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In Asiana Crash Investigation, Early Focus Is on the Crew’s Actions In Asiana Crash Investigation, Early Focus Is on the Crew’s Actions
(about 1 hour later)
SAN FRANCISCO — The Boeing 777 that crashed here Saturday hit a rocky sea wall at the edge of the airport so hard that debris from the wall was found several hundred feet down the runway where the plane was supposed to land, the chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board said on Monday.SAN FRANCISCO — The Boeing 777 that crashed here Saturday hit a rocky sea wall at the edge of the airport so hard that debris from the wall was found several hundred feet down the runway where the plane was supposed to land, the chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board said on Monday.
As her investigators began interviewing the four pilots in the cockpit, they were looking at all possible causes, but they were trying to piece together how an experienced crew in an advanced jet with no obvious mechanical problems came down in near-perfect weather hundreds of feet from the intended touchdown point.As her investigators began interviewing the four pilots in the cockpit, they were looking at all possible causes, but they were trying to piece together how an experienced crew in an advanced jet with no obvious mechanical problems came down in near-perfect weather hundreds of feet from the intended touchdown point.
Two passengers died and about 50 were seriously injured when the plane, Asiana Flight 214, crashed in clear weather on Saturday morning, while making a routine visual approach.Two passengers died and about 50 were seriously injured when the plane, Asiana Flight 214, crashed in clear weather on Saturday morning, while making a routine visual approach.
The chairwoman, Deborah A. P. Hersman, said, “We’re looking at some issues with respect to the crew,” but warned that the board was a long way from reaching a conclusion. “We want to understand the humans, we want to understand the aircraft.”The chairwoman, Deborah A. P. Hersman, said, “We’re looking at some issues with respect to the crew,” but warned that the board was a long way from reaching a conclusion. “We want to understand the humans, we want to understand the aircraft.”
On Monday in Seoul, South Korea, the president of Asiana, Yoon Young-doo, said that one of the two pilots at the controls, Lee Kang-guk, was making his first landing at San Francisco in a 777, in which he had only 43 hours of flying time and eight landings. But Mr. Lee had landed here numerous times at the controls of a 747, Mr. Yoon said. Normal procedure for pilots upgrading to another aircraft is to be paired with a more experienced colleague, and in fact three of them were on board on Saturday. The N.T.S.B. has not said yet if all four were in the cockpit, although that would be the normal procedure.On Monday in Seoul, South Korea, the president of Asiana, Yoon Young-doo, said that one of the two pilots at the controls, Lee Kang-guk, was making his first landing at San Francisco in a 777, in which he had only 43 hours of flying time and eight landings. But Mr. Lee had landed here numerous times at the controls of a 747, Mr. Yoon said. Normal procedure for pilots upgrading to another aircraft is to be paired with a more experienced colleague, and in fact three of them were on board on Saturday. The N.T.S.B. has not said yet if all four were in the cockpit, although that would be the normal procedure.
If the cause of the Asiana 214 crash here is as simple as it looks at first glance — the crew mismanaging the approach — the board could eventually recommend adding more bells and whistles to the 777’s cockpit, but it has many already, experts say.If the cause of the Asiana 214 crash here is as simple as it looks at first glance — the crew mismanaging the approach — the board could eventually recommend adding more bells and whistles to the 777’s cockpit, but it has many already, experts say.
Preliminary data showed the crew let the plane’s airspeed deteriorate, which could have been equipment failure, mismanagement of automated systems or simple neglect. Cockpit indicators clearly display target airspeed, which is based in part on factors like aircraft weight. Airspeed dropped to 103 knots — about 118 miles per hour — but the target speed was 137 knots.Preliminary data showed the crew let the plane’s airspeed deteriorate, which could have been equipment failure, mismanagement of automated systems or simple neglect. Cockpit indicators clearly display target airspeed, which is based in part on factors like aircraft weight. Airspeed dropped to 103 knots — about 118 miles per hour — but the target speed was 137 knots.
The investigators have not said publicly if the crew was using the auto-throttle. If the crew was confused about whether the auto-throttle was engaged, that could have been a factor, according to aviation experts. The investigators have not even said who was in charge of the landing.The investigators have not said publicly if the crew was using the auto-throttle. If the crew was confused about whether the auto-throttle was engaged, that could have been a factor, according to aviation experts. The investigators have not even said who was in charge of the landing.
On the 777 that crashed, a low-airspeed warning called a stick shaker, which literally shakes the control yoke that the pilots hold in their hands, activated shortly before the crash, but it came too late for the crew to react successfully. The throttles were moved to a higher setting eight seconds before impact, Ms. Hersman said. On a big jet, though, the engines take time to develop power. The plane was at an altitude of only 125 feet at that point.On the 777 that crashed, a low-airspeed warning called a stick shaker, which literally shakes the control yoke that the pilots hold in their hands, activated shortly before the crash, but it came too late for the crew to react successfully. The throttles were moved to a higher setting eight seconds before impact, Ms. Hersman said. On a big jet, though, the engines take time to develop power. The plane was at an altitude of only 125 feet at that point.
Inadvertent loss of airspeed is nothing new; among the many jet crashes in which it played a role is the one that killed Senator Paul Wellstone in Minnesota in 2002. But that was a charter with a single pilot. Inadvertent loss of airspeed is nothing new; among the many jet crashes in which it played a role is the one that killed Senator Paul Wellstone in Minnesota in 2002.
Rather than onboard equipment, experts point to other elements that may loom large in this investigation, involving training, procedures and human factors.Rather than onboard equipment, experts point to other elements that may loom large in this investigation, involving training, procedures and human factors.
One is overreliance on technology, some of which was not available on Saturday. Part of the instrument landing system on Runway 28 Left here had been shut down because of construction.One is overreliance on technology, some of which was not available on Saturday. Part of the instrument landing system on Runway 28 Left here had been shut down because of construction.
The 777 is built to lock on to the instrument landing system, accepting its signals for lateral and horizontal navigation to land in the correct spot on the tarmac. American pilots use that capability often, especially when visibility is poor, but airports prefer visual approaches to instrument approaches, because the planes can squeeze slightly closer together. And American pilots often switch off the auto-land capability to “hand-fly” the airplane.The 777 is built to lock on to the instrument landing system, accepting its signals for lateral and horizontal navigation to land in the correct spot on the tarmac. American pilots use that capability often, especially when visibility is poor, but airports prefer visual approaches to instrument approaches, because the planes can squeeze slightly closer together. And American pilots often switch off the auto-land capability to “hand-fly” the airplane.
But in Asia, “there is high reluctance to hand-fly the airplane,” said Oscar S. Garcia, now the chief executive of InterFlight Global, a consulting firm, but formerly a 777 pilot with a major Asian carrier. Others say such reliance is common in developing countries. In any case, it can limit the proficiency of pilots landing under visual flight rules. This is a bigger problem for bigger planes because they make longer flights and thus fewer landings. The crew had turned off the autopilot at 1,600 feet; they could not land by autopilot without the instrument landing system.But in Asia, “there is high reluctance to hand-fly the airplane,” said Oscar S. Garcia, now the chief executive of InterFlight Global, a consulting firm, but formerly a 777 pilot with a major Asian carrier. Others say such reliance is common in developing countries. In any case, it can limit the proficiency of pilots landing under visual flight rules. This is a bigger problem for bigger planes because they make longer flights and thus fewer landings. The crew had turned off the autopilot at 1,600 feet; they could not land by autopilot without the instrument landing system.
Another issue is making use of all the people in the cockpit. That issue was highlighted by the other big Korean carrier, Korean Air, in a 1997 crash in Guam. In that crash, too, part of the instrument landing system was out of service for scheduled maintenance. But the captain of a 747 insisted it was working, and managed to tune the plane’s radio to pick up some stray signal he concluded was the glide-slope indicator, which helps keep planes at the correct descent angle. It was not, and the junior officer, the flight engineer, kept saying so, but the captain pressed on, bringing the plane down in the jungle several miles short of the runway.Another issue is making use of all the people in the cockpit. That issue was highlighted by the other big Korean carrier, Korean Air, in a 1997 crash in Guam. In that crash, too, part of the instrument landing system was out of service for scheduled maintenance. But the captain of a 747 insisted it was working, and managed to tune the plane’s radio to pick up some stray signal he concluded was the glide-slope indicator, which helps keep planes at the correct descent angle. It was not, and the junior officer, the flight engineer, kept saying so, but the captain pressed on, bringing the plane down in the jungle several miles short of the runway.
Robert T. Francis, who was the vice chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board at the time of the Guam crash, said that making good use of all the people in the cockpit was essential. “It’s important when you have four sets of eyes in the cockpit, that everyone, if they see something wrong, be encouraged to sing out,” he said.Robert T. Francis, who was the vice chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board at the time of the Guam crash, said that making good use of all the people in the cockpit was essential. “It’s important when you have four sets of eyes in the cockpit, that everyone, if they see something wrong, be encouraged to sing out,” he said.
But Asiana 214 may have had a difficult mix. Gregory Feith, who was in charge in the Guam accident and is now a safety consultant, pointed out that there were three captains on board and a pilot new to the aircraft. “You usually don’t fly with three captains,” he said, and in some other accidents involving teams of two captains (instead of a captain and a first officer), the captains failed to monitor each other. “You start having senior guys in the cockpit, rather than a regular captain and a regular line first officer, and maybe there’s not the same situational awareness, the same checking the other guy,” he said.But Asiana 214 may have had a difficult mix. Gregory Feith, who was in charge in the Guam accident and is now a safety consultant, pointed out that there were three captains on board and a pilot new to the aircraft. “You usually don’t fly with three captains,” he said, and in some other accidents involving teams of two captains (instead of a captain and a first officer), the captains failed to monitor each other. “You start having senior guys in the cockpit, rather than a regular captain and a regular line first officer, and maybe there’s not the same situational awareness, the same checking the other guy,” he said.
“You would suspect there had to be some oversight issues,” he said.“You would suspect there had to be some oversight issues,” he said.

Choe Sang-hun contributed reporting from Seoul, South Korea.

Choe Sang-hun contributed reporting from Seoul, South Korea.