, the Obama administration has ignored this consideration by repeatedly signaling to the American people its war-weariness and reluctance to act. The result is that current and future opponents of the United States will now have a measure of its intentions and of its unwillingness to bear costs, and they will behave accordingly – either in thwarting its plans (as Russia and China are seeking to do today) or testing other "red lines" in the future.
Because the administration has prioritized domestic politics over the strategic logic of the strike, they have almost guaranteed that it will be ineffective. It is possible that if Obama had sought congressional authorization for a strike immediately following the attack, and struck before Assad had a chance to prepare himself, that an American air operation might have been successful in deterring future chemical attacks.Because the administration has prioritized domestic politics over the strategic logic of the strike, they have almost guaranteed that it will be ineffective. It is possible that if Obama had sought congressional authorization for a strike immediately following the attack, and struck before Assad had a chance to prepare himself, that an American air operation might have been successful in deterring future chemical attacks.
But by handing off the decision to the Congress and producing such a substantial delay, and by telegraphing his reluctance to the American electorate so obviously, Obama has all but guaranteed that this attempt to "lead from behind" will be unsuccessful.But by handing off the decision to the Congress and producing such a substantial delay, and by telegraphing his reluctance to the American electorate so obviously, Obama has all but guaranteed that this attempt to "lead from behind" will be unsuccessful.
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