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| Did Syrian rebels have sarin gas? Your questions on the crisis answered | Did Syrian rebels have sarin gas? Your questions on the crisis answered |
| (14 days later) | |
| The US has evidence that sarin nerve gas was used in chemical attacks outside Damascus last month that killed at least 1,429 civilians, more than 400 of whom were children, the secretary of state, John Kerry, has said. | The US has evidence that sarin nerve gas was used in chemical attacks outside Damascus last month that killed at least 1,429 civilians, more than 400 of whom were children, the secretary of state, John Kerry, has said. |
| Barack Obama has now begun the task of persuading members of Congress to authorise military action against Syria, even though Kerry has said the president has the "right to strike" regardless of the outcome of the vote. | Barack Obama has now begun the task of persuading members of Congress to authorise military action against Syria, even though Kerry has said the president has the "right to strike" regardless of the outcome of the vote. |
| France is the only country firmly on board among the major military powers, after Britain rejected the use of force in a vote last week, and a return to parliament for a new vote has been ruled out. | France is the only country firmly on board among the major military powers, after Britain rejected the use of force in a vote last week, and a return to parliament for a new vote has been ruled out. |
| But how did these events unfold, why is Obama seeking congressional approval, and what effect will a military attack have on the country and the region? | But how did these events unfold, why is Obama seeking congressional approval, and what effect will a military attack have on the country and the region? |
| Ian Black, the Guardian's Middle East editor, answered a selection of your questions about Syria. | Ian Black, the Guardian's Middle East editor, answered a selection of your questions about Syria. |
| AmenophisIV: How many different opposition parties exist in Syria? Which party is representing which interests, what goals do they have, and who are the supporting parties? herero: To what extent are they infiltrated by al-Qaida or not? | AmenophisIV: How many different opposition parties exist in Syria? Which party is representing which interests, what goals do they have, and who are the supporting parties? herero: To what extent are they infiltrated by al-Qaida or not? |
| The Syrian opposition is highly fragmented and divided between groups based abroad and inside the country. When protests began in March 2011, the first coherent body to emerge was the Syrian National Council, established in Istanbul. Externally, that was backed by Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and western countries. It included a big Syrian Muslim Brotherhood element as well as liberal and secular figures associated with the Damascus Declaration group. Groups on the ground began to operate under the name of the Free Syrian Army, with different local agenda and backing from different sources, including the Gulf. | The Syrian opposition is highly fragmented and divided between groups based abroad and inside the country. When protests began in March 2011, the first coherent body to emerge was the Syrian National Council, established in Istanbul. Externally, that was backed by Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and western countries. It included a big Syrian Muslim Brotherhood element as well as liberal and secular figures associated with the Damascus Declaration group. Groups on the ground began to operate under the name of the Free Syrian Army, with different local agenda and backing from different sources, including the Gulf. |
| Nowadays the main political grouping is the Syrian National Coalition, set up in Qatar in 2012, again with Gulf backing. The main legal internal opposition is the Damascus-based National Co-ordination Body, which calls for a negotiated settlement with the Assad regime. | Nowadays the main political grouping is the Syrian National Coalition, set up in Qatar in 2012, again with Gulf backing. The main legal internal opposition is the Damascus-based National Co-ordination Body, which calls for a negotiated settlement with the Assad regime. |
| There are now hundreds and perhaps thousands of armed rebel groups. More moderate outfits such as Liwa al-Tawhid answer to the Supreme Military Command, headed by Selim Idriss, a senior army defector. The SMC is used to channel Gulf, especially Saudi, funds and is thought to have received US and British training in Jordan. | There are now hundreds and perhaps thousands of armed rebel groups. More moderate outfits such as Liwa al-Tawhid answer to the Supreme Military Command, headed by Selim Idriss, a senior army defector. The SMC is used to channel Gulf, especially Saudi, funds and is thought to have received US and British training in Jordan. |
| Islamist groups have become stronger and tend to be better armed and financed than others. Two of the strongest are Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq, both of them linked to al-Qaida. JAN insists on a future Syria becoming an Islamic state under sharia law, and has openly pledged its allegiance to the al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Another important group is Ahrar al-Sham. Sectarianism is also becoming more pronounced, with foreign Arab Shia fighters (including Lebanon's powerful Hezbollah) arriving to fight Sunni extremists. Large numbers of liberal and secular opposition figures have left the country. Important work is still done on the ground by the Local Co-ordination Committees. | Islamist groups have become stronger and tend to be better armed and financed than others. Two of the strongest are Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq, both of them linked to al-Qaida. JAN insists on a future Syria becoming an Islamic state under sharia law, and has openly pledged its allegiance to the al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Another important group is Ahrar al-Sham. Sectarianism is also becoming more pronounced, with foreign Arab Shia fighters (including Lebanon's powerful Hezbollah) arriving to fight Sunni extremists. Large numbers of liberal and secular opposition figures have left the country. Important work is still done on the ground by the Local Co-ordination Committees. |
| EbbTide64: Why is the media assuming that it was Assad who was responsible, when there are reports (here, here & here) of the rebels being caught with sarin? | EbbTide64: Why is the media assuming that it was Assad who was responsible, when there are reports (here, here & here) of the rebels being caught with sarin? |
| It is not the media that is assuming that Assad is responsible. The Guardian and other media have reported claims and assessments by the US, UK, France and the Syrian rebels, and of course official Syrian denials. Only western governments have provided any evidence at all, however adequate or convincing it is judged. All three governments also state categorically that the rebels did not have the capacity to mount a CW attack on the scale of what occurred on 21 August. All have stated they are relying on classified sources as well as the precedent of earlier, smaller attacks. More detail is clearly needed to convince sceptics, given the experience of the Iraq WMD dossier. | It is not the media that is assuming that Assad is responsible. The Guardian and other media have reported claims and assessments by the US, UK, France and the Syrian rebels, and of course official Syrian denials. Only western governments have provided any evidence at all, however adequate or convincing it is judged. All three governments also state categorically that the rebels did not have the capacity to mount a CW attack on the scale of what occurred on 21 August. All have stated they are relying on classified sources as well as the precedent of earlier, smaller attacks. More detail is clearly needed to convince sceptics, given the experience of the Iraq WMD dossier. |
| It has previously been reported that members of the al-Nusra front were caught with sarin nerve gas in Turkey – and this has been echoed by Syrian state media. Dale Gavlak, an independent journalist, has reported a belief that nerve agents used in Ghouta were supplied by Saudi Arabia. | It has previously been reported that members of the al-Nusra front were caught with sarin nerve gas in Turkey – and this has been echoed by Syrian state media. Dale Gavlak, an independent journalist, has reported a belief that nerve agents used in Ghouta were supplied by Saudi Arabia. |
| So far, however, neither the Syrian government nor Russia have publicly provided any evidence that the rebels were responsible for the incident. Delay in allowing the UN inspectors access to the scene of the attacks, and heavy shelling before they were able to get there, appeared designed to destroy evidence. | So far, however, neither the Syrian government nor Russia have publicly provided any evidence that the rebels were responsible for the incident. Delay in allowing the UN inspectors access to the scene of the attacks, and heavy shelling before they were able to get there, appeared designed to destroy evidence. |
| bunburinamx: What is the role of other regional actors in the Syrian crisis? More specifically, I am talking about Saudi Arabia (rumoured to be arming the opposition) and Iran (supporting Assad). zionysus: Why is Saudi motivation, involvement and funding of the FSA off the radar? | bunburinamx: What is the role of other regional actors in the Syrian crisis? More specifically, I am talking about Saudi Arabia (rumoured to be arming the opposition) and Iran (supporting Assad). zionysus: Why is Saudi motivation, involvement and funding of the FSA off the radar? |
| Saudi Arabia has been open in its wish to see the overthrow of the Assad regime but opaque about the efforts it has devoted to it. It has called for arming the opposition and has done so through governmental and private channels, the latter involving wealthy businessmen, some of them with Syrian links. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi intelligence chief, took over the effort some months ago. The Saudi religious establishment has also fuelled a sectarian narrative targeting Syria's Alawite community – the minority grouping the Assads come from. | Saudi Arabia has been open in its wish to see the overthrow of the Assad regime but opaque about the efforts it has devoted to it. It has called for arming the opposition and has done so through governmental and private channels, the latter involving wealthy businessmen, some of them with Syrian links. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi intelligence chief, took over the effort some months ago. The Saudi religious establishment has also fuelled a sectarian narrative targeting Syria's Alawite community – the minority grouping the Assads come from. |
| The Saudis are significant players in the Syrian conflict, but they have little military power or the confidence to act on their own and have provided far less support to the anti-Assad rebels than Iran and Hezbollah have to the regime. It is clearly fanciful to suggest that the Saudis or other Gulf states are seeking democracy. But they do want to see Assad go. Part of their motivation is strategic competition with Syria's staunch ally (non-Arab, Shia) Iran, which is seen as a standing threat to the Gulf region. In one intriguing recent report the Saudis were said to have offered Russia a deal to control the global oil market and safeguard its gas contracts if the Kremlin backs away from the Assad regime. | The Saudis are significant players in the Syrian conflict, but they have little military power or the confidence to act on their own and have provided far less support to the anti-Assad rebels than Iran and Hezbollah have to the regime. It is clearly fanciful to suggest that the Saudis or other Gulf states are seeking democracy. But they do want to see Assad go. Part of their motivation is strategic competition with Syria's staunch ally (non-Arab, Shia) Iran, which is seen as a standing threat to the Gulf region. In one intriguing recent report the Saudis were said to have offered Russia a deal to control the global oil market and safeguard its gas contracts if the Kremlin backs away from the Assad regime. |
| GreenRevolution: Why is Syria so important to Russia? Surely it cannot be purely for the sake of a naval base. | GreenRevolution: Why is Syria so important to Russia? Surely it cannot be purely for the sake of a naval base. |
| Russia has been Syria's most important international ally since Soviet/cold war days. Its interests there are strategic, commercial and broadly political. Tartus is Russia's sole remaining Russian naval base on the Mediterranean. Besides arms exports, Russian companies have major investments in Syria's infrastructure, energy and tourism sectors, worth $19.4bn in 2009. | Russia has been Syria's most important international ally since Soviet/cold war days. Its interests there are strategic, commercial and broadly political. Tartus is Russia's sole remaining Russian naval base on the Mediterranean. Besides arms exports, Russian companies have major investments in Syria's infrastructure, energy and tourism sectors, worth $19.4bn in 2009. |
| Russia strongly disliked the way the 2011 Libya crisis was handled when a UN security council resolution it supported on humanitarian grounds morphed into Nato-backed regime change. Vague phrases like "further measures" now set off alarm bells in Moscow. Western intervention is a red line. | Russia strongly disliked the way the 2011 Libya crisis was handled when a UN security council resolution it supported on humanitarian grounds morphed into Nato-backed regime change. Vague phrases like "further measures" now set off alarm bells in Moscow. Western intervention is a red line. |
| More broadly the Kremlin fears instability in the Middle East and Central Asia. Russian policymakers worry about the spread of Islamic militancy as well as a western/Arab project, via the fall of Assad in Syria, to isolate Iran. Russia has occasionally hinted that it is not wedded to Assad himself, but its policies have continued to protect him. Some western policymakers still believe that could yet change. | More broadly the Kremlin fears instability in the Middle East and Central Asia. Russian policymakers worry about the spread of Islamic militancy as well as a western/Arab project, via the fall of Assad in Syria, to isolate Iran. Russia has occasionally hinted that it is not wedded to Assad himself, but its policies have continued to protect him. Some western policymakers still believe that could yet change. |
| woodsorrel: Could we have a bit more background, please, on Russia's interests in the region, and, indeed, on the Chinese viewpoint? | woodsorrel: Could we have a bit more background, please, on Russia's interests in the region, and, indeed, on the Chinese viewpoint? |
| China's thinking follows Russia's in many respects. Beijing invariably follows Moscow's position on the UN security council, consistently blocking any punitive action against the Syrian government and opposing western intervention, especially on humanitarian grounds. China has joined Iran and Russia in delivering $500m a month in oil and credit to Syria. Assad's survival is tied up in Beijing's geostrategic outlook on the Middle East and its energy resources. The Chinese government is nervous of precedents for intervention in any country's "internal affairs" due to its own insecurities at home. | China's thinking follows Russia's in many respects. Beijing invariably follows Moscow's position on the UN security council, consistently blocking any punitive action against the Syrian government and opposing western intervention, especially on humanitarian grounds. China has joined Iran and Russia in delivering $500m a month in oil and credit to Syria. Assad's survival is tied up in Beijing's geostrategic outlook on the Middle East and its energy resources. The Chinese government is nervous of precedents for intervention in any country's "internal affairs" due to its own insecurities at home. |
| annatuson33: What do the countries in favour of carrying out an intervention in Syria stand to gain from doing so? | annatuson33: What do the countries in favour of carrying out an intervention in Syria stand to gain from doing so? |
| Only the US and France currently appear likely to intervene militarily. Their primary motivation is to punish the Assad regime for the alleged use of banned chemical weapons near Damascus on 21 August and, presumably, to deter their future use by Assad and others. According to extensive US media leaks and statements from Barack Obama, it is not his intention to intervene directly in the war or to tip the balance of power towards the rebels. But that could clearly be an unintended consequence of such intervention. It may also be an unspoken motive. But determination to act over the use of CW contrasts starkly with hitherto confused US and western policies towards what is now the bloodiest of the uprisings of the Arab spring. | Only the US and France currently appear likely to intervene militarily. Their primary motivation is to punish the Assad regime for the alleged use of banned chemical weapons near Damascus on 21 August and, presumably, to deter their future use by Assad and others. According to extensive US media leaks and statements from Barack Obama, it is not his intention to intervene directly in the war or to tip the balance of power towards the rebels. But that could clearly be an unintended consequence of such intervention. It may also be an unspoken motive. But determination to act over the use of CW contrasts starkly with hitherto confused US and western policies towards what is now the bloodiest of the uprisings of the Arab spring. |
| Celtiberico: What percentage of the Syrian population really support the Ba'athist regime? Have we any way of knowing what percentage of the Syrian people really oppose the government, and how many support President Assad and will be pleased, for whatever reason, if the government forces win out? | Celtiberico: What percentage of the Syrian population really support the Ba'athist regime? Have we any way of knowing what percentage of the Syrian people really oppose the government, and how many support President Assad and will be pleased, for whatever reason, if the government forces win out? |
| There is no reliable polling data and gauging support for the Assad regime is largely guesswork complicated by propaganda. A current snapshot of the military situation suggests that despite reverses the (largely) Sunni rebels are holding their own against the Alawite-dominated regime. The Free Syrian Army is currently calling for more defections from government forces. | There is no reliable polling data and gauging support for the Assad regime is largely guesswork complicated by propaganda. A current snapshot of the military situation suggests that despite reverses the (largely) Sunni rebels are holding their own against the Alawite-dominated regime. The Free Syrian Army is currently calling for more defections from government forces. |
| Assad however still appears to enjoy significant support from Sunnis (the majority of the population) and Christians, especially since armed Islamist groups, including foreign fighters, have come to the fore in the opposition. The Syrian government narrative, however, falsely portrays all rebels as jihadis. Impressions vary. In 2012 Syrians tended to say privately that support for the government had dwindled to 20-30% but it may have grown again. | Assad however still appears to enjoy significant support from Sunnis (the majority of the population) and Christians, especially since armed Islamist groups, including foreign fighters, have come to the fore in the opposition. The Syrian government narrative, however, falsely portrays all rebels as jihadis. Impressions vary. In 2012 Syrians tended to say privately that support for the government had dwindled to 20-30% but it may have grown again. |
| Another highly significant factor is that 2m Syrians have now left the country as refugees while 5m are internally displaced. The chances of either side prevailing militarily have induced in many a mood of desperation in which all that matters is ending the war and returning to normality - whatever the political outcome. | Another highly significant factor is that 2m Syrians have now left the country as refugees while 5m are internally displaced. The chances of either side prevailing militarily have induced in many a mood of desperation in which all that matters is ending the war and returning to normality - whatever the political outcome. |
| In a highly polarised situation where misinformation is the norm, polling data is unlikely to be accurate or neutral. Information reportedly given to Nato in May found 70% of Syrians supporting the Assad regime. Another 20% were deemed neutral and the remaining 10% expressed support for the rebels. That was at a time of intensifying debate about whether western countries should arm the rebels. | In a highly polarised situation where misinformation is the norm, polling data is unlikely to be accurate or neutral. Information reportedly given to Nato in May found 70% of Syrians supporting the Assad regime. Another 20% were deemed neutral and the remaining 10% expressed support for the rebels. That was at a time of intensifying debate about whether western countries should arm the rebels. |
| VerdigrisGreen: I have yet to hear a coherent argument on why they think a missile strike will help the Syrian people and what they think the outcome will be - why now and why the urgency? | VerdigrisGreen: I have yet to hear a coherent argument on why they think a missile strike will help the Syrian people and what they think the outcome will be - why now and why the urgency? |
| The arguments are not convincing. President Obama says that an attack will punish and deter the Syrian regime (and others) from again using internationally banned weapons. In a fast-moving situation it is unclear exactly what is now being planned by the US. Initial media leaks suggested it would be a short and highly limited campaign. Experts argue that a carefully calibrated approach would damage the Syrian regime's ability to delivery CW (by hitting its artillery and rocket launchers) though they can be (and may already have been) moved. Attacking CW stockpiles could cause unacceptable damage. Wiping out a divisional headquarters, for example, would have greater strategic significance than destroying a battalion. Targeting Assad himself or other senior figures could be construed as an attempt at regime "decapitation" and would constitute the active involvement in the war which Obama has so far eschewed. It is not clear whether talk of new efforts to arm the rebels would mean a higher level of involvement than what has already done in a semi-clandestine manner by the CIA. It still seems unlikely that the rebels can defeat the regime militarily, as long as it enjoys Russian and Chinese support. | The arguments are not convincing. President Obama says that an attack will punish and deter the Syrian regime (and others) from again using internationally banned weapons. In a fast-moving situation it is unclear exactly what is now being planned by the US. Initial media leaks suggested it would be a short and highly limited campaign. Experts argue that a carefully calibrated approach would damage the Syrian regime's ability to delivery CW (by hitting its artillery and rocket launchers) though they can be (and may already have been) moved. Attacking CW stockpiles could cause unacceptable damage. Wiping out a divisional headquarters, for example, would have greater strategic significance than destroying a battalion. Targeting Assad himself or other senior figures could be construed as an attempt at regime "decapitation" and would constitute the active involvement in the war which Obama has so far eschewed. It is not clear whether talk of new efforts to arm the rebels would mean a higher level of involvement than what has already done in a semi-clandestine manner by the CIA. It still seems unlikely that the rebels can defeat the regime militarily, as long as it enjoys Russian and Chinese support. |
| It is true that the 350-1500 victims of the Ghouta attacks are only a small proportion of the 100,000 + victims of the violence of the last 29 months. But it is very hard for Obama' to ignore his own "red line" and retain any credibility. | It is true that the 350-1500 victims of the Ghouta attacks are only a small proportion of the 100,000 + victims of the violence of the last 29 months. But it is very hard for Obama' to ignore his own "red line" and retain any credibility. |
| The original urgency has clearly faded because of David Cameron's defeat in the UK and Obama's subsequent surprise decision to consult Congress. But it was originally driven by a wish to be seen to be responding specifically to the Ghouta attacks and to avoid blurring US intentions – exactly what is happening now. | The original urgency has clearly faded because of David Cameron's defeat in the UK and Obama's subsequent surprise decision to consult Congress. But it was originally driven by a wish to be seen to be responding specifically to the Ghouta attacks and to avoid blurring US intentions – exactly what is happening now. |
| Please join the discussion by adding your comment to the thread. | Please join the discussion by adding your comment to the thread. |
| Here's the latest on Syria. | Here's the latest on Syria. |
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