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Bad immigration policy doesn't spring from bad stats Bad immigration policy doesn't spring from bad stats
(about 2 months later)
"Disney World can keep better track of its visitors than Britain" was the Mail on Sunday's summary of the public administration committee's report on migration statistics. That's probably true. But it's hardly surprising; Disney World's task is, for obvious reasons, rather easier. In particular, Disney doesn't have to deal with the fact that well over 500 million people are free to come to the UK whenever they like, and stay for as long as they want."Disney World can keep better track of its visitors than Britain" was the Mail on Sunday's summary of the public administration committee's report on migration statistics. That's probably true. But it's hardly surprising; Disney World's task is, for obvious reasons, rather easier. In particular, Disney doesn't have to deal with the fact that well over 500 million people are free to come to the UK whenever they like, and stay for as long as they want.
In fact, the main focus of the committee's criticism, the International Passenger Survey (IPS), performs reasonably well in the circumstances at estimating overall migration flows. In the decade to 2011, the IPS-based estimate of net migration from outside the EU was about 2 million. Reading the committee report, you would be entitled to assume that was at best a stab in the dark. In fact, one of the more surprising results from the 2011 census was that this figure was almost spot on – accurate to within 1 or 2%. It's true that the IPS did underestimate flows from elsewhere in the EU, largely as a consequence of not properly surveying rapidly expanding air routes from eastern Europe, but that has now largely been rectified.In fact, the main focus of the committee's criticism, the International Passenger Survey (IPS), performs reasonably well in the circumstances at estimating overall migration flows. In the decade to 2011, the IPS-based estimate of net migration from outside the EU was about 2 million. Reading the committee report, you would be entitled to assume that was at best a stab in the dark. In fact, one of the more surprising results from the 2011 census was that this figure was almost spot on – accurate to within 1 or 2%. It's true that the IPS did underestimate flows from elsewhere in the EU, largely as a consequence of not properly surveying rapidly expanding air routes from eastern Europe, but that has now largely been rectified.
The committee is quite right that the IPS tells us little about the "social and economic consequences of immigration policy": how could it? But in fact, compared to a decade ago, when we did indeed know very little about these topics, we now know rather a lot, thanks both to better data collection and much more economic research on immigration inside and outside government. We know, for example, that the Office for Budget Responsibility thinks that immigration is good for the public finances in both the short and long run. We know that there is little evidence that immigration impacts negatively on jobs or wages; we know that immigrants are much less likely to claim benefits, and that they overall make less than proportionate use of public services like health. All of this research is based on government data on immigration and immigrants; the committee – and the government – would perhaps be better occupied highlighting the results and calling for further research in areas where we know less.The committee is quite right that the IPS tells us little about the "social and economic consequences of immigration policy": how could it? But in fact, compared to a decade ago, when we did indeed know very little about these topics, we now know rather a lot, thanks both to better data collection and much more economic research on immigration inside and outside government. We know, for example, that the Office for Budget Responsibility thinks that immigration is good for the public finances in both the short and long run. We know that there is little evidence that immigration impacts negatively on jobs or wages; we know that immigrants are much less likely to claim benefits, and that they overall make less than proportionate use of public services like health. All of this research is based on government data on immigration and immigrants; the committee – and the government – would perhaps be better occupied highlighting the results and calling for further research in areas where we know less.
On what is perhaps the central issue, the committee slightly misses the point. It argues that "the government should not base its target level of net migration on such an uncertain statistic: doing so could lead to inappropriate immigration policy." But the reason the net migration target leads to bad migration policy is not because the statistics are uncertain; The Office for National Statistics revises GDP and deficit figures years after the event, and that doesn't mean the government shouldn't focus on the deficit in making economic policy. The net migration target leads to bad policy because it is fundamentally misconceived. As anti-immigration advocate David Goodhart puts it, "if more Britons retire to Spain, more space will be created for Canadian nanotechnologists." Indeed – and if fewer Britons retire to Spain, we'll have to keep out Canadian nanotechnologists. As the committee seems to recognise, but doesn't quite say, this is a bizarre and economically damaging approach.On what is perhaps the central issue, the committee slightly misses the point. It argues that "the government should not base its target level of net migration on such an uncertain statistic: doing so could lead to inappropriate immigration policy." But the reason the net migration target leads to bad migration policy is not because the statistics are uncertain; The Office for National Statistics revises GDP and deficit figures years after the event, and that doesn't mean the government shouldn't focus on the deficit in making economic policy. The net migration target leads to bad policy because it is fundamentally misconceived. As anti-immigration advocate David Goodhart puts it, "if more Britons retire to Spain, more space will be created for Canadian nanotechnologists." Indeed – and if fewer Britons retire to Spain, we'll have to keep out Canadian nanotechnologists. As the committee seems to recognise, but doesn't quite say, this is a bizarre and economically damaging approach.
As a researcher, of course I'd like to see better data on migration, and the committee's call for better linking of administrative data between departments could indeed greatly improve both research and policy in this area as in many others. But the fundamental problem with the government's migration policy is not down to flaws in data or statistics. It is because policy is not based on the economic analysis and evidence that we already have.As a researcher, of course I'd like to see better data on migration, and the committee's call for better linking of administrative data between departments could indeed greatly improve both research and policy in this area as in many others. But the fundamental problem with the government's migration policy is not down to flaws in data or statistics. It is because policy is not based on the economic analysis and evidence that we already have.
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