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| Give President Obama a chance: there is a role for drones | Give President Obama a chance: there is a role for drones |
| (35 minutes later) | |
| For better or for worse, the public face of Barack Obama's national security strategy is an armed drone. It's hardly a surprise when one considers that in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, US drones have killed thousands of alleged "terrorists", but little transparency from the Obama administration has accompanied this ramping up of military engagement. | For better or for worse, the public face of Barack Obama's national security strategy is an armed drone. It's hardly a surprise when one considers that in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, US drones have killed thousands of alleged "terrorists", but little transparency from the Obama administration has accompanied this ramping up of military engagement. |
| Instead government officials speak mainly of the drone program's successes. According to President Obama, the drone campaign has taken dozens of al Qaida members off the battlefield and has done so with minimal civilian deaths. Indeed, current CIA director John Brennan publicly claimed in 2011 that there had not been a "single collateral death" from US drone strikes in the previous year. | Instead government officials speak mainly of the drone program's successes. According to President Obama, the drone campaign has taken dozens of al Qaida members off the battlefield and has done so with minimal civilian deaths. Indeed, current CIA director John Brennan publicly claimed in 2011 that there had not been a "single collateral death" from US drone strikes in the previous year. |
| Drone critics have a much different take. They are passionate in their conviction that US drones are indiscriminately killing and terrorizing civilians. The Guardian's own Glenn Greenwald argued recently that no "minimally rational person" can defend "Obama's drone kills on the ground that they are killing The Terrorists or that civilian deaths are rare". Conor Friedersdorf, an editor at the Atlantic and a vocal drone critic, wrote last year that liberals should not vote for President Obama's re-election because of the drone campaign, which he claimed "kills hundreds of innocents, including children," "terrorizes innocent Pakistanis on an almost daily basis" and "makes their lives into a nightmare worthy of dystopian novels". I disagree. Increasingly it appears that arguments like Friedersdorf makes are no longer sustainable (and there's real question if they ever were). Not only have drone strikes decreased, but so too have the number of civilians killed – and dramatically so. | Drone critics have a much different take. They are passionate in their conviction that US drones are indiscriminately killing and terrorizing civilians. The Guardian's own Glenn Greenwald argued recently that no "minimally rational person" can defend "Obama's drone kills on the ground that they are killing The Terrorists or that civilian deaths are rare". Conor Friedersdorf, an editor at the Atlantic and a vocal drone critic, wrote last year that liberals should not vote for President Obama's re-election because of the drone campaign, which he claimed "kills hundreds of innocents, including children," "terrorizes innocent Pakistanis on an almost daily basis" and "makes their lives into a nightmare worthy of dystopian novels". I disagree. Increasingly it appears that arguments like Friedersdorf makes are no longer sustainable (and there's real question if they ever were). Not only have drone strikes decreased, but so too have the number of civilians killed – and dramatically so. |
| This conclusion comes not from Obama administration apologists but rather, Chris Woods, whose research has served as the empirical basis for the harshest attacks on the Obama Administration's drone policy. | This conclusion comes not from Obama administration apologists but rather, Chris Woods, whose research has served as the empirical basis for the harshest attacks on the Obama Administration's drone policy. |
| Woods heads the covert war program for the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), which maintains one of three major databases tabulating civilian casualties from US drone strikes. The others are the Long War Journal and the New America Foundation (full disclosure: I used to be a fellow there). While LWJ and NAJ estimate that drone strikes in Pakistan have killed somewhere between 140 and 300 civilians, TBIJ utilizes a far broader classification for civilians killed, resulting in estimates of somewhere between 411-884 civilians killed by drones in Pakistan. The wide range of numbers here speaks to the extraordinary challenge in tabulating civilian death rates. | Woods heads the covert war program for the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), which maintains one of three major databases tabulating civilian casualties from US drone strikes. The others are the Long War Journal and the New America Foundation (full disclosure: I used to be a fellow there). While LWJ and NAJ estimate that drone strikes in Pakistan have killed somewhere between 140 and 300 civilians, TBIJ utilizes a far broader classification for civilians killed, resulting in estimates of somewhere between 411-884 civilians killed by drones in Pakistan. The wide range of numbers here speaks to the extraordinary challenge in tabulating civilian death rates. |
| There is little local reporting done on the ground in northwest Pakistan, which is the epicenter of the US drone program. As a result data collection is reliant on Pakistani news reporting, which is also dependent on Pakistani intelligence, which has a vested interest in playing up the negative consequences of US drones. | There is little local reporting done on the ground in northwest Pakistan, which is the epicenter of the US drone program. As a result data collection is reliant on Pakistani news reporting, which is also dependent on Pakistani intelligence, which has a vested interest in playing up the negative consequences of US drones. |
| When I spoke with Woods last month, he said that a fairly clear pattern has emerged over the past year – far fewer civilians are dying from drones. "For those who are opposed to drone strikes," says Woods there is historical merit to the charge of significant civilian deaths, "but from a contemporary standpoint the numbers just aren't there." | When I spoke with Woods last month, he said that a fairly clear pattern has emerged over the past year – far fewer civilians are dying from drones. "For those who are opposed to drone strikes," says Woods there is historical merit to the charge of significant civilian deaths, "but from a contemporary standpoint the numbers just aren't there." |
| While Woods makes clear that one has to be "cautious" on any estimates of casualties, it's not just a numeric decline that is being seen, but rather it's a "proportionate decline". In other words, the percentage of civilians dying in drone strikes is also falling, which suggests to Woods that US drone operators are showing far greater care in trying to limit collateral damage. />Woods estimates are supported by the aforementioned databases. In Pakistan, New America Foundation claims there have been no civilian deaths this year and only five last year; Long War Journal reported four deaths in 2012 and 11 so far in 2013; and TBIJ reports a range of 7-42 in 2012 and 0-4 in 2013. In addition, the drop in casualty figures is occurring not just in Pakistan but also in Yemen. | |
| These numbers are broadly consistent with what has been an under-reported decline in drone use overall. According to TBIJ, the number of drone strikes went from 128 in 2010 to 48 in 2012 and only 12 have occurred this year. These statistics are broadly consistent with LWJ and NAF's reporting. In Yemen, while drone attacks picked up in 2012, they have slowed dramatically this year. And in Somalia there has been no strike reported for more than a year. | These numbers are broadly consistent with what has been an under-reported decline in drone use overall. According to TBIJ, the number of drone strikes went from 128 in 2010 to 48 in 2012 and only 12 have occurred this year. These statistics are broadly consistent with LWJ and NAF's reporting. In Yemen, while drone attacks picked up in 2012, they have slowed dramatically this year. And in Somalia there has been no strike reported for more than a year. |
| Ironically, these numbers are in line with the public statements of CIA director Brennan, and even more so with Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, chairman of the Select Intelligence Committee, who claimed in February that the numbers she has received from the Obama administration suggest that the typical number of victims per year from drone attacks is in "the single digits". | Ironically, these numbers are in line with the public statements of CIA director Brennan, and even more so with Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, chairman of the Select Intelligence Committee, who claimed in February that the numbers she has received from the Obama administration suggest that the typical number of victims per year from drone attacks is in "the single digits". |
| Part of the reason for these low counts is that the Obama administration has sought to minimize the number of civilian casualties through what can best be described as "creative bookkeeping". The administration counts all military-age males as possible combatants unless they have information (posthumously provided) that proves them innocent. Few have taken the White House's side on this issue (and for good reason) though some outside researchers concur with the administration's estimates. | Part of the reason for these low counts is that the Obama administration has sought to minimize the number of civilian casualties through what can best be described as "creative bookkeeping". The administration counts all military-age males as possible combatants unless they have information (posthumously provided) that proves them innocent. Few have taken the White House's side on this issue (and for good reason) though some outside researchers concur with the administration's estimates. |
| Christine Fair, a professor at Georgetown University has long maintained that civilian deaths from drones in Pakistan are dramatically overstated. She argues that considering the alternatives of sending in the Pakistani military or using manned aircraft to flush out jihadists, drone strikes are a far more humane method of war-fighting. | Christine Fair, a professor at Georgetown University has long maintained that civilian deaths from drones in Pakistan are dramatically overstated. She argues that considering the alternatives of sending in the Pakistani military or using manned aircraft to flush out jihadists, drone strikes are a far more humane method of war-fighting. |
| So how does one explain this rather important shift in the US drone war? The reasons appear to be three-fold. First, as technology has improved so too have the capabilities of drone operators to be more precise. Second, there appears to be shift in targeting, particularly away from so-called "signature strikes" that rely more on behavior than specific intelligence to justify kills. Considering the criticism of the program – from both inside and outside the US – it's difficult to imagine this hasn't given impetus for Obama administration officials to take even greater caution in how drones are utilized. Or to put it more directly, drone critics are having a constructive impact. | So how does one explain this rather important shift in the US drone war? The reasons appear to be three-fold. First, as technology has improved so too have the capabilities of drone operators to be more precise. Second, there appears to be shift in targeting, particularly away from so-called "signature strikes" that rely more on behavior than specific intelligence to justify kills. Considering the criticism of the program – from both inside and outside the US – it's difficult to imagine this hasn't given impetus for Obama administration officials to take even greater caution in how drones are utilized. Or to put it more directly, drone critics are having a constructive impact. |
| But there's a third reason: as the war in Afghanistan has begun to wind down the use of drones against militants across the border from Pakistan has declined as well. | But there's a third reason: as the war in Afghanistan has begun to wind down the use of drones against militants across the border from Pakistan has declined as well. |
| For several years now this has been the worst kept secret about drones: namely that they were disproportionately targeting not al Qaida, but rather Pakistan Taliban and Afghan Taliban militants. The latter were being killed because they threatened US troops in Afghanistan; the former as a sort of quid pro quo to Pakistan for their granting of permission to kill AQ operatives. This speaks, however, to one of the more troubling aspects of the current drone program: it's dubious legality. | For several years now this has been the worst kept secret about drones: namely that they were disproportionately targeting not al Qaida, but rather Pakistan Taliban and Afghan Taliban militants. The latter were being killed because they threatened US troops in Afghanistan; the former as a sort of quid pro quo to Pakistan for their granting of permission to kill AQ operatives. This speaks, however, to one of the more troubling aspects of the current drone program: it's dubious legality. |
| The Obama Administration has long argued that its counter-terrorism program in Pakistan targets member of al Qaida or those who pose an "imminent threat" to the United States. That would exclude Taliban militants, no matter how nefarious their intentions might be. But a blockbuster report last month from Jonathan Landay, which oddly received little attention in scandal-besotted Washington, exposed the fact that the Obama administration is simply not being truthful about who its drone program is targeting. Relying on top-secret US intelligence reports, Landay revealed that the lion's share of drone strikes in Pakistan are against militants and not al Qaida; and that in more than a few occasions, drone operators are not even sure who they are killing. | The Obama Administration has long argued that its counter-terrorism program in Pakistan targets member of al Qaida or those who pose an "imminent threat" to the United States. That would exclude Taliban militants, no matter how nefarious their intentions might be. But a blockbuster report last month from Jonathan Landay, which oddly received little attention in scandal-besotted Washington, exposed the fact that the Obama administration is simply not being truthful about who its drone program is targeting. Relying on top-secret US intelligence reports, Landay revealed that the lion's share of drone strikes in Pakistan are against militants and not al Qaida; and that in more than a few occasions, drone operators are not even sure who they are killing. |
| Quite simply, the drone war is merely an arm of the US war in Afghanistan. This targeting of Taliban foot soldiers in Pakistan is not covered under the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) that was passed by Congress in 2001. As a result the strikes are likely illegal, both under US law but also international law. | Quite simply, the drone war is merely an arm of the US war in Afghanistan. This targeting of Taliban foot soldiers in Pakistan is not covered under the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) that was passed by Congress in 2001. As a result the strikes are likely illegal, both under US law but also international law. |
| Beyond the legal issues there is also the question of transparency. Obama administration officials have still not revealed their targeting procedures. They refuse to acknowledge the use of signature strikes, nor have they released the Justice Department memo that legally justified the killing of a US citizen in Yemen, who had joined al Qaida. The recent decision to move the drone program from the CIA to the US military is a positive step in the right direction and has the potential to offer more clarity about what the US is doing. But this only a first step. | Beyond the legal issues there is also the question of transparency. Obama administration officials have still not revealed their targeting procedures. They refuse to acknowledge the use of signature strikes, nor have they released the Justice Department memo that legally justified the killing of a US citizen in Yemen, who had joined al Qaida. The recent decision to move the drone program from the CIA to the US military is a positive step in the right direction and has the potential to offer more clarity about what the US is doing. But this only a first step. |
| Moreover, the drone program appears to operate in a sort of strategic netherworld in which counter-terrorism operations continue ad infinitum in an unceasing game of Whack-a-Terrorist. Drones are and should be an integral part of any effective counter-terrorism program. There is little doubt that they have played an effective role in reducing al Qaida ranks in Pakistan and putting cells in Yemen on the run (a fact acknowledged by Osama bin Laden). So long as there are jihadist terrorists intent on striking America, a drone capability will likely be necessary. | Moreover, the drone program appears to operate in a sort of strategic netherworld in which counter-terrorism operations continue ad infinitum in an unceasing game of Whack-a-Terrorist. Drones are and should be an integral part of any effective counter-terrorism program. There is little doubt that they have played an effective role in reducing al Qaida ranks in Pakistan and putting cells in Yemen on the run (a fact acknowledged by Osama bin Laden). So long as there are jihadist terrorists intent on striking America, a drone capability will likely be necessary. |
| Yet at the same time it begs the question – how does this end? Considering that the Obama administration has basically defined the battlefield in the war on terror as global it's hard to see what, if any, limits exist on the use of drones. In fact, the irony of drones being such an effective and precise killing tool is that their use could theoretically continue forever. If they're not killing civilians, what's the harm? | Yet at the same time it begs the question – how does this end? Considering that the Obama administration has basically defined the battlefield in the war on terror as global it's hard to see what, if any, limits exist on the use of drones. In fact, the irony of drones being such an effective and precise killing tool is that their use could theoretically continue forever. If they're not killing civilians, what's the harm? |
| Indeed, the focus on security from terrorism has seemed to cloud the vision of policymakers and blinded them to the public image of the US being created by the drone program as well as the recruitment capabilities for al Qaida and others. There has been, as of yet, no serious backlash from the Obama Administration's promiscuous use of drones. But the optimal word here is "yet." | Indeed, the focus on security from terrorism has seemed to cloud the vision of policymakers and blinded them to the public image of the US being created by the drone program as well as the recruitment capabilities for al Qaida and others. There has been, as of yet, no serious backlash from the Obama Administration's promiscuous use of drones. But the optimal word here is "yet." |
| As the president delivers a major national security speech, it is incumbent upon him to offer more information about the program, explain how targets are chosen and above all place clear and identifiable limitations on their use – limitations that will continue after he leaves office and that can be codified for international norms guiding the use of drones. In addition, if the administration believes that drones should be used in the fight against militants in Pakistan then it needs to ensure it has clear legal justification to do so – and not rely on a wink and nod to legal niceties. | As the president delivers a major national security speech, it is incumbent upon him to offer more information about the program, explain how targets are chosen and above all place clear and identifiable limitations on their use – limitations that will continue after he leaves office and that can be codified for international norms guiding the use of drones. In addition, if the administration believes that drones should be used in the fight against militants in Pakistan then it needs to ensure it has clear legal justification to do so – and not rely on a wink and nod to legal niceties. |
| In the end, it is Obama's lack of candor on the drone program that has led to so much disinformation has undermined whatever legitimacy the program should theoretically enjoy. It's not too late for the White House to correct the record and place not just the drone program but it's larger counter-terrorism efforts in a clear legal and institutional framework. Until then, the questions and accusations will keep coming. | In the end, it is Obama's lack of candor on the drone program that has led to so much disinformation has undermined whatever legitimacy the program should theoretically enjoy. It's not too late for the White House to correct the record and place not just the drone program but it's larger counter-terrorism efforts in a clear legal and institutional framework. Until then, the questions and accusations will keep coming. |