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| Version 3 | Version 4 |
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| Why we went into Helmand | Why we went into Helmand |
| (8 days later) | |
| The former Labour defence secretary, John Reid, is chiefly remembered by the public for something he never quite said - that he hoped British troops could go into Helmand "without a shot being fired". What he actually said on a visit to Kabul in April 2006 was: "We would be perfectly happy to leave in three years time without firing one shot." Not quite the same thing, but the myth does nonetheless encapsulate a deeper truth about the blithe optimism with which the Blair government sent the first deployment of 3,000 soldiers into Helmand in early 2006, just as the Taliban was beginning its resurgence. | The former Labour defence secretary, John Reid, is chiefly remembered by the public for something he never quite said - that he hoped British troops could go into Helmand "without a shot being fired". What he actually said on a visit to Kabul in April 2006 was: "We would be perfectly happy to leave in three years time without firing one shot." Not quite the same thing, but the myth does nonetheless encapsulate a deeper truth about the blithe optimism with which the Blair government sent the first deployment of 3,000 soldiers into Helmand in early 2006, just as the Taliban was beginning its resurgence. |
| One source who took part in the discussions leading up to that fateful decision told me that Reid asked a senior military advisor: "What if they don't like us there?", to which the insouciant reply was: "Don't worry. The people who don't like us are in Quetta and we'll see them coming across the desert." | One source who took part in the discussions leading up to that fateful decision told me that Reid asked a senior military advisor: "What if they don't like us there?", to which the insouciant reply was: "Don't worry. The people who don't like us are in Quetta and we'll see them coming across the desert." |
| Now Matt Cavanagh, a senior advisor to Gordon Brown and Des Browne at Treasury at the time of the fateful decision, has given an insider's account of the process in the new edition of the Royal United Services Institute's RUSI Journal (use the link saying: "click here to access the article"). | Now Matt Cavanagh, a senior advisor to Gordon Brown and Des Browne at Treasury at the time of the fateful decision, has given an insider's account of the process in the new edition of the Royal United Services Institute's RUSI Journal (use the link saying: "click here to access the article"). |
| Essentially, Cavanagh says that ministers, civil servants and generals fell victim to groupthink around a single idea: "that the deployment was going to happen one way or another, so we might as well get on with it". | Essentially, Cavanagh says that ministers, civil servants and generals fell victim to groupthink around a single idea: "that the deployment was going to happen one way or another, so we might as well get on with it". |
| This assumption sprang from Tony Blair's tendency to frame the decision in the abstract, in terms of the 'long struggle' against Islamic extremism, "thinking about Britain's place in that struggle alongside the US more than he did about Afghanistan or the plan itself". Blair was to host an international conference on Afghanistan in late January 2006, and it would have been "embarrassing" to turn up not having made up his mind on deployment. | This assumption sprang from Tony Blair's tendency to frame the decision in the abstract, in terms of the 'long struggle' against Islamic extremism, "thinking about Britain's place in that struggle alongside the US more than he did about Afghanistan or the plan itself". Blair was to host an international conference on Afghanistan in late January 2006, and it would have been "embarrassing" to turn up not having made up his mind on deployment. |
| Cavanagh says that actual knowledge of the realities of Helmand was extremely limited among the decision-makers in Whitehall at the time. | Cavanagh says that actual knowledge of the realities of Helmand was extremely limited among the decision-makers in Whitehall at the time. |
| Worse still, what relevant knowledge did exist inside the system was often wasted. The military as well as politicians relied too heavily on the analogy with Northern Ireland and neglected the lessons of Iraq. | Worse still, what relevant knowledge did exist inside the system was often wasted. The military as well as politicians relied too heavily on the analogy with Northern Ireland and neglected the lessons of Iraq. |
| Cavanagh's account broadly supports the assertion made by Britain's former Afghan envoy, Sherard Cowper-Coles - and furiously denied by the top brass - that the military pushed for Helmand to expunge the shame of 'defeat' in Iraq, and to justify their budget requests. | Cavanagh's account broadly supports the assertion made by Britain's former Afghan envoy, Sherard Cowper-Coles - and furiously denied by the top brass - that the military pushed for Helmand to expunge the shame of 'defeat' in Iraq, and to justify their budget requests. |
| It was obvious by the middle of the last decade that the MoD's long-running budget problems were growing more acute, and that a strategic defence review was overdue. Afghanistan was seen as an opportunity to make the financial case for defence, or for a particular service (the army), or a particular set of military capabilities. | It was obvious by the middle of the last decade that the MoD's long-running budget problems were growing more acute, and that a strategic defence review was overdue. Afghanistan was seen as an opportunity to make the financial case for defence, or for a particular service (the army), or a particular set of military capabilities. |
| Cavanagh concludes there is plenty of blame to go around, and does not spare himself. He notes that even a brilliantly-planned campaign in Helmand would not have made up for the bigger failings involved in the overall western strategy and in the Kabul government it was intended to support. That is small comfort, particularly as it is far from clear whether the lessons spelt out by Cavanagh have been learned. | Cavanagh concludes there is plenty of blame to go around, and does not spare himself. He notes that even a brilliantly-planned campaign in Helmand would not have made up for the bigger failings involved in the overall western strategy and in the Kabul government it was intended to support. That is small comfort, particularly as it is far from clear whether the lessons spelt out by Cavanagh have been learned. |
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