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| Russia’s Retreat From Kherson Brings Ukraine One Step Closer to Victory | Russia’s Retreat From Kherson Brings Ukraine One Step Closer to Victory |
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| News Update: Russia’s defense minister, Sergei K. Shoigu, on Wednesday ordered Russian forces to retreat from the city of Kherson in Ukraine. | News Update: Russia’s defense minister, Sergei K. Shoigu, on Wednesday ordered Russian forces to retreat from the city of Kherson in Ukraine. |
| Even amid heavy shelling of their cities, the Ukrainian people are defiant. The savage destruction of the country’s electricity grid and indiscriminate violence against civilians have seemed to consolidate Western determination to support Ukraine “as long as it takes.” But many in Europe and in the United States, including a group of Democratic lawmakers who walked back their call for stepping up U.S. negotiations with the Kremlin, have begun to wonder how Russia’s war on Ukraine ends. Such conflicting signals are unfortunate because Ukraine has a very clear understanding of what victory will entail. | Even amid heavy shelling of their cities, the Ukrainian people are defiant. The savage destruction of the country’s electricity grid and indiscriminate violence against civilians have seemed to consolidate Western determination to support Ukraine “as long as it takes.” But many in Europe and in the United States, including a group of Democratic lawmakers who walked back their call for stepping up U.S. negotiations with the Kremlin, have begun to wonder how Russia’s war on Ukraine ends. Such conflicting signals are unfortunate because Ukraine has a very clear understanding of what victory will entail. |
| The battle for Ukraine has now lasted for eight years and eight months, starting with the annexation of Crimea and the establishment of Kremlin puppet regimes in Donbas and exploding, on Feb. 24, 2022, into a full-scale invasion. Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine is part of the Kremlin’s plan to subjugate one of the largest European states and project power over Europe by brutal force. Ukraine’s fight to reclaim sovereignty seeks to deny Russia what it sees as its right to impose its neo-imperial aspirations on its neighbor. | The battle for Ukraine has now lasted for eight years and eight months, starting with the annexation of Crimea and the establishment of Kremlin puppet regimes in Donbas and exploding, on Feb. 24, 2022, into a full-scale invasion. Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine is part of the Kremlin’s plan to subjugate one of the largest European states and project power over Europe by brutal force. Ukraine’s fight to reclaim sovereignty seeks to deny Russia what it sees as its right to impose its neo-imperial aspirations on its neighbor. |
| Ukraine’s victory will require defeating the Russian Army on Ukrainian territory, including in Crimea. Ukraine’s recent advances prove that this is not a distant dream anymore. Russia struggles to control the 800-mile front line that stretches from the Black Sea coast to the northeastern mining cities of Luhansk Oblast. In September, better-trained, well-equipped and highly motivated Ukrainian troops regained the strategic initiative. Kyiv has reclaimed more territory in its counteroffensive than Russia has gained in recent months. Restoring Ukraine to the internationally recognized borders of 1991 is an objective of the Ukrainian Army. It has the full backing of the citizens, only 8 percent of whom are ready to give up territory in exchange for peace. | Ukraine’s victory will require defeating the Russian Army on Ukrainian territory, including in Crimea. Ukraine’s recent advances prove that this is not a distant dream anymore. Russia struggles to control the 800-mile front line that stretches from the Black Sea coast to the northeastern mining cities of Luhansk Oblast. In September, better-trained, well-equipped and highly motivated Ukrainian troops regained the strategic initiative. Kyiv has reclaimed more territory in its counteroffensive than Russia has gained in recent months. Restoring Ukraine to the internationally recognized borders of 1991 is an objective of the Ukrainian Army. It has the full backing of the citizens, only 8 percent of whom are ready to give up territory in exchange for peace. |
| Fighting is fierce, especially in the Donetsk region, but even Russia’s most capable fighting units are failing to advance even as they continue to outnumber Ukrainian soldiers. To prevail, Kyiv has fought smart, causing the front line to crumble by attacking deep behind enemy lines. U.S.-supplied HIMARS rocket launchers have enabled this strategy. Sophisticated deception operations, such as in Kharkiv Oblast around Izium, have put Russians on the run and provided more supplies for the advancing Ukrainian troops. If the current dynamic continues, Ukraine looks certain to enter Kherson. | Fighting is fierce, especially in the Donetsk region, but even Russia’s most capable fighting units are failing to advance even as they continue to outnumber Ukrainian soldiers. To prevail, Kyiv has fought smart, causing the front line to crumble by attacking deep behind enemy lines. U.S.-supplied HIMARS rocket launchers have enabled this strategy. Sophisticated deception operations, such as in Kharkiv Oblast around Izium, have put Russians on the run and provided more supplies for the advancing Ukrainian troops. If the current dynamic continues, Ukraine looks certain to enter Kherson. |
| Damage to the Crimean bridge has already complicated supply to Russian positions in the south. Crimea is used as the main route for Russian reinforcement in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. The disruption will slow down the arrival of newly mobilized soldiers to the front lines. If Crimea can still be supplied by sea, Russian positions on the Ukrainian coast, especially in Melitopol, are in danger. The tipping point may come within the next six months, when Ukraine’s upgraded stocks of artillery, air defense systems and armored vehicles allow for a new push. The head of Ukrainian military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, suggests Ukraine will keep advancing throughout the winter, with the goal of reaching Crimea in the spring of 2023. | Damage to the Crimean bridge has already complicated supply to Russian positions in the south. Crimea is used as the main route for Russian reinforcement in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. The disruption will slow down the arrival of newly mobilized soldiers to the front lines. If Crimea can still be supplied by sea, Russian positions on the Ukrainian coast, especially in Melitopol, are in danger. The tipping point may come within the next six months, when Ukraine’s upgraded stocks of artillery, air defense systems and armored vehicles allow for a new push. The head of Ukrainian military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, suggests Ukraine will keep advancing throughout the winter, with the goal of reaching Crimea in the spring of 2023. |
| Whether militarily or as a result of a negotiated settlement, it is only a matter of time before control of Crimea is re-established. The annexation of the peninsula was the starting point of the war; Ukrainians consider the resolution of its status in line with international law as the mark of the conflict’s end. Ukrainian victory without reclamation of Crimea is no Ukrainian victory. | Whether militarily or as a result of a negotiated settlement, it is only a matter of time before control of Crimea is re-established. The annexation of the peninsula was the starting point of the war; Ukrainians consider the resolution of its status in line with international law as the mark of the conflict’s end. Ukrainian victory without reclamation of Crimea is no Ukrainian victory. |
| This brings us to Vladimir Putin. For the war to end, a power transfer must happen in the Kremlin. Because Mr. Putin has made the subjugation of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea his personal missions, a defeat of Russian armed forces and a threat to the hold on Crimea will undermine both elite and popular support for his regime. Losing a war is lethal to any dictator. | This brings us to Vladimir Putin. For the war to end, a power transfer must happen in the Kremlin. Because Mr. Putin has made the subjugation of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea his personal missions, a defeat of Russian armed forces and a threat to the hold on Crimea will undermine both elite and popular support for his regime. Losing a war is lethal to any dictator. |
| A change of head of state will be driven by Russian elites, rather than popular protest. The time will come when the ruling class changes its calculus about where to invest its shrinking resources. Dissatisfaction with mobilization, poor army supply, heavy troop losses, especially among non-Russian ethnic minorities — all will undermine cohesion. Last month, a mass shooting incident between two Tajik conscripts and Russian soldiers was believed to have been sparked by a religious dispute. Groups like the Free Buryatia Foundation advocate an end to war and racism in Russia. But there are also more militant segments that could aim to commandeer resources and power as the Kremlin is bogged down in Ukraine. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the man behind the notorious Wagner Group, a private military company playing a crucial role for Russia in the war, has come into the spotlight as a proponent of all-out war with Ukraine. He directs his anguish at Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu for battlefield failures. Internal dissension within Mr. Putin’s circle suggests some of these effects are already happening. | A change of head of state will be driven by Russian elites, rather than popular protest. The time will come when the ruling class changes its calculus about where to invest its shrinking resources. Dissatisfaction with mobilization, poor army supply, heavy troop losses, especially among non-Russian ethnic minorities — all will undermine cohesion. Last month, a mass shooting incident between two Tajik conscripts and Russian soldiers was believed to have been sparked by a religious dispute. Groups like the Free Buryatia Foundation advocate an end to war and racism in Russia. But there are also more militant segments that could aim to commandeer resources and power as the Kremlin is bogged down in Ukraine. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the man behind the notorious Wagner Group, a private military company playing a crucial role for Russia in the war, has come into the spotlight as a proponent of all-out war with Ukraine. He directs his anguish at Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu for battlefield failures. Internal dissension within Mr. Putin’s circle suggests some of these effects are already happening. |
| To spare their country from the risks of centrifugal forces, ruinous war and internal disarray, the elites may find it expedient to try to save Russia instead of slaughtering Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelensky firmly stated after the most recent wave of annexations that he will negotiate only with a new leader of Russia. This decision was approved by the Ukrainian National Security Council and is supported by an absolute majority of Ukrainians. With the powerful state propaganda machine, Russian citizens could be presented with a new reality encouraging them to back a policy to end war and return to normality. | To spare their country from the risks of centrifugal forces, ruinous war and internal disarray, the elites may find it expedient to try to save Russia instead of slaughtering Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelensky firmly stated after the most recent wave of annexations that he will negotiate only with a new leader of Russia. This decision was approved by the Ukrainian National Security Council and is supported by an absolute majority of Ukrainians. With the powerful state propaganda machine, Russian citizens could be presented with a new reality encouraging them to back a policy to end war and return to normality. |
| The new leader of Russia will have to deal with another key element of Ukrainian victory: accountability. Mr. Putin and his successor must answer for apparent war crimes and crimes against humanity, and their funds must be directed to compensating for the destruction of Ukraine’s industries, energy facilities and other infrastructure, which has been estimated at about $130 billion. If Russia refuses to pay for this horrific destruction voluntarily, its frozen state assets should be seized and redirected for rebuilding Ukraine. | The new leader of Russia will have to deal with another key element of Ukrainian victory: accountability. Mr. Putin and his successor must answer for apparent war crimes and crimes against humanity, and their funds must be directed to compensating for the destruction of Ukraine’s industries, energy facilities and other infrastructure, which has been estimated at about $130 billion. If Russia refuses to pay for this horrific destruction voluntarily, its frozen state assets should be seized and redirected for rebuilding Ukraine. |
| This kind of victory by Ukraine and its international partners can bring a lasting chance of peace in Europe. A Ukrainian victory will also bring the continent into equilibrium by defeating Russia’s revisionist plans, which reach beyond Ukraine, for instance in Bosnia. Russia clearly stated in its December 2021 ultimatum that it rejects the right of its neighboring countries to choose the security alliances they desire. The victory of a global democratic coalition would be a definitive “no” to Mr. Putin’s colonial agenda to rule neighbors under threats of nuclear blackmail should they decide to break free from Russian control. | This kind of victory by Ukraine and its international partners can bring a lasting chance of peace in Europe. A Ukrainian victory will also bring the continent into equilibrium by defeating Russia’s revisionist plans, which reach beyond Ukraine, for instance in Bosnia. Russia clearly stated in its December 2021 ultimatum that it rejects the right of its neighboring countries to choose the security alliances they desire. The victory of a global democratic coalition would be a definitive “no” to Mr. Putin’s colonial agenda to rule neighbors under threats of nuclear blackmail should they decide to break free from Russian control. |
| The defiance of Russian aggression by the Ukrainian people and their leaders paves the way to a future in which the free world might prevail over Mr. Putin’s autocratic regime — it will not happen tomorrow, but Ukrainians believe it is within sight. Defeating Russia in Ukraine may sound daunting, but the alternative will cost us more. If Mr. Putin is allowed to prevail and sell this war as a victory to his people, it will reinforce Russia’s aggressive posture, embolden the use of force by other autocrats, strengthen current shock waves across global food and energy markets, and set in motion rapid militarization. Ukraine will continue to sacrifice a great deal to avoid this outcome. That is why the West must help Ukraine win. | The defiance of Russian aggression by the Ukrainian people and their leaders paves the way to a future in which the free world might prevail over Mr. Putin’s autocratic regime — it will not happen tomorrow, but Ukrainians believe it is within sight. Defeating Russia in Ukraine may sound daunting, but the alternative will cost us more. If Mr. Putin is allowed to prevail and sell this war as a victory to his people, it will reinforce Russia’s aggressive posture, embolden the use of force by other autocrats, strengthen current shock waves across global food and energy markets, and set in motion rapid militarization. Ukraine will continue to sacrifice a great deal to avoid this outcome. That is why the West must help Ukraine win. |
| Orysia Lutsevych is a research fellow and the head of the Ukraine Forum at Chatham House. | |
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