This article is from the source 'nytimes' and was first published or seen
on .
It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.
U.N. Court Acquits 2 Serbs of Crimes in Balkan Wars
U.N. Court Acquits 2 Serbs Of War Crimes
(about 4 hours later)
PARIS — In one of the most surprising verdicts of its checkered prosecution of war crimes in the Balkans, a United Nations court on Thursday acquitted two close aides of the former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, spurning the prosecution’s demand for life sentences for his once all-powerful secret police chief and his deputy.
PARIS — In one of the most surprising verdicts of its checkered prosecution of Balkan war crimes, a United Nations court on Thursday acquitted two close aides of the former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, spurning the prosecution’s demand for life sentences for his once all-powerful secret police chief and the chief’s deputy.
The judges, voting 2 to 1, said the men, Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic, had — as charged — formed, directed and paid special secret combat units during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia from 1991 to 1995. But the judges deemed that they were not criminally liable for crimes committed by these groups.
The judges, voting 2 to 1, found that the men had formed, directed and paid special secret combat units during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia from 1991 to 1995 — but that they were not criminally liable for crimes committed by those units.
The acquittal means that the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal, after almost two decades of trials involving close to 120 people, has declined to hold any member of the Milosevic regime individually accountable for the many atrocities committed by Serbs and others. The verdict also fails to tie the Serbian state directly to those deeds.
This and other recent acquittals have effectively absolved Serbia of any responsibility for atrocities committed by proxy armies in Croatia and Bosnia and by the covert network of paramilitary combat units trained, paid and supervised by the secret police.
Three months ago, appeals judges at the tribunal unexpectedly acquitted the former chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army of aiding and abetting atrocities by Serbian forces in Bosnia that had also been financed and supplied by Belgrade.
Experts said Thursday’s verdict also added to a potentially serious judicial inconsistency in the tribunal: while top commanders have been acquitted recently of serious charges, more minor defendants were convicted and sentenced earlier on far lesser counts.
On Thursday, as Alphons Orie, the presiding judge from the Netherlands, ordered Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic released and closed the session, defense lawyers and their clients smiled and embraced.
As the presiding judge, Alphons Orie of the Netherlands, ordered the defendants, Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic, released and closed the session Thursday, a live Web broadcast showed defense lawyers and their clients smiling and embracing. The chief prosecutor, Dermot Groome, an American, sat motionless in his seat.
A live broadcast on the Web from the tribunal showed the chief prosecutor, Dermot Groome, an American, remaining motionless in his seat. Judge Orie and Elizabeth Gwaunza, a judge from Zimbabwe, acquitted the defendants; Michèle Picard, a judge from France, dissented on most of the top findings.
Judge Orie and Elizabeth Gwaunza, a judge from Zimbabwe, had voted to acquit; Michèle Picard, a judge from France, had voted to convict on most of the top counts. The two accused had been charged with advancing a “joint criminal enterprise” that aimed, at Mr. Milosevic’s behest, to drive non-Serbs from large areas of Croatia and Bosnia.
The two defendants had been charged with being members of a “joint criminal enterprise” that aimed, at the behest of Mr. Milosevic, to drive non-Serbs from large swaths of Croatia and Bosnia.
Mr. Milosevic died in his cell in The Hague in 2006 before his trial ended.
Mr. Milosevic was delivered to The Hague tribunal in 2001 after being toppled in 2000 by a popular uprising that was crucially backed by armed bands who had once served Mr. Simatovic. The former Serbian leader died in prison in 2006 before his trial at the tribunal was completed.
Legal experts expressed astonishment at the acquittals, which apparently rested on new standards applied by senior judges.
In the early to mid-1990s, Mr. Stanisic, now 62, was head of Serbia’s state security service. He also handled some negotiations with foreign officials, most notably the release of United Nations peacekeepers held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs in the summer of 1995. Mr. Milosevic fired him in 1998, before NATO went to war against Serbia to drive its forces from Kosovo, the southern Serbian province. Mr. Simatovic, now 63, was Mr. Stanisic’s deputy and headed the special operations arm of the security service. Known as “Frenki,” the units he commanded were nicknamed “Frenki’s boys.”
“The entire doctrine of command responsibility has been ditched,” said Eric Gordy, who teaches the politics of Eastern Europe at the University of London and follows the trials closely. “So has the liability for aiding and abetting.”
Despite the acquittal, the three-year trial laid bare many of the inner workings of the Milosevic period, ones that had not been documented before. Among the nearly 100 prosecution witnesses were many former members of secret wartime units who testified behind closed doors as protected witnesses. Others used pseudonyms or had their voices electronically scrambled so they could not identified.
“This and several other recent decisions have become completely irrational,” he said, citing as evidence the Serb attack in late 1991 that virtually leveled the town of Vukovar in eastern Croatia, where both Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic were present with special units and giving directions. “There is no way they could not have known there were crimes involved,” he said.
Prosecutors also played radio and telephone intercepts to demonstrate how special paramilitary groups were used during the bloodiest part of the wars in 1992, when Serb and Bosnian Serb forces attacked villages to create large areas for Serbs only. Units from Belgrade were also sent to Bosnia to help with mop-up operations during the summer of 1995, after the fall of Srebrenica, where army and police units killed more than 7,000 unarmed Muslim men and boys.
In the early to mid-1990s, Mr. Stanisic, now 62, was head of Serbia’s state security service. He handled some negotiations with foreign officials, most notably the release of United Nations peacekeepers held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs in summer 1995. Mr. Milosevic fired him in 1998. Mr. Simatovic, now 63, was Mr. Stanisic’s deputy and headed the security service’s special operations arm. Together they ran the units, like Arkan’s Tigers, the Red Berets and the Scorpions. The groups became notorious because they rampaged through towns and villages, killing, as well as looting cars, cattle and valuables, and burning homes and mosques.
The Belgrade government had provided portions from the archives of the secret police, including the names of operatives and details of payments for special operations. These were redacted in open court.
Despite the acquittals, the three-year trial laid bare many inner workings of the Milosevic era. Among the nearly 100 prosecution witnesses were former members of secret units who testified behind closed doors or used pseudonyms. Some said the Tigers and Red Berets were paid with fresh bills brought from the Ministry of Interior.
Judge Orie, reading from the summary of the verdict, agreed with the prosecution that special units — with names like the Skorpions, or the Serbian Volunteer Guard, better known as Arkan’s Tigers — had, together with police and military forces, committed a large number of murders against Bosnian Muslims, Croats and other non-Serbs in Bosnia, and against Croats in Croatia.
Prosecutors played tapes of radio and telephone conversations to show the use of special units during the bloodiest part of the wars in 1992, when Serb and Bosnian Serb forces attacked villages to create large Serb-only areas. Belgrade also dispatched such units to Bosnia to help with mop-up operations after the fall of Srebrenica, where army and police units had killed more than 7,000 unarmed Muslim men and boys.
He said the accused had evidently provided training and logistical support. But they had not directed the units to commit crimes. Even the risk that they would commit crimes, Judge Orie said, was not sufficient to make them criminally liable.
Judge Orie, reading from the verdict summary, agreed with prosecutors that special units, together with police and military forces, had murdered many Bosnian Muslims, Croats and other non-Serbs in Bosnia, and Croats in Croatia.
“The chamber found,” the summary of the verdict said, “that the prosecution had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused planned or ordered the crimes charged in the indictment.”
While the accused had provided training and logistical support, the judge said, they had not directed the units to commit crimes and their awareness that there was a risk of such crimes was not enough to hold them criminally liable.
A number of experts expressed astonishment at the apparent new legal strategy of the tribunal.
“The chamber found,” the summary said, “that the prosecution had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused planned or ordered the crimes charged in the indictment.”
Eric Gordy, who teaches politics of Eastern Europe at the University of London and follows the trials closely, said that recently the judges had completely changed their standards. “The entire doctrine of command responsibility has been ditched,” he said. “So has the liability for aiding and abetting.”
“This and several other recent decisions have become completely irrational,” he said. He cited in particular the Serb attack in late 1991 that virtually leveled the town of Vukovar in eastern Croatia, where both Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic were present and giving directions, he said. “There is no way they could not have known there were crimes involved. The military strategy was to destroy the city, which the Serbian forces did. Both Stanisic and Simatovic were there.”
Groups like the Tigers became widely feared in the 1990s. Their commander was Arkan, the nom de guerre of Zeljko Raznatovic, a criminal who told his men that he never moved without word from Mr. Simatovic. He was indicted by the Hague tribunal but died in a hail of bullets in a Belgrade hotel lobby after the war.
First in Croatia, and more chillingly in Bosnia, groups like the Tigers or the Red Berets rampaged through towns and villages, killing, wounding and driving out non-Serbs. They looted cars, valuables and cattle, and torched homes, mosques, Catholic churches, almost any place of communal gathering.
Eventually, all ethnic groups turned viciously on one another. As a result, while the Serbs went first to war and committed the most crimes, Bosnia’s landscape is still dotted with roofless shells of burned out buildings.
The violence did not cease when the Dayton peace agreement ended Bosnia’s war in December 1995. After the Kosovo war, the relatively peaceful removal of Mr. Milosevic in Serbia led to score settling.
Perhaps most shockingly, Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, a former opponent of the Milosevic regime, was assassinated in Belgrade in March 2003. That killing has never been wholly solved, but Milorad Ulemek, once one of Arkan’s men and a leader of the Red Berets, was sentenced in Serbian court to 40 years in prison for his alleged role.
