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| North Korea's third test brings it closer to nuclear power status | North Korea's third test brings it closer to nuclear power status |
| (about 1 month later) | |
| When it threatened to carry out its third nuclear test, the North Korean military boasted it would be at a 'higher level' than the two earlier efforts, in 2006 and 2009, triggering speculation on what such an advance would entail. | When it threatened to carry out its third nuclear test, the North Korean military boasted it would be at a 'higher level' than the two earlier efforts, in 2006 and 2009, triggering speculation on what such an advance would entail. |
| Now we know what the regime had in mind. The official North Korean news agency, KCNA, has claimed the country's scientists had successfully tested "a miniaturised and lighter nuclear device with greater explosive force". | Now we know what the regime had in mind. The official North Korean news agency, KCNA, has claimed the country's scientists had successfully tested "a miniaturised and lighter nuclear device with greater explosive force". |
| The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), which monitored the seismic shocks from the test, said it had indeed made a bigger bang that in 2006, and the Russian defence ministry believes the yield was over seven kilotons, above the top end of the estimates for the last test. | The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), which monitored the seismic shocks from the test, said it had indeed made a bigger bang that in 2006, and the Russian defence ministry believes the yield was over seven kilotons, above the top end of the estimates for the last test. |
| For the sake of comparison, the Hiroshima bomb was estimated to have a yield of 13-18 kilotons and each of the permitted eight W88 warheads on a Trident II missile is 475 kilotons. However, the relatively small yield on the North Korea test is not necessarily a sign the test fizzled. If Pyongyang's claims are true, the regime has mastered the art of making a viable warhead that can sit atop of the medium- and long-range missiles it is developing. | For the sake of comparison, the Hiroshima bomb was estimated to have a yield of 13-18 kilotons and each of the permitted eight W88 warheads on a Trident II missile is 475 kilotons. However, the relatively small yield on the North Korea test is not necessarily a sign the test fizzled. If Pyongyang's claims are true, the regime has mastered the art of making a viable warhead that can sit atop of the medium- and long-range missiles it is developing. |
| In that case, North Korea has made the last major technological leap to becoming a nuclear weapons power. Until now, it could only gets its rudimentary warheads to their targets by boat or lorry. Miniaturisation gives it a far more fearsome and immediate means of delivering a bomb. | In that case, North Korea has made the last major technological leap to becoming a nuclear weapons power. Until now, it could only gets its rudimentary warheads to their targets by boat or lorry. Miniaturisation gives it a far more fearsome and immediate means of delivering a bomb. |
| Seen from Pyongyang, this means the country has achieved under Kim Jong-un's young reign what eluded his father, a credible deterrent to safeguard the regime's survival. Seen from the region, the move will be profoundly destabilising, accelerating Japanese and South Korean efforts to build missile defences. That in turn will concern China, which is likely to see such defences as blunting the effectiveness of its own deterrence. It could consider increasing the size of its own relatively modest nuclear arsenal. | Seen from Pyongyang, this means the country has achieved under Kim Jong-un's young reign what eluded his father, a credible deterrent to safeguard the regime's survival. Seen from the region, the move will be profoundly destabilising, accelerating Japanese and South Korean efforts to build missile defences. That in turn will concern China, which is likely to see such defences as blunting the effectiveness of its own deterrence. It could consider increasing the size of its own relatively modest nuclear arsenal. |
| The neighbouring states, the US and CTBTO will now be trying to "sniff" the air for any radioactive contamination. The big question will be whether the warhead tested was made of plutonium or highly-enriched uranium (HEU). | The neighbouring states, the US and CTBTO will now be trying to "sniff" the air for any radioactive contamination. The big question will be whether the warhead tested was made of plutonium or highly-enriched uranium (HEU). |
| The country is only thought to have produced enough plutonium to make a handful of bombs, one or two of which it had to use for testing, and its production facilities are in poor repair. | The country is only thought to have produced enough plutonium to make a handful of bombs, one or two of which it had to use for testing, and its production facilities are in poor repair. |
| However, in 2010, the regime surprised the world by showing an American academic, Siegfried Hecker, a tour of what appeared to be sophisticated uranium enrichment plant. | However, in 2010, the regime surprised the world by showing an American academic, Siegfried Hecker, a tour of what appeared to be sophisticated uranium enrichment plant. |
| The ability to make weapons-grade HEU gives Pyongyang the ability to build a much more substantial arsenal. HEU is not as convenient as plutonium for making warheads. You can't make them as small. But as Hecker wrote in a recent Foreign Policy article, the Pakistani nuclear smuggler, AQ Khan, is thought to have taught the North Koreans how to do the job adequately with HEU. | The ability to make weapons-grade HEU gives Pyongyang the ability to build a much more substantial arsenal. HEU is not as convenient as plutonium for making warheads. You can't make them as small. But as Hecker wrote in a recent Foreign Policy article, the Pakistani nuclear smuggler, AQ Khan, is thought to have taught the North Koreans how to do the job adequately with HEU. |
| If the new warhead is small and made of HEU, the North Korean headache just got exponentially bigger. In Chuck Hagel's Senate confirmation hearings the questions focused somewhat obsessively on Iran and Israel, as if North Korea was a contained threat. If that assumption was ever true, it is no longer after today. | If the new warhead is small and made of HEU, the North Korean headache just got exponentially bigger. In Chuck Hagel's Senate confirmation hearings the questions focused somewhat obsessively on Iran and Israel, as if North Korea was a contained threat. If that assumption was ever true, it is no longer after today. |
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