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David Cameron's pro-EU charade cannot go on much longer David Cameron's pro-EU charade cannot go on much longer
(3 days later)
After Wednesday's vote in the House of Commons, David Cameron could find himself the last "pro-European" in Britain. He will leave for Brussels next month for the seven-year EU budget summit trying to hang tough, but outflanked by his party rebels and by Labour, all wanting him to hang even tougher. He wants to keep the EU budget in line with inflation. The others want it slashed. Whatever next?After Wednesday's vote in the House of Commons, David Cameron could find himself the last "pro-European" in Britain. He will leave for Brussels next month for the seven-year EU budget summit trying to hang tough, but outflanked by his party rebels and by Labour, all wanting him to hang even tougher. He wants to keep the EU budget in line with inflation. The others want it slashed. Whatever next?
The EU budget is a flatulent confection of national, industrial and sectoral lobbies. It has never passed audit and makes Britain's Ministry of Defence seem a haven of cheese-paring efficiency. Cameron may want to keep it within inflation, but that makes no difference. Even the German compromise, for a modest cut, may not be agreed. Cameron thus finds himself trapped between the hopelessness of his own proposal and the fantasies of his opponents. To make matters worse, Denmark, Sweden and Austria are lining up behind Britain for special rebates. Small wonder that delegates next month have been told to bring overnight bags. It will be chaos. The EU budget is a flatulent confection of national, industrial and sectoral lobbies. It has not passed audit since 1994 and makes Britain's Ministry of Defence seem a haven of cheese-paring efficiency. Cameron may want to keep it within inflation, but that makes no difference. Even the German compromise, for a modest cut, may not be agreed. Cameron thus finds himself trapped between the hopelessness of his own proposal and the fantasies of his opponents. To make matters worse, Denmark, Sweden and Austria are lining up behind Britain for special rebates. Small wonder that delegates next month have been told to bring overnight bags. It will be chaos.
The EU can disregard them all. Unlike America, stymied when Congress rejects a budget, it can go on spending what it likes pending eventual "agreement". Besides, it has no mechanism for restraining, let alone cutting, spending. Those who blow a whistle on its endemic corruption face dismissal or jail. For all its anthems, flags and public relations, the EU is not a nice organisation. The affection for it shown by a dwindling band of British politicians is bizarre.The EU can disregard them all. Unlike America, stymied when Congress rejects a budget, it can go on spending what it likes pending eventual "agreement". Besides, it has no mechanism for restraining, let alone cutting, spending. Those who blow a whistle on its endemic corruption face dismissal or jail. For all its anthems, flags and public relations, the EU is not a nice organisation. The affection for it shown by a dwindling band of British politicians is bizarre.
Historians will wonder at what point the postwar European enterprise imploded into its core paradox: the impossibility of making a supranational union answerable to subsidiary national identities. The parallel is not with the US but with the old Soviet Union. It was forged in the idealistic aftermath of war to make war unrepeatable, an achievement for which the EU was eerily awarded a Nobel prize earlier this month. But that goal, now achieved, seems to obscure clear thinking. Moscow in 1990 was more realistic.Historians will wonder at what point the postwar European enterprise imploded into its core paradox: the impossibility of making a supranational union answerable to subsidiary national identities. The parallel is not with the US but with the old Soviet Union. It was forged in the idealistic aftermath of war to make war unrepeatable, an achievement for which the EU was eerily awarded a Nobel prize earlier this month. But that goal, now achieved, seems to obscure clear thinking. Moscow in 1990 was more realistic.
Britain has long recognised the EU paradox as insoluble. But rather than turn its back on Europe it has merely mirrored the paradox in its politics. It had led to intense strain. Policy towards Europe brought down Margaret Thatcher and John Major, and savaged relations between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Politicians of all parties have swerved this way and that. Thatcher could put on a pro-Europe T-shirt in 1973 and declare that "France and Germany sink their political differences and work for a united Europe. If France can do this, so can we." Meanwhile, the Europhile Blair could declare 10 years later: "Just so there is no further misunderstanding, I support withdrawal from the European economic community."Britain has long recognised the EU paradox as insoluble. But rather than turn its back on Europe it has merely mirrored the paradox in its politics. It had led to intense strain. Policy towards Europe brought down Margaret Thatcher and John Major, and savaged relations between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Politicians of all parties have swerved this way and that. Thatcher could put on a pro-Europe T-shirt in 1973 and declare that "France and Germany sink their political differences and work for a united Europe. If France can do this, so can we." Meanwhile, the Europhile Blair could declare 10 years later: "Just so there is no further misunderstanding, I support withdrawal from the European economic community."
By the end of the last decade, the paradox seemed almost resolved. Debt-fuelled prosperity appeared to be driving Europe's national economies towards a sort of equilibrium. Scepticism towards the Lisbon treaty, notably in France, Denmark and Britain, had succeeded in halting "ever closer union". Talk instead was of layered sovereignty, of more power to national assemblies and of Brussels no longer measuring cucumbers and telling hairdressers what to wear. Despite continued hostility from Europe's voters, there seemed a route ahead.By the end of the last decade, the paradox seemed almost resolved. Debt-fuelled prosperity appeared to be driving Europe's national economies towards a sort of equilibrium. Scepticism towards the Lisbon treaty, notably in France, Denmark and Britain, had succeeded in halting "ever closer union". Talk instead was of layered sovereignty, of more power to national assemblies and of Brussels no longer measuring cucumbers and telling hairdressers what to wear. Despite continued hostility from Europe's voters, there seemed a route ahead.
The eurozone crisis shattered this. It turbo-charged debt and induced a crippling dependency of poor states on rich ones. The result is a coalition between the closer-union Brussels elite and an austerity-obsessed Germany, jointly seeking a pan-European command economy. Germany wants EU commissioners sitting in authority over national budgets, under the aegis of German bankers.The eurozone crisis shattered this. It turbo-charged debt and induced a crippling dependency of poor states on rich ones. The result is a coalition between the closer-union Brussels elite and an austerity-obsessed Germany, jointly seeking a pan-European command economy. Germany wants EU commissioners sitting in authority over national budgets, under the aegis of German bankers.
This must be the most awesomely authoritarian project to emerge in western Europe since 1945. It is proposed because German bankers and exporters have so much to lose if the EU were to do what every canon of economics says it should do, which is allow weaker regions to devalue out of the single currency. Where now is a Maynard Keynes to rewrite The Economic Consequences of the Peace?This must be the most awesomely authoritarian project to emerge in western Europe since 1945. It is proposed because German bankers and exporters have so much to lose if the EU were to do what every canon of economics says it should do, which is allow weaker regions to devalue out of the single currency. Where now is a Maynard Keynes to rewrite The Economic Consequences of the Peace?
A clearer route to induce pan-European hatred of political union would be hard to imagine. The result can already be seen in the streets of Athens and Madrid, and in opinion polls across the continent. Political union may seem to some the only way to relieve the debt crisis, but it seems so at precisely the moment it has become most unimaginable.A clearer route to induce pan-European hatred of political union would be hard to imagine. The result can already be seen in the streets of Athens and Madrid, and in opinion polls across the continent. Political union may seem to some the only way to relieve the debt crisis, but it seems so at precisely the moment it has become most unimaginable.
Back in Britain, Wednesday's Commons vote on the EU budget is theatre. It is not binding on Cameron and its demands will not be realised. But it will render impossible any concession by him on Britain's now outdated £2bn rebate. It will make him even more intransigent on EU rescues, bailouts and banking regulations. Having broken his pledge to hold a referendum on the EU, Cameron must now behave as if, to all intents and purposes, he had held one and the antis had won it.Back in Britain, Wednesday's Commons vote on the EU budget is theatre. It is not binding on Cameron and its demands will not be realised. But it will render impossible any concession by him on Britain's now outdated £2bn rebate. It will make him even more intransigent on EU rescues, bailouts and banking regulations. Having broken his pledge to hold a referendum on the EU, Cameron must now behave as if, to all intents and purposes, he had held one and the antis had won it.
European diplomacy looks as it might have done prior to the first world war. Rambling alliances, ambitions, coalitions and fears swirl through the capitals of Europe. The fringes comprise a tinder box of nationalist conflicts. All eyes are again fixed on Germany, as it seeks a continental dominance that conforms to realpolitik, but at the price of impoverishing a third of the continent. Trade is sometimes war by other means.European diplomacy looks as it might have done prior to the first world war. Rambling alliances, ambitions, coalitions and fears swirl through the capitals of Europe. The fringes comprise a tinder box of nationalist conflicts. All eyes are again fixed on Germany, as it seeks a continental dominance that conforms to realpolitik, but at the price of impoverishing a third of the continent. Trade is sometimes war by other means.
Cameron cannot surely join Germany in approving a budgetary commissioner and an EU dictatorship over national budgets. But how long can he sustain the charade of being "pro-Europe", yet sceptical of Europe's current direction? Successive prime ministers have appeased domestic sentiment by hanging tough in Brussels, yet appeased Euro-centralism by capitulating to it at the last minute.Cameron cannot surely join Germany in approving a budgetary commissioner and an EU dictatorship over national budgets. But how long can he sustain the charade of being "pro-Europe", yet sceptical of Europe's current direction? Successive prime ministers have appeased domestic sentiment by hanging tough in Brussels, yet appeased Euro-centralism by capitulating to it at the last minute.
Cabinet ministers are now openly talking of disengaging, not just from the euro rescue bid but from its emerging political institutions. Labour's Ed Balls and Douglas Alexander this week accused Cameron of "throwing away a genuine opportunity to deliver a budget that is best for Britain", which clearly implies a radical change of Labour direction, indeed a bipartisan Euro-scepticism.Cabinet ministers are now openly talking of disengaging, not just from the euro rescue bid but from its emerging political institutions. Labour's Ed Balls and Douglas Alexander this week accused Cameron of "throwing away a genuine opportunity to deliver a budget that is best for Britain", which clearly implies a radical change of Labour direction, indeed a bipartisan Euro-scepticism.
Cameron must be tempted to go for the nuclear option of an early referendum, thus stifling the electoral threat from the UK Independence party. Sooner rather than later, he must negotiate a new deal with a fast-changing EU, one that should require explicit public support. If parliament wants to go down such a path, it should start mapping it now.Cameron must be tempted to go for the nuclear option of an early referendum, thus stifling the electoral threat from the UK Independence party. Sooner rather than later, he must negotiate a new deal with a fast-changing EU, one that should require explicit public support. If parliament wants to go down such a path, it should start mapping it now.
• This article was amended on 2 November 2012. The original said the EU budget "has never passed audit". To clarify: the EU's court of auditors has not given a declaration of assurance in relation to the EU budget since 1994.