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Credit crunch confusion sends China's stock market on wild ride Credit crunch confusion sends China's stock market on wild ride
(3 months later)
Down 6% in the morning, up 6% in the afternoon. The wild ride in the Chinese stock market on Tuesday tells the tale of confusion about the depth of the China's credit crunch and the authorities' ability to control events.Down 6% in the morning, up 6% in the afternoon. The wild ride in the Chinese stock market on Tuesday tells the tale of confusion about the depth of the China's credit crunch and the authorities' ability to control events.
The trigger for the afternoon rebound was comments from the central bank that it would guide interest rates to "reasonable levels" and that cash in the financial system would be managed flexibly. In normal circumstances, such a statement would be regarded as woefully vague, almost meaningless. But the People's Bank of China traditionally runs its communications in a near-vacuum. Two statements in two days counts as an outbreak of verbosity. Investors took that as reassuring evidence that the authorities are at least aware of the risks as they attempt to defuse a credit boom.The trigger for the afternoon rebound was comments from the central bank that it would guide interest rates to "reasonable levels" and that cash in the financial system would be managed flexibly. In normal circumstances, such a statement would be regarded as woefully vague, almost meaningless. But the People's Bank of China traditionally runs its communications in a near-vacuum. Two statements in two days counts as an outbreak of verbosity. Investors took that as reassuring evidence that the authorities are at least aware of the risks as they attempt to defuse a credit boom.
Well, it's something to cling to. Confidence, however, looks fragile. The big problem is the scale of the ramp-up in credit in recent years. Fitch, the credit ratings agency, has calculated that the total lending in the $7.3tn (£4.7tn) Chinese economy reached almost 200% of economic output last year, up from 125% five years earlier. That rate of explosive growth can be dangerous. History is littered with example of economic blow-ups and banking crises that followed massive increases in lending – Japan in the late 1980s, most famously.Well, it's something to cling to. Confidence, however, looks fragile. The big problem is the scale of the ramp-up in credit in recent years. Fitch, the credit ratings agency, has calculated that the total lending in the $7.3tn (£4.7tn) Chinese economy reached almost 200% of economic output last year, up from 125% five years earlier. That rate of explosive growth can be dangerous. History is littered with example of economic blow-ups and banking crises that followed massive increases in lending – Japan in the late 1980s, most famously.
China's recent credit explosion started in 2009, when Beijing reacted to the west's banking bust and recession by ordering a massive programme of investment, principally in public infrastructure, offices and flats. That succeeded in restoring strong growth to the economy – and, indeed, helped to prevent a bigger global downturn. But, for the bears, the critical point is that the Chinese credit boom never slowed down: the skyscrapers and flats continued to be built before demand could catch up.China's recent credit explosion started in 2009, when Beijing reacted to the west's banking bust and recession by ordering a massive programme of investment, principally in public infrastructure, offices and flats. That succeeded in restoring strong growth to the economy – and, indeed, helped to prevent a bigger global downturn. But, for the bears, the critical point is that the Chinese credit boom never slowed down: the skyscrapers and flats continued to be built before demand could catch up.
"The excess borrowing that occurred in 2009 has never been absorbed by the real economy and now more borrowing is being piled on top of this," said Wei Yao, an analyst at the Société Générale bank, earlier this month. She thinks "the debt snowball is getting bigger and bigger, without contributing to real activity" and suspects many borrowers are rolling over loans at punitive rates in a desperate struggle to stay in the game."The excess borrowing that occurred in 2009 has never been absorbed by the real economy and now more borrowing is being piled on top of this," said Wei Yao, an analyst at the Société Générale bank, earlier this month. She thinks "the debt snowball is getting bigger and bigger, without contributing to real activity" and suspects many borrowers are rolling over loans at punitive rates in a desperate struggle to stay in the game.
SocGen's chart shows where the credit has come from – most of the extra lending is not being made by mainstream banks but by the so-called "shadow banking" system, which largely means small finance houses that have often funded speculative property projects.SocGen's chart shows where the credit has come from – most of the extra lending is not being made by mainstream banks but by the so-called "shadow banking" system, which largely means small finance houses that have often funded speculative property projects.
Beijing has traditionally tolerated the shadow banks. They are viewed as an essential part of a financial system that is steadily liberalising, even if they have also become a way for state-backed banks themselves to bypass official lending caps. But it was these shadow lenders that the People's Bank of China seemed to want to punish last week.Beijing has traditionally tolerated the shadow banks. They are viewed as an essential part of a financial system that is steadily liberalising, even if they have also become a way for state-backed banks themselves to bypass official lending caps. But it was these shadow lenders that the People's Bank of China seemed to want to punish last week.
Short-term lending rates between banks were allowed to soar – to 11% for one-week money. The official message seemed blunt: rein it in, apply discipline, and don't assume the state is always on hand to keep interest rates low. Having made its point, then central bank then managed rates back downwards, albeit not all the way down.Short-term lending rates between banks were allowed to soar – to 11% for one-week money. The official message seemed blunt: rein it in, apply discipline, and don't assume the state is always on hand to keep interest rates low. Having made its point, then central bank then managed rates back downwards, albeit not all the way down.
Beijing's mission seems reasonable enough – if there is excess credit in the Chinese economy, it's better to tackle the problem before a bigger bubble is blown. Mark Williams of thinktank Capital Economics comments: "The episode is arguably the strongest sign yet that the leadership is willing to suffer short-term economic pain if necessary to achieve more sustainable growth."Beijing's mission seems reasonable enough – if there is excess credit in the Chinese economy, it's better to tackle the problem before a bigger bubble is blown. Mark Williams of thinktank Capital Economics comments: "The episode is arguably the strongest sign yet that the leadership is willing to suffer short-term economic pain if necessary to achieve more sustainable growth."
But Williams also calls the People's Bank's behaviour "extraordinarily reckless" since it offered no explanation for its initial inaction. Indeed. It's all very well to have a policy but surely it's better to communicate it. The risk is that confidence is damaged.But Williams also calls the People's Bank's behaviour "extraordinarily reckless" since it offered no explanation for its initial inaction. Indeed. It's all very well to have a policy but surely it's better to communicate it. The risk is that confidence is damaged.
What's more, shock and awe tactics look ill-suited to the delicate task of finessing investment away from unprofitable property projects while simultaneously keeping the economy stable. Bank of America Merrill Lynch's analysts think the biggest risk lies in the central bank mishandling the situation. "In our view, dealing with banks in breach of regulations should be done by improving prudential regulations rather than engineering an interbank credit crunch which could potentially backfire should banks lose mutual trust," they said.What's more, shock and awe tactics look ill-suited to the delicate task of finessing investment away from unprofitable property projects while simultaneously keeping the economy stable. Bank of America Merrill Lynch's analysts think the biggest risk lies in the central bank mishandling the situation. "In our view, dealing with banks in breach of regulations should be done by improving prudential regulations rather than engineering an interbank credit crunch which could potentially backfire should banks lose mutual trust," they said.
Viewed from outside, China's building boom also looks to rely on inherently shaky financial structures. The shadow banks attract cash in short-term products from middle-class savers keen to escape the low deposit rates on offer at state-sponsored banks. But then they lend to long-term illiquid building projects. In a full-brown credit crunch, they would be horribly exposed. We would also see the first test of how far Beijing is willing to go to protect the shadow banks.Viewed from outside, China's building boom also looks to rely on inherently shaky financial structures. The shadow banks attract cash in short-term products from middle-class savers keen to escape the low deposit rates on offer at state-sponsored banks. But then they lend to long-term illiquid building projects. In a full-brown credit crunch, they would be horribly exposed. We would also see the first test of how far Beijing is willing to go to protect the shadow banks.
"I would say the [Chinese] authorities have the situation well in hand," said incoming Bank of England governor Mark Carney. For now, that's the consensus view. While economists are busy trimming their forecasts of GDP growth – Goldman Sachs now expects the economy to grow 7.7% in 2014, not 8.4% – they are also praising China for acting early to prevent a bigger debt crisis."I would say the [Chinese] authorities have the situation well in hand," said incoming Bank of England governor Mark Carney. For now, that's the consensus view. While economists are busy trimming their forecasts of GDP growth – Goldman Sachs now expects the economy to grow 7.7% in 2014, not 8.4% – they are also praising China for acting early to prevent a bigger debt crisis.
The alternative view is that China has left it late to rein in the credit boom without risking a major slump. If Wei Yao at SocGen is right about the chronic problem of over-extended corporate borrowers, there are lots of bad debts that haven't been recognised. In the past, recapitalising banks has never a problem for China – but the economy's new reliance on shadow banks and hazy specialist financing vehicles makes events harder to predict. Given the size of the building boom, is it even possible to estimate accurately the accumulation of bad loans in the system?The alternative view is that China has left it late to rein in the credit boom without risking a major slump. If Wei Yao at SocGen is right about the chronic problem of over-extended corporate borrowers, there are lots of bad debts that haven't been recognised. In the past, recapitalising banks has never a problem for China – but the economy's new reliance on shadow banks and hazy specialist financing vehicles makes events harder to predict. Given the size of the building boom, is it even possible to estimate accurately the accumulation of bad loans in the system?
China will also have to attempt the trick against an uncertain global backdrop. The US economy is growing but not everybody is convinced the recovery can withstand higher interest rates. In the meantime, recession rumbles on in the eurozone. But Beijing seems to have decided the country's credit pains have to be confronted anyway. After 12 years of boom, Chinese-style capitalism faces its biggest test – how to apply the brakes without crashing.China will also have to attempt the trick against an uncertain global backdrop. The US economy is growing but not everybody is convinced the recovery can withstand higher interest rates. In the meantime, recession rumbles on in the eurozone. But Beijing seems to have decided the country's credit pains have to be confronted anyway. After 12 years of boom, Chinese-style capitalism faces its biggest test – how to apply the brakes without crashing.
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