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How Did No-Mandate Sweden End Up With Such an Average Pandemic? How Did No-Mandate Sweden End Up With Such an Average Pandemic?
(about 3 hours later)
If you know one thing about Sweden’s pandemic, it is almost certainly that the country followed a radical, contrarian public health path. Its hands-off approach to Covid-19 mitigation — no stay-at-home orders to begin with, and no mask mandates later on — was one that many on the pandemic left quickly derided as sadistic public policy and many on the pandemic right praised as enlightened.If you know one thing about Sweden’s pandemic, it is almost certainly that the country followed a radical, contrarian public health path. Its hands-off approach to Covid-19 mitigation — no stay-at-home orders to begin with, and no mask mandates later on — was one that many on the pandemic left quickly derided as sadistic public policy and many on the pandemic right praised as enlightened.
That was the story three years ago, and although the terms of the debate have been somewhat frozen in time since, the argument has been burning again. In recent weeks, the former state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell, the architect of the Swedish response, has been taking a sort of victory lap through the media. Norway’s top epidemiologist has expressed support bordering on envy, and on social media those who believe the pandemic response went overboard have been excitedly sharing charts purporting to show that Sweden “won” the pandemic — in theory, a vindication for public health libertarianism.That was the story three years ago, and although the terms of the debate have been somewhat frozen in time since, the argument has been burning again. In recent weeks, the former state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell, the architect of the Swedish response, has been taking a sort of victory lap through the media. Norway’s top epidemiologist has expressed support bordering on envy, and on social media those who believe the pandemic response went overboard have been excitedly sharing charts purporting to show that Sweden “won” the pandemic — in theory, a vindication for public health libertarianism.
But as with so much in this pandemic, our narratives are blinding us as much as they help us to see. Earlier this month, I wrote about the ways in which American discourse about the initial pandemic response has been shifting toward a new consensus that the country did too much — an unsettling response given the death toll, one that treats the million-plus dead almost as an afterthought (or perhaps a totally independent variable). In 2023, when Americans talk about the range of possible approaches, they still invariably refer to two countries as conceptual anchors: China and Sweden. In that previous newsletter, I wrote about how our hardening narrative about China’s pandemic disaster has drifted away from reality — however unhappy or uncomfortable it would have been for most Americans to live through “zero Covid” in Shanghai, by every concrete measure the country outperformed the United States overall, making our objections more political than epidemiological in nature.But as with so much in this pandemic, our narratives are blinding us as much as they help us to see. Earlier this month, I wrote about the ways in which American discourse about the initial pandemic response has been shifting toward a new consensus that the country did too much — an unsettling response given the death toll, one that treats the million-plus dead almost as an afterthought (or perhaps a totally independent variable). In 2023, when Americans talk about the range of possible approaches, they still invariably refer to two countries as conceptual anchors: China and Sweden. In that previous newsletter, I wrote about how our hardening narrative about China’s pandemic disaster has drifted away from reality — however unhappy or uncomfortable it would have been for most Americans to live through “zero Covid” in Shanghai, by every concrete measure the country outperformed the United States overall, making our objections more political than epidemiological in nature.
The same type of confusion applies to Sweden. You may think of the country as the pandemic’s libertarian poster child, which is how the country’s leaders have described their course as well. But three years on it is hard to treat Sweden as an exceptional example of anything, because overall, compared to its neighbors and peer countries, it has in fact had a remarkably average pandemic. There is almost no evidence anywhere in the abundant data of any extreme or unusual policy response — not in the country’s mortality figures, not in its economic trajectories, and not in the squishier set of metrics we might use to estimate effects on quality of life and indeed human flourishing. At the beginning of the pandemic, Sweden boldly set off on its own, global public health consensus be damned. Three years on, it looks like just another member of the same pandemic pack. How can that be?The same type of confusion applies to Sweden. You may think of the country as the pandemic’s libertarian poster child, which is how the country’s leaders have described their course as well. But three years on it is hard to treat Sweden as an exceptional example of anything, because overall, compared to its neighbors and peer countries, it has in fact had a remarkably average pandemic. There is almost no evidence anywhere in the abundant data of any extreme or unusual policy response — not in the country’s mortality figures, not in its economic trajectories, and not in the squishier set of metrics we might use to estimate effects on quality of life and indeed human flourishing. At the beginning of the pandemic, Sweden boldly set off on its own, global public health consensus be damned. Three years on, it looks like just another member of the same pandemic pack. How can that be?
What follows is an exploration, through data, of the larger mystery. In the big picture, I think the lessons are twofold. First, by now, more than three years since the arrival of the coronavirus and more than two years since the arrival of vaccines, vaccination — and policies to encourage it — reign over cumulative pandemic outcomes much more heavily than do mitigation choices. Second, though it is humbling to acknowledge, policy and mandates may matter somewhat less than social behavior and the disease itself — and surely less than we want to believe. What follows is an exploration, through data, of the larger mystery. In the big picture, I think the lessons are twofold. First, by now, more than three years since the arrival of the coronavirus and more than two years since the arrival of vaccines, vaccination and policies to encourage it reign over cumulative pandemic outcomes much more heavily than do mitigation choices. Second, though it is humbling to acknowledge, policy and mandates may matter somewhat less than social behavior and the disease itself — and surely less than we want to believe.
Let’s look at mortality first. Analysis by Statistics Sweden has led a lot of the recent commentary on Sweden, suggesting that, measured by excess mortality, the country had actually fared best of all the Nordic and European Union countries — that is, better than all the countries that had tried to do more, with fewer Swedes dying per capita than in any other E.U. member nation.Let’s look at mortality first. Analysis by Statistics Sweden has led a lot of the recent commentary on Sweden, suggesting that, measured by excess mortality, the country had actually fared best of all the Nordic and European Union countries — that is, better than all the countries that had tried to do more, with fewer Swedes dying per capita than in any other E.U. member nation.
This claim relies on imperfect data analysis — excess mortality calculations that didn’t take into account demographic factors and the trend lines of each country’s recent history. But while better adjusted data — from the W.H.O., The Economist and Our World in Data — tells a more nuanced story, it is still one that should challenge or even frustrate Sweden’s critics.This claim relies on imperfect data analysis — excess mortality calculations that didn’t take into account demographic factors and the trend lines of each country’s recent history. But while better adjusted data — from the W.H.O., The Economist and Our World in Data — tells a more nuanced story, it is still one that should challenge or even frustrate Sweden’s critics.
According to The Economist’s gold standard excess-mortality database, Sweden’s performance across the entire pandemic ranks 109th in the world — a bit behind the relatively impressive performance of most of its neighbors across Scandinavia, but not that far behind. According to The Economist, Denmark ranks 65th in excess mortality and Norway 85th. Iceland, often hailed as the great European success story, ranks 53rd. Finland did a bit worse than Sweden (ranking 145th), as did much of mainland Europe, with more heterogeneous populations and cross-national mixing and lower levels of social trust. The United States fares considerably worse still. Cross-country comparisons are invariably messy, especially after three years of pandemic ups and downs. But judged from a global perspective, it’s hard to argue on the basis of Sweden’s epidemiological experience that its policy course was a disastrous one.According to The Economist’s gold standard excess-mortality database, Sweden’s performance across the entire pandemic ranks 109th in the world — a bit behind the relatively impressive performance of most of its neighbors across Scandinavia, but not that far behind. According to The Economist, Denmark ranks 65th in excess mortality and Norway 85th. Iceland, often hailed as the great European success story, ranks 53rd. Finland did a bit worse than Sweden (ranking 145th), as did much of mainland Europe, with more heterogeneous populations and cross-national mixing and lower levels of social trust. The United States fares considerably worse still. Cross-country comparisons are invariably messy, especially after three years of pandemic ups and downs. But judged from a global perspective, it’s hard to argue on the basis of Sweden’s epidemiological experience that its policy course was a disastrous one.
Of course, the appeal of the Swedish model was not merely that the country’s death rates would be average but that, by avoiding lockdowns and perhaps reaching herd immunity faster, the country would ultimately outperform its peers. Intrusive mitigation policies weren’t just unnecessary, in other words, but potentially counterproductive. And although Tegnell tried to distance himself from a goal of “herd immunity,” many of those cheering Sweden on saw that as the natural exit ramp from the pandemic, and as early as April 2020 Tegnell was predicting that herd immunity was just weeks away. Of course, the appeal of the Swedish model was not merely that the country’s death rates would be average but that, by avoiding lockdowns and perhaps reaching herd immunity faster, the country would ultimately outperform its peers. Intrusive mitigation policies weren’t just unnecessary, in other words, but potentially counterproductive. And although Tegnell tried to distance himself from a goal of herd immunity, many of those cheering Sweden on saw that as the natural exit ramp from the pandemic, and as early as April 2020 Tegnell was predicting that herd immunity was just weeks away.
But herd immunity never came — not to Sweden, and not anywhere in the world, at least not as it was conventionally understood at the time. Almost everywhere now, populations are dramatically more protected against severe Covid-19 than they were three years ago, thanks to immunity derived from both infections and vaccination. But no country has even glimpsed a horizon past which the disease would simply recede; in the United States, for instance, an estimated 94 percent of the country has now been infected, and yet the disease continues to circulate quite promiscuously, among the vaccinated and unvaccinated alike.But herd immunity never came — not to Sweden, and not anywhere in the world, at least not as it was conventionally understood at the time. Almost everywhere now, populations are dramatically more protected against severe Covid-19 than they were three years ago, thanks to immunity derived from both infections and vaccination. But no country has even glimpsed a horizon past which the disease would simply recede; in the United States, for instance, an estimated 94 percent of the country has now been infected, and yet the disease continues to circulate quite promiscuously, among the vaccinated and unvaccinated alike.
This is one of the most conspicuous landmarks of the early pandemic to have been memory-holed in the post-vaccination, quasi-endemic phase we are still living through. In 2020, almost every conversation about the Covid-19 endgame featured references to herd immunity. Anthony Fauci even got into some trouble for revising his public estimate of the threshold of infection and vaccination that would be required for it, moving his goal posts by December of 2020 from 60 percent or 70 percent of the population to 80 percent or 85 percent.This is one of the most conspicuous landmarks of the early pandemic to have been memory-holed in the post-vaccination, quasi-endemic phase we are still living through. In 2020, almost every conversation about the Covid-19 endgame featured references to herd immunity. Anthony Fauci even got into some trouble for revising his public estimate of the threshold of infection and vaccination that would be required for it, moving his goal posts by December of 2020 from 60 percent or 70 percent of the population to 80 percent or 85 percent.
But we hit those thresholds, one after another, and then kept going with the disease still spreading. And we never really got an explanation or had a proper reckoning with the false predictions of a natural subsidence — which undergirded both the “conservative” case for “reopening” and the “liberal” case for “flattening the curve” until vaccines arrived. But we hit those thresholds, one after another, and then kept going, with the disease still spreading. And we never really got an explanation or had a proper reckoning with the false predictions of a natural subsidence — which undergirded both the conservative case for reopening and the liberal case for flattening the curve until vaccines arrived.
Why did herd immunity turn into a mirage? New variants grew more transmissible and more immune-evasive, and vaccines proved less effective against simple spread than was initially hoped. But last year, the epidemiologist Michael Mina told me a more fundamental factor was at play: SARS-CoV-2 was simply not the kind of virus where infection or vaccination was likely to really stop transmission. This January, Fauci himself published a paper making a similar point — that viruses that replicate in mucosal passages can’t be eradicated by vaccines that create systemic immunity.Why did herd immunity turn into a mirage? New variants grew more transmissible and more immune-evasive, and vaccines proved less effective against simple spread than was initially hoped. But last year, the epidemiologist Michael Mina told me a more fundamental factor was at play: SARS-CoV-2 was simply not the kind of virus where infection or vaccination was likely to really stop transmission. This January, Fauci himself published a paper making a similar point — that viruses that replicate in mucosal passages can’t be eradicated by vaccines that create systemic immunity.
In a context where the disease is circulating freely enough to reach the whole population eventually, the total number of infections is probably less consequential for mortality than how well the population is protected by vaccination when waves of initial infections arrive. Mitigation measures can reduce spread, of course, and help delay infections until vaccines are available. But the effect is, compared with vaccination itself, relatively small: A much lauded study in Bangladesh, for instance, found that a tripling in mask use resulted in only an 11 percent reduction in total cases, while on average, vaccination reduces the risk of severe outcomes and death by more than 80 percent. Especially as the years wear on, with the vaccination phase occupying a larger and larger share of the pandemic timeline, the mitigation phase plays a smaller and smaller role in shaping overall mortality — but remains a dominant feature of our pandemic memory.In a context where the disease is circulating freely enough to reach the whole population eventually, the total number of infections is probably less consequential for mortality than how well the population is protected by vaccination when waves of initial infections arrive. Mitigation measures can reduce spread, of course, and help delay infections until vaccines are available. But the effect is, compared with vaccination itself, relatively small: A much lauded study in Bangladesh, for instance, found that a tripling in mask use resulted in only an 11 percent reduction in total cases, while on average, vaccination reduces the risk of severe outcomes and death by more than 80 percent. Especially as the years wear on, with the vaccination phase occupying a larger and larger share of the pandemic timeline, the mitigation phase plays a smaller and smaller role in shaping overall mortality — but remains a dominant feature of our pandemic memory.
And in Sweden, whatever the downstream effects of limited national mitigation measures, the vaccination experience has been enviable by global standards — a rapid rollout that reached 87 percent of the country’s population over 60 by May of 2021.And in Sweden, whatever the downstream effects of limited national mitigation measures, the vaccination experience has been enviable by global standards — a rapid rollout that reached 87 percent of the country’s population over 60 by May of 2021.
Like everything else in our experience of the last several years, these phases can blur together — when we think of pandemic response, we often think of testing, masking, social distancing and school closures, not the policies designed to promote vaccination and boosting among the most vulnerable. But considered clearly, the phases often tell very different stories. In the first year of the pandemic, Swedish excess mortality was considerably higher than that of its neighbors — almost 10 times the level of Norway, according to Our World in Data, and at least four times as high as its other neighbors, according to The Lancet. It was only in the years that followed, shaped much more by vaccination, that the cumulative outcomes somewhat evened out.Like everything else in our experience of the last several years, these phases can blur together — when we think of pandemic response, we often think of testing, masking, social distancing and school closures, not the policies designed to promote vaccination and boosting among the most vulnerable. But considered clearly, the phases often tell very different stories. In the first year of the pandemic, Swedish excess mortality was considerably higher than that of its neighbors — almost 10 times the level of Norway, according to Our World in Data, and at least four times as high as its other neighbors, according to The Lancet. It was only in the years that followed, shaped much more by vaccination, that the cumulative outcomes somewhat evened out.
What about the benefits of staying “open”? If Sweden ultimately paid little price for its hands-off approach to mitigation, the “public health versus the economy” logic of the early pandemic suggests that it should have reaped enormous payoffs, compared to countries that hunkered in and bunkered down. In a globalized system, a single open economy in a shutdown world is still going to face some pandemic headwinds, but you’d still expect to see it suffering less than its peers, since most of any country’s economic activity is domestic. What about the benefits of staying open? If Sweden ultimately paid little price for its hands-off approach to mitigation, the “public health versus the economy” logic of the early pandemic suggests that it should have reaped enormous payoffs, compared to countries that hunkered in and bunkered down. In a globalized system, a single open economy in a shutdown world is still going to face some pandemic headwinds, but you’d still expect to see it suffering less than its peers, since most of any country’s economic activity is domestic.
Yet this isn’t what the data shows. There was no economic “boom” in Sweden in 2020; in fact, it had a deep and sudden recession, like much of the rest of the world. And while the country’s recovery was encouraging in 2021 and 2022, it was not more rapid or thorough than that of all of its neighbors or many other countries in the global north. In fact, according to the O.E.C.D. pandemic recovery tracker, Sweden apparently had the most average recovery of any studied country — another sign that pandemic policy and pandemic behavior can diverge, and that when they do, behavior seems to carry the day. Yet this isn’t what the data shows. There was no economic boom in Sweden in 2020; in fact, it had a deep and sudden recession, like much of the rest of the world. And while the country’s recovery was encouraging in 2021 and 2022, it was not more rapid or thorough than that of all of its neighbors or many other countries in the global north. In fact, according to the O.E.C.D. pandemic recovery tracker, Sweden apparently had the most average recovery of any studied country — another sign that pandemic policy and pandemic behavior can diverge, and that when they do, behavior seems to carry the day.
The “path not taken” effects are also not that visible in other, somewhat squishier metrics. Fewer Swedes have reported feeling exceptional anxiety or depression since the beginning of the pandemic than did Americans and Brits, but Norway and the Netherlands both endured these difficult years even better. Suicide rates in Sweden dipped in 2020 and then ticked back up in 2021, according to the country’s Karolinska Institutet, echoing the American pattern and still below levels observed in the country as recently as a few years before the pandemic (also echoing the American pattern). And though many in Britain and the United States worried that unusually large waves of R.S.V. and other viruses in the fall of 2022 were a sign that masking and social distancing had imposed an “immunity debt” on the country’s children in particular, Sweden did not avoid those waves at all. Now, several months later, they are dealing with a startling wave of influenza B. The path-not-taken effects are also not that visible in other, somewhat squishier metrics. Fewer Swedes have reported feeling exceptional anxiety or depression since the beginning of the pandemic than did Americans and Brits, but Norway and the Netherlands both endured these difficult years even better. Suicide rates in Sweden dipped in 2020 and then ticked back up in 2021, according to the country’s Karolinska Institutet, echoing the American pattern and still below levels observed in the country as recently as a few years before the pandemic (also echoing the American pattern). And though many in Britain and the United States worried that unusually large waves of R.S.V. and other viruses in the fall of 2022 were a sign that masking and social distancing had imposed an “immunity debt” on the country’s children in particular, Sweden did not avoid those waves at all. Now, several months later, they are dealing with a startling wave of influenza B.
The most high-profile Swedish study examining pandemic learning loss suggests that students in the country did not suffer at all compared to their prepandemic counterparts — a striking finding, and one that does seem to set the country apart. But the study itself drew on a curious data set from a single online learning platform, making it less extensive than some more rigorous national, test-based assessments. And while that one paper means that Sweden occupied the top spot in the most comprehensive international meta-review of learning loss to date, it was closely followed in that ranking by Australia, which had quite draconian lockdowns and extended school closures, and Denmark and Germany, which each adopted quite conventional, middle-of-the-road approaches to schools and mitigation.The most high-profile Swedish study examining pandemic learning loss suggests that students in the country did not suffer at all compared to their prepandemic counterparts — a striking finding, and one that does seem to set the country apart. But the study itself drew on a curious data set from a single online learning platform, making it less extensive than some more rigorous national, test-based assessments. And while that one paper means that Sweden occupied the top spot in the most comprehensive international meta-review of learning loss to date, it was closely followed in that ranking by Australia, which had quite draconian lockdowns and extended school closures, and Denmark and Germany, which each adopted quite conventional, middle-of-the-road approaches to schools and mitigation.
This all seems like a mystery: How could such a different approach to mitigation have yielded such a not-different set of outcomes? Well, perhaps Swedes weren’t really all that different in their approach in the end. That is the contention of the Stringency Index maintained by Oxford’s Coronavirus Government Response Tracker, which is also published by Our World in Data and shows that, however the Swedish response was understood by its leaders and its citizens and both critics and supporters elsewhere in the world, on the ground, the policies were quite … average.This all seems like a mystery: How could such a different approach to mitigation have yielded such a not-different set of outcomes? Well, perhaps Swedes weren’t really all that different in their approach in the end. That is the contention of the Stringency Index maintained by Oxford’s Coronavirus Government Response Tracker, which is also published by Our World in Data and shows that, however the Swedish response was understood by its leaders and its citizens and both critics and supporters elsewhere in the world, on the ground, the policies were quite … average.
This index is not perfect, but it is probably the best tool we have for systematically comparing pandemic policies across countries, collating measures of nine mitigation tools — from school closures to stay-at-home orders and travel restrictions to the size of public gatherings. Each policy is measured by degree rather than in binary terms, and then synthesized into a single overall score ranging from zero (no restrictions at all) to 100 (total shutdown).This index is not perfect, but it is probably the best tool we have for systematically comparing pandemic policies across countries, collating measures of nine mitigation tools — from school closures to stay-at-home orders and travel restrictions to the size of public gatherings. Each policy is measured by degree rather than in binary terms, and then synthesized into a single overall score ranging from zero (no restrictions at all) to 100 (total shutdown).
According to this analysis, Swedish stringency was not exceptional in one direction or another. It registered about 65 for much of the spring of 2020, then fell to 55 by the end of the summer, climbed above 70 in response to the winter surge of early 2021 and then fell quite rapidly with vaccination in the months that followed. These numbers are abstract, of course, and make most sense as points of comparison. In the United States, for instance, restrictions began at around 72, then fell to 66 in September of 2020, and climbed again to 72 before dropping more slowly after the vaccine rollout. And Sweden’s neighbors were, for stretches of the first year, actually more open than Sweden — especially in the fall, when Norway’s stringency rated barely half as high, for instance. Germany, France and the Netherlands were also all less strict than Sweden at certain points in the nine months between initial pandemic panic and the beginning of mass vaccination.According to this analysis, Swedish stringency was not exceptional in one direction or another. It registered about 65 for much of the spring of 2020, then fell to 55 by the end of the summer, climbed above 70 in response to the winter surge of early 2021 and then fell quite rapidly with vaccination in the months that followed. These numbers are abstract, of course, and make most sense as points of comparison. In the United States, for instance, restrictions began at around 72, then fell to 66 in September of 2020, and climbed again to 72 before dropping more slowly after the vaccine rollout. And Sweden’s neighbors were, for stretches of the first year, actually more open than Sweden — especially in the fall, when Norway’s stringency rated barely half as high, for instance. Germany, France and the Netherlands were also all less strict than Sweden at certain points in the nine months between initial pandemic panic and the beginning of mass vaccination.
This set of data may seem like more of a paradox or contradiction than it really is. The Swedish national government leaned heavily into its quasi-libertarian messaging, emphasizing the individual responsibility of its citizens and avoiding national stay-at-home orders and most other forms of intrusive mandates. But both at the local and national levels, they still offered a robust array of recommendations aimed at mitigation: at one point limiting public gatherings to just eight people, for instance, closing their borders to non-E.U. travelers and recommending that those who could should stay home when possible.This set of data may seem like more of a paradox or contradiction than it really is. The Swedish national government leaned heavily into its quasi-libertarian messaging, emphasizing the individual responsibility of its citizens and avoiding national stay-at-home orders and most other forms of intrusive mandates. But both at the local and national levels, they still offered a robust array of recommendations aimed at mitigation: at one point limiting public gatherings to just eight people, for instance, closing their borders to non-E.U. travelers and recommending that those who could should stay home when possible.
The policies weren’t as heavy-handed as some of those executed elsewhere, and mobility data suggests that Swedes did move about more freely early on than the citizens of other countries. But there wasn’t an absence of guidance, just an absence of mandates. And there was more death in Sweden that first year than in its neighboring peer countries — just not off-the-charts death.The policies weren’t as heavy-handed as some of those executed elsewhere, and mobility data suggests that Swedes did move about more freely early on than the citizens of other countries. But there wasn’t an absence of guidance, just an absence of mandates. And there was more death in Sweden that first year than in its neighboring peer countries — just not off-the-charts death.
In the end, “what the ‘Swedish model’ really suggests is that pandemic mitigation measures can be effectively deployed in a respectful, largely noncoercive way,” Francois Balloux wrote recently. “Obviously, being a rich country with a decent welfare net and achieving high vaccination rates didn’t hurt either.”In the end, “what the ‘Swedish model’ really suggests is that pandemic mitigation measures can be effectively deployed in a respectful, largely noncoercive way,” Francois Balloux wrote recently. “Obviously, being a rich country with a decent welfare net and achieving high vaccination rates didn’t hurt either.”
What kind of case study is this? And how replicable are its lessons in a country like the United States? Sweden never exactly let it rip, nor did the country truly expose its population to uninterrupted spread. Instead, it asked its citizens to protect themselves, according to a suite of best practices familiar to anyone who’s lived through the last three years with open eyes. And then to vaccinate like crazy. The result wasn’t painless; the country didn’t “beat” or even emerge unscathed from the pandemic. But it did survive it. Like much of the rest of the world. What kind of case study is this? And how replicable are its lessons in a country like the United States? Sweden never exactly let it rip, nor did the country truly expose its population to uninterrupted spread. Instead, it asked its citizens to protect themselves, according to a suite of best practices familiar to anyone who’s lived through the last three years with open eyes. And then to vaccinate like crazy. The result wasn’t painless; the country didn’t beat or even emerge unscathed from the pandemic. But it did survive it. Like much of the rest of the world.
David Wallace-Wells (@dwallacewells), a writer for Opinion and a columnist for The New York Times Magazine, is the author of “The Uninhabitable Earth.”David Wallace-Wells (@dwallacewells), a writer for Opinion and a columnist for The New York Times Magazine, is the author of “The Uninhabitable Earth.”