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Osama bin Laden: Pakistan criticised over failure to capture al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden: Pakistan criticised over failure to capture al-Qaida chief
(about 2 hours later)
Pakistan failed to detect Osama bin Laden during the six years he hid in Abbottabad because of the "collective incompetence and negligence" of the country's intelligence and security forces, the country's official report into the killing of the al-Qaida chief in 2011 has concluded. Pakistan failed to detect Osama bin Laden during the six years he hid in Abbottabad because of the "collective incompetence and negligence" of the country's intelligence and security forces, the official report into the killing of the al-Qaida chief in 2011 has concluded.
The much anticipated report, a copy of which has been obtained by al-Jazeera, is withering in its criticism of Pakistan's dysfunctional institutions, which were unable to find the world's most wanted man during his long stay in a major Pakistani city. The much anticipated report, a copy of which was acquired by al-Jazeera, is withering in its criticism of Pakistan's dysfunctional institutions that were unable to find the world's most wanted man during his long stay in a major Pakistani city.
"It is a glaring testimony to the collective incompetence and negligence, at the very least, of the security and intelligence community in the Abbottabad area." "It is a glaring testimony to the collective incompetence and negligence, at the very least, of the security and intelligence community in the Abbottabad area," said the report, which criticised Pakistan's military spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI), for having prematurely "closed the book" on bin Laden in 2005.
Nor does it rule out the possibility of involvement by rogue Pakistani intelligence officers who have been accused of deliberately shielding the world's most wanted man by some commentators. Nor does the 336-page document rule out the possibility of involvement by rogue Pakistani intelligence officers, who have been accused of deliberately shielding the world's most wanted man by some commentators.
"Given the length of stay and the changes of residence of [Bin Laden] and his family in Pakistan … the possibility of some such direct or indirect and 'plausibly deniable' support cannot be ruled out, at least, at some level outside formal structures of the intelligence establishment." "Given the length of stay and the changes of residence of [bin Laden] and his family in Pakistan … the possibility of some such direct or indirect and "plausibly deniable" support cannot be ruled out, at least, at some level outside formal structures of the intelligence establishment."
It warns that the influence of radical Islamists inside the armed forces had been "underestimated by senior military officials whom the commission met".It warns that the influence of radical Islamists inside the armed forces had been "underestimated by senior military officials whom the commission met".
The inquiry by the Abbottabad commission heard testimony from some of the country's most powerful people, including former spy chief Ahmad Shuja Pasha, who shares much of the authors' despair about Pakistan, warning it is a "failing state". In addition to its scorching criticism of Pakistani institutions, the document reflects official fury at the behaviour of the US. It concludes the US "acted like a criminal thug" when it sent the special forces raiding party into Pakistani territory.
The publication of the judge-led inquiry has long been delayed amid fears that it might be suppressed for decades.
In addition to its scorching criticism of Pakistani institutions, it also reflects official fury at the behaviour of the US. The report concludes that in sending special forces to raid a house inside Pakistani territory the US "acted like a criminal thug".
It concurs that the incident was a "national tragedy" because of the "illegal manner in which [Bin Laden] was killed along with three Pakistani citizens".It concurs that the incident was a "national tragedy" because of the "illegal manner in which [Bin Laden] was killed along with three Pakistani citizens".
It says the 2 May 2011 operation was "the American act of war against Pakistan" and illustrated the US's "contemptuous disregard of Pakistan's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity in the arrogant certainty of its unmatched military might". It says the operation on 2 May 2011 was an "American act of war against Pakistan" and illustrated the US's "contemptuous disregard of Pakistan's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity in the arrogant certainty of its unmatched military might".
The report repeatedly returns to the remarkable failure of the police, army and civilian authorities to investigate the unusual house where Bin Laden hid for so long. Begun soon after the dramatic US raid, the judge-led inquiry by the Abbottabad commission heard testimony from some of the country's most important players, including the ISI chief, Ahmad Shuja Pasha, who shared much of the authors' despair about Pakistan, warning it is a "failing state".
"How the entire neighbourhood, local officials, police and security and intelligence officials all missed the size, the strange shape, the barbed wire, the lack of cars and visitors … over a period of nearly six years beggars belief." With frank discussion of some of the country's most sensitive issues there were real fears it would never be published.
It notes that the house was even declared uninhabited in an official survey of houses in the area, even though 26 people were living there. In remarks that will be seized on by critics of the CIA's use of drone strikes against suspected militants inside Pakistan, Pasha admits to a "political understanding" on the issue between Islamabad and the US – something Pakistan has always officially denied.
The report notes that Bin Laden required a support network "that could not possibly have been confined to the two Pashtun brothers who worked as his couriers, security guards and general factotums". Pasha said there were no written agreements, and that Pakistan did subsequently attempt to stop drone attacks, but added that "it was easier to say no to them at the beginning".
Other people involved in protecting Bin Laden should have been discovered. The former spy chief is scathing about the quality of Pakistan's civilian leadership, accusing his nominal boss, the defence minister, of failing to have read "the basic documents concerning defence policy".
"There was simply no culture of reading among the political leadership," and "the thinking process was also non-existent".
The report also contains much criticism of the US, in particular the CIA for its failure to share intelligence fully with the ISI.
At one point the CIA gave Pakistan telephone numbers to monitor that would ultimately help identify Bin Laden's personal courier – the all-important lead that eventually brought the manhunt to the al-Qaida chief's Abbottabad home. The CIA never explained the significance of the phone numbers and the ISI failed to properly monitor them, the report said.
But in a striking echo of US unwillingness to share intelligence with its Pakistani partners, Pasha said the ISI was reluctant to work with Pakistan's own law enforcement organisations because "there were too many instances where information shared with the police had been compromised".
His evidence highlights the ISI's distrust and anger at the CIA, which Pasha claimed deliberately prevented Pakistan from claiming the glory of finding Bin Laden, which he said would have improved Pakistan's international reputation.
The "main agenda of the CIA was to have the ISI declared a terrorist organisation", he is quoted as saying.
Pasha reports the words of a US spy: "You are so cheap … we can buy you with a visa, with a visit to the US, even with a dinner … we can buy anyone."
The report asks whether the ISI had been compromised by CIA spies. One lieutenant colonel who "disappeared" with his family the day after the Abbottabad raid had a profile that "matched that of a likely CIA recruit".
The document repeatedly returns to what it describes as "government implosion syndrome" to explain the failure of any institution to investigate Bin Laden's unusual hideout.
"How the entire neighbourhood, local officials, police and security and intelligence officials all missed the size, the strange shape, the barbed wire, the lack of cars and visitors … over a period of nearly six years beggars belief," it said.
It notes that the house was even declared uninhabited in an official survey of the area, even though 26 people were living there at the time.
It said that Bin Laden must have required a support network "that could not possibly have been confined to the two Pashtun brothers who worked as his couriers, security guards and general factotums".
The report says: "Over a period of time an effective intelligence agency should have been able to contact, infiltrate or co-opt them and to develop a whole case load of information. Apparently, this was not the case."The report says: "Over a period of time an effective intelligence agency should have been able to contact, infiltrate or co-opt them and to develop a whole case load of information. Apparently, this was not the case."
It also expresses shock that the helicopters carrying members of Navy Seal team six were not spotted as they swooped in over Abbottabad. It also expresses shock that the helicopters carrying members of Navy Seal team six were not spotted as they swooped in over Abbottabad on 2 May. A lack of operational radar meant the Pakistani air force only became aware of the attack from media reports after it was over.
The report also contains much criticism of the US, in particular the CIA for its failure to share intelligence fully with Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence agency (ISI).
At one point the CIA gave Pakistan phone numbers to monitor that would ultimately help identify the all-important Bin Laden courier that led the CIA to the house in Abbottabad. The CIA never explained their significance and the ISI failed to properly monitor the numbers, the report said.
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