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| UK report on chemical attack in Syria adds nothing to informed speculation | UK report on chemical attack in Syria adds nothing to informed speculation |
| (21 days later) | |
| The report by Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) on the Syrian chemical warfare attacks fails to answer a central question – the motivation of President Bashar al-Assad. | The report by Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) on the Syrian chemical warfare attacks fails to answer a central question – the motivation of President Bashar al-Assad. |
| Its conclusion that the Syrian regime was "highly likely" to be responsible rests partly on precedent and the firm view that the opposition was not capable of carrying out attacks on this scale. But it does not reveal a "smoking gun" in Assad's hand. | Its conclusion that the Syrian regime was "highly likely" to be responsible rests partly on precedent and the firm view that the opposition was not capable of carrying out attacks on this scale. But it does not reveal a "smoking gun" in Assad's hand. |
| The JIC did say that it had "some intelligence" to suggest "regime culpability" for the 21 August incident at Ghouta, eastern Damascus. David Cameron, according to a covering letter from the JIC chairman, Jon Day, has had access to it all. But there is however no elaboration of this key point. There is also a striking lack of any scientific evidence in the document. | The JIC did say that it had "some intelligence" to suggest "regime culpability" for the 21 August incident at Ghouta, eastern Damascus. David Cameron, according to a covering letter from the JIC chairman, Jon Day, has had access to it all. But there is however no elaboration of this key point. There is also a striking lack of any scientific evidence in the document. |
| The committee's most unequivocal statement is that it was "not possible" for the anti-Assad opposition to have carried out a chemical warfare (CW) attack on this scale. Syria and Russia claim that is exactly what did happen – without producing evidence of their own. The JIC noted only that a number of opposition groups "continue to seek a CW capability". | The committee's most unequivocal statement is that it was "not possible" for the anti-Assad opposition to have carried out a chemical warfare (CW) attack on this scale. Syria and Russia claim that is exactly what did happen – without producing evidence of their own. The JIC noted only that a number of opposition groups "continue to seek a CW capability". |
| Overall, the JIC said it had "high confidence" in the accuracy of all its assessments. But there was one significant qualification: "Except in relation to the regime's precise motivation for carrying out an attack of this scale at this time – though intelligence may increase our confidence in the future." | Overall, the JIC said it had "high confidence" in the accuracy of all its assessments. But there was one significant qualification: "Except in relation to the regime's precise motivation for carrying out an attack of this scale at this time – though intelligence may increase our confidence in the future." |
| Motivation remains a puzzle – given the presence of UN weapons inspectors on a pre-existing mission in Damascus when the attack took place and the likely knowledge that chemical weapons use would attract international opprobrium – and cross Barack Obama's "red line". | Motivation remains a puzzle – given the presence of UN weapons inspectors on a pre-existing mission in Damascus when the attack took place and the likely knowledge that chemical weapons use would attract international opprobrium – and cross Barack Obama's "red line". |
| The JIC case also rests on evidence that has been challenged by Damascus and Moscow: the assessment (shared by the US, Britain, France and Israel), that Assad had used CW on 14 occasions from 2012, establishing "a clear pattern of regime use". Yet Britain has still not set out that older evidence. | The JIC case also rests on evidence that has been challenged by Damascus and Moscow: the assessment (shared by the US, Britain, France and Israel), that Assad had used CW on 14 occasions from 2012, establishing "a clear pattern of regime use". Yet Britain has still not set out that older evidence. |
| Following on from that, there was "no credible intelligence" to substantiate claims of opposition use and thus "no plausible alternative scenarios to regime responsibility". | Following on from that, there was "no credible intelligence" to substantiate claims of opposition use and thus "no plausible alternative scenarios to regime responsibility". |
| Day told Cameron of a "limited but growing body of intelligence [that] supports the judgment that the regime was responsible for the attacks and that they were conducted to help clear the opposition from strategic parts of Damascus. Some of this intelligence is highly sensitive but you have had access to it all." Last week's attacks took place in the context of a Syrian government offensive against rebel forces in the Ghouta area. | Day told Cameron of a "limited but growing body of intelligence [that] supports the judgment that the regime was responsible for the attacks and that they were conducted to help clear the opposition from strategic parts of Damascus. Some of this intelligence is highly sensitive but you have had access to it all." Last week's attacks took place in the context of a Syrian government offensive against rebel forces in the Ghouta area. |
| In one passage the JIC even appears to weaken its own conclusions by noting that there was "no obvious political or military trigger for regime use of CW on an apparently larger scale now" – given the presence of the UN inspectors. | In one passage the JIC even appears to weaken its own conclusions by noting that there was "no obvious political or military trigger for regime use of CW on an apparently larger scale now" – given the presence of the UN inspectors. |
| Permission to authorise CW had "probably been delegated" by Assad to "senior regime commanders". It added: "But any deliberate change in the scale and nature of use would require his authorisation." That language suggests the possibility, as reported in the US, of unauthorised or accidental use of CW munitions. | Permission to authorise CW had "probably been delegated" by Assad to "senior regime commanders". It added: "But any deliberate change in the scale and nature of use would require his authorisation." That language suggests the possibility, as reported in the US, of unauthorised or accidental use of CW munitions. |
| The JIC chairman refers to "the closest possible co-operation with other agencies as well as work in concert with the US intelligence community and agree with the conclusions they have reached". | The JIC chairman refers to "the closest possible co-operation with other agencies as well as work in concert with the US intelligence community and agree with the conclusions they have reached". |
| Analysis of the attacks is based solely on a review of video footage. It concludes that the scenes would have been hard to fake and are consistent with an attack using a nerve agent, such as sarin. | Analysis of the attacks is based solely on a review of video footage. It concludes that the scenes would have been hard to fake and are consistent with an attack using a nerve agent, such as sarin. |
| Many chemical weapons experts have seen this footage and come to the same conclusion. What is surprising is that the document adds nothing to the speculation – informed as it is – around the incidents. | Many chemical weapons experts have seen this footage and come to the same conclusion. What is surprising is that the document adds nothing to the speculation – informed as it is – around the incidents. |
| Alastair Hay, a chemical weapons expert, said the JIC report contained little new information. "There are no hard facts," he told the Guardian. "It is more a case of 'believe us and our experts.'" | Alastair Hay, a chemical weapons expert, said the JIC report contained little new information. "There are no hard facts," he told the Guardian. "It is more a case of 'believe us and our experts.'" |
| Britain has stated before on previous occasions that it has proof of sarin attacks induring the Syrian conflict but has chosen not to give details beyond saying the evidence comes from tests on physiological samples. The government could have backed up those claims by describing what the tests had revealed. Sarin itself? Or a breakdownby-product? | Britain has stated before on previous occasions that it has proof of sarin attacks induring the Syrian conflict but has chosen not to give details beyond saying the evidence comes from tests on physiological samples. The government could have backed up those claims by describing what the tests had revealed. Sarin itself? Or a breakdownby-product? |
| Sarin breaks down in a day or two into isopropylmethylphosphonic acid (IMPA) and realistically this can only come from sarin. A secondary breakdown product is methylphosphonic acid (MPA), but this is the signature of a number of chemicals, not just sarin. | Sarin breaks down in a day or two into isopropylmethylphosphonic acid (IMPA) and realistically this can only come from sarin. A secondary breakdown product is methylphosphonic acid (MPA), but this is the signature of a number of chemicals, not just sarin. |
| This is where the UN team's findings are needed: they will almost certainly be able to say whether or not chemical weapons were used in Syria, and crucially lay out their scientific evidence. | This is where the UN team's findings are needed: they will almost certainly be able to say whether or not chemical weapons were used in Syria, and crucially lay out their scientific evidence. |
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