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A Big Challenge to China’s New Leader After North Korean Nuclear Test, China Must Deal With Its Wayward Ally
(about 3 hours later)
BEIJING — The nuclear test by North Korea on Tuesday, in defiance of warnings by China, leaves the new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, with a choice: Does he upset North Korea just a bit by agreeing to stepped up United Nations sanctions, or does he rattle the regime by pulling the plug on infusions of Chinese oil and investments that keep North Korea afloat? BEIJING — In the aftermath of Tuesday’s nuclear test by North Korea, China will almost certainly join the United States in supporting tougher sanctions at the United Nations, accompanied by sterner reprimands from Beijing against its recalcitrant ally in Pyongyang.
The test poses a major foreign policy challenge to Mr. Xi, the new head of the Communist Party, who has said he wants the United States and China to develop a “new type of relationship between two great powers.” How Mr. Xi deals with North Korea in the coming period could tell the United States what kind of leader he will be and what kind of relationship he envisions with Washington. But as impatient as China might be with North Korea, there is little chance that the new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, will move quickly to change the nation’s long-held policy of propping up the walled-off government that has long served as a buffer against closer intrusion by the United States on the Korean Peninsula.
Already he has shown himself to be more of a nationalist than his predecessor, Hu Jintao, displaying China’s determination to prevail in the East China Sea crisis in which China is trying to wrest control of islands administered by Japan. He has also displayed considerably more interest in China’s military, visiting bases and troops in the last two months with blandishments to soldiers to be combat ready. The Chinese military, and to a lesser extent the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, assert strong influence on China’s Korean policy, and both these powerful entities prefer to keep North Korea close at hand, Chinese and American analysts say.
To improve the strained relationship with the United States, Mr. Xi could start with getting tougher on North Korea, harnessing China’s clout with the outlier government to help slow down its nuclear program. If Mr. Xi does not help in curbing the North Koreans, he will almost certainly face accelerated ballistic missile defense efforts by the United States in Northeast Asia, especially with Japan, an unpalatable situation for China. While the People’s Liberation Army does not even conduct military exercises with the North Koreans — the government in the North forbids such contact with outsiders — Chinese military strategists adhere to the doctrine that they cannot afford to abandon their ally, no matter how bad its behavior, analysts here say.
But if Mr. Xi took the measures against North Korea that the United States wants, Chinese and American analysts say, Mr. Xi would risk destabilizing North Korea, spurring its collapse and pushing the creation of a unified Korean Peninsula that could well turn out to be an American ally. An American-controlled Korean Peninsula is not an option for Mr. Xi, the analysts agree. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party looks upon the North Korean Communist Party — led by Kim Jong-un, the grandson of the nation’s founder — as a fraternal brotherhood. Indeed, relations between the two countries are conducted largely between the two parties rather than through the more normal diplomatic channels between the two foreign ministries.
The first reaction from the Chinese government was relatively mild, and suggested no immediate change in policy or attitude toward North Korea. A statement on the Foreign Ministry Web site said that the government was expressing its “staunch opposition” to the test and “strongly urges” North Korea to abide by its commitment to denuclearization. But within this basic contour there could be some adjustments by Mr. Xi, according to Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Peking University, an advocate of a tougher policy by China against North Korea.
Later in the day, the Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, summoned the North Korean ambassador, Ji Jae Ryong, to express his opposition to the test. “One nuclear test will not make China’s new administration decide to ‘abandon North Korea’ but it will definitely worsen China-North Korea relations,” Professor Zhu wrote in a recent article in the Straits Times of Singapore. “North Korea’s nuclear test will make the new Xi Jinping administration angry, and give China a headache.”
After North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009, the Obama administration excoriated Mr. Hu, accusing him of “willful blindness” to the country’s actions. Mr. Xi, who became head of the Communist Party and military council in November, will ascend to the presidency of the country next month. Already he has shown himself to be more nationalistic than his predecessor, Hu Jintao, displaying China’s determination to prevail in the East China Sea crisis in which China is seeking to wrest control of islands administered by Japan. He has also displayed considerably more interest in China’s military, visiting bases and troops in the last two months with blandishments to soldiers to be combat ready.
“With Hu out of the picture the administration is intent on determining whether Xi Jinping will prove more attentive to U.S. security concerns,” Jonathan D. Pollack, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution said. “How Xi chooses to respond will be an important early signal of his foreign policy priorities and whether he is ready to cooperate much more openly and fully with Washington and Seoul than his predecessor.” To improve China’s strained relationship with the United States, Mr. Xi could start with getting tougher on North Korea, harnessing China’s clout with the outlier government to help slow down its nuclear program. If Mr. Xi does not help in curbing the North Koreans, perhaps by privately threatening to pull the plug on infusions of Chinese oil and investments that keep North Korea afloat, he will almost certainly face an accelerated American ballistic missile defense program in Northeast Asia on behalf of Japan and other allies in the region. That would be an unpalatable situation for China.
A more heightened debate about North Korea is now swirling around China’s foreign policy circles, but whether the voices of a tough policy on North Korea can prevail remains very uncertain. The Obama administration excoriated Mr. Hu after North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009, accusing him of “willful blindness” to that country’s actions.
Despite the increasing concern in some quarters about North Korea’s wayward behavior, that dread of losing a buffer still prevails among China’s most influential policy makers, particularly in the military, according to Jia Qingguo, a professor at the School of International Studies at Beijing University who is a proponent of a new policy toward North Korea. “With Hu out of the picture, the administration is intent on determining whether Xi Jinping will prove more attentive to U.S. security concerns,” said Jonathan D. Pollack, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.
“It’s better than before, but it is still difficult to overcome” the mind-set, he said. “A lot of people are taking the very old-fashioned belief that North Korea is a strategic buffer, and they still believe American invaders would march over North Korea to come to China.” “How Xi chooses to respond will be an important early signal of his foreign policy priorities and whether he is ready to cooperate much more openly and fully with Washington and Seoul than his predecessor,” he said, referring to South Korea.
Professor Jia, who visited Washington last month, says China should use wayward North Korea as a starting point for a more cooperative relationship with the United States. “One option is North Korea,” he said. “We have to work together to stop it becoming a nuclear power.” A more heightened debate about North Korea is now swirling around China’s foreign policy circles. On one side are those like Professor Zhu who favor some kind of co-operation with the United States in curbing North Korea’s nuclear program. On the other side are the traditionalists in powerful positions in the army and the party who adhere to the buffer zone theory.
Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Beijing University who is also a proponent of a tougher stance against North Korea, said Chinese news media accounts stressing the need for punishing North Korea in a more meaningful way were an encouraging sign. “A lot of people are taking the very old-fashioned belief that North Korea is a strategic buffer,” said Jia Qingguo, a professor at Peking University’s School of International Studies who is also proponent of a new policy toward North Korea. “They still believe American invaders would march over North Korea to come to China.”
“They are quite rare signals, and I don’t recall any moment during the past 10 years that Beijing unequivocally and forcefully spoke up against Pyongyang’s nuclear tricks,” he said. Professor Jia, who visited Washington last month, said China should use wayward North Korea as a starting point for a more cooperative relationship with the United States. “One option is North Korea,” he said. “We have to work together to stop it becoming a nuclear power.”
Professor Zhu described Mr. Hu as “indecisive” on North Korea. While Mr. Xi is seen as a “more nationalistic” leader, he is also “more pragmatic,” and sees that Beijing has run out of “good will options,” Professor Zhu said. Professor Zhu said Chinese news media accounts stressing the need for punishing North Korea in a more meaningful way were an encouraging sign. “They are quite rare signals, and I don’t recall any moment during the past 10 years that Beijing unequivocally and forcefully spoke up against Pyongyang’s nuclear tricks,” he said.
China agreed to join the United States in backing new United Nations sanctions against the North after the successful test in December of a missile that reached the Philippines. But for all China’s distaste for North Korea — culturally and politically the two governments stand far apart — China should remain a firm ally of North Korea, said Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, North East Asia director and China adviser for the International Crisis Group in Beijing.
In response to China’s joining the sanctions, North Korea unleashed a scathing attack on China and vowed to push ahead with the third nuclear test. China will almost certainly join a new round of sanctions, Chinese analysts said. “The political relationship between China and North Korea right now is at a low point, but China’s longstanding priorities on the Korean Peninsula of no war, no instability and no nukes remain in that order of priority,” she said.
But for all China’s distaste for North Korea — culturally and politically the two governments stand far apart — China will most likely remain a firm ally of North Korea, said Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, North East Asia director and China adviser for the International Crisis Group in Beijing.
“The traditionalists in the People’s Liberation Army and the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party control North Korea policy,” she said. “The political relationship between China and North Korea right now is at a low point, but China’s longstanding priorities on the Korean Peninsula of no war, no instability and no nukes remain in that order of priority.”
China was prepared to live with a nuclear North Korea as long as the arsenal remained small and its nuclear status did not result in an arms race, she said.China was prepared to live with a nuclear North Korea as long as the arsenal remained small and its nuclear status did not result in an arms race, she said.
But the third nuclear test takes North Korea another step closer to a nuclear weapon that can reach the United States, even though that accomplishment may be years away, said Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, at Stanford University. He visited North Korea two years ago and was shown the country’s uranium enrichment facilities. But the third nuclear test takes take North Korea another step closer to a nuclear weapon that can reach the United States, even though that accomplishment may be years away, said Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.
If China fails to rein in North Korea, the United States will become increasingly impatient and ratchet up its defense capacities in Asia, and those of its allies, Mr. Hecker said. He visited North Korea two years ago and was shown the country’s uranium enrichment facilities.
“What is quite apparent to me is that threatening a missile-capable warhead with a successful third nuclear test gives the United States, South Korea and Japan good reason to step up their regional ballistic missile defense capabilities — that should give the Chinese government some pause.” “Threatening a missile-capable warhead with a successful third nuclear test gives the United States, South Korea and Japan good reason to step up their regional ballistic missile defense capabilities,” Mr. Hecker said. “That should give the Chinese government some pause.”