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‘Elites Are Making Choices That Are Not Good News’ ‘Elites Are Making Choices That Are Not Good News’
(about 4 hours later)
Even as the economic pressures that drove millions of white working class voters to the right are moderating, the hostility this key segment of the electorate feels toward the Democratic Party has deepened and is less and less amenable to change. Even as the economic pressures that drove millions of white working-class voters to the right are moderating, the hostility this key segment of the electorate feels toward the Democratic Party has deepened and is less and less amenable to change.
“You cannot really understand the working-class rightward shift without discussing what the Democratic Party is doing,” Daron Acemoglu, an economist at M.I.T., wrote by email:“You cannot really understand the working-class rightward shift without discussing what the Democratic Party is doing,” Daron Acemoglu, an economist at M.I.T., wrote by email:
Poll data suggest that Democratic struggles with the white working class are worsening. In “Elections and Demography: Democrats Lose Ground, Need Strong Turnout,” an Oct. 22 American Enterprise institute report by Ruy Teixeira, Karlyn Bowman and Nate Moore write that Poll data suggest that Democratic struggles with the white working class are worsening. In “Elections and Demography: Democrats Lose Ground, Need Strong Turnout,” an Oct. 22 American Enterprise institute report by Ruy Teixeira, Karlyn Bowman and Nate Moore write:
David Autor, an economist at M.I.T. who has written on the role of the trade shocks that have driven white working class voters into the arms of the Republican Party, described his assessment of the current mood of these voters in an email: David Autor, an economist at M.I.T. who has written on the role of the trade shocks that have driven white working-class voters into the arms of the Republican Party, described his assessment of the current mood of these voters in an email:
“The pandemic,” Autor noted, “has actually compressed earnings inequality sharply over the last two years. This potentially reduces some of the political pressure accompanying the decline of manufacturing and erosion of non-college wages.”“The pandemic,” Autor noted, “has actually compressed earnings inequality sharply over the last two years. This potentially reduces some of the political pressure accompanying the decline of manufacturing and erosion of non-college wages.”
While this trend would seem to favor Democrats, Autor pointed out that While this trend would seem to favor Democrats, Autor pointed out:
In a 2020 study, “The Work of the Future: Building Better Jobs in an Age of Intelligent Machines,” Autor, David Mindell, professor of the history of engineering and manufacturing at M.I.T. and Elisabeth Reynolds, executive director of the M.I.T. Industrial Performance Center, contend that the United States is unique among developed countries in failing to counter the negative effects of technological change on workers: In a 2020 study, “The Work of the Future: Building Better Jobs in an Age of Intelligent Machines,” Autor, David Mindell, professor of the history of engineering and manufacturing at M.I.T., and Elisabeth Reynolds, executive director of the M.I.T. Industrial Performance Center, contend that the United States is unique among developed countries in failing to counter the negative effects of technological change on workers:
Acemoglu sounded a pessimistic note in his email: “Elites are making choices that are not good news for non-college workers. In fact, they are bad news for most workers.”Acemoglu sounded a pessimistic note in his email: “Elites are making choices that are not good news for non-college workers. In fact, they are bad news for most workers.”
He also predicted that “robots and Artificial Intelligence — and especially A.I. — will continue to automate a broad range of jobs, and their main impact will be to destroy ‘good’ or ‘medium-quality’ jobs for non-college workers, as well as increasingly perhaps for workers with college degrees but without postgraduate degrees. They will tend to increase inequality.” He also predicted that “robots and artificial intelligence — and especially A.I. — will continue to automate a broad range of jobs, and their main impact will be to destroy ‘good’ or ‘medium-quality’ jobs for non-college workers, as well as increasingly perhaps for workers with college degrees but without postgraduate degrees. They will tend to increase inequality.”
Robots will continue to spread throughout U.S. industry, Acemoglu continued, “but there are fewer and fewer non-college jobs in this sector, so perhaps robots will not be the main issue for non-college workers.” Instead, he argued,Robots will continue to spread throughout U.S. industry, Acemoglu continued, “but there are fewer and fewer non-college jobs in this sector, so perhaps robots will not be the main issue for non-college workers.” Instead, he argued,
In a September 2022 paper “Tasks, Automation and The Rise In U.S. Wage Inequality,” Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo, an economist at Boston University, found that automation “accounts for 50 percent of the changes in the wage structure” from 1980 and 2016, reducing “the real wage of high-school dropout men by 8.8 percent and high-school dropout women by 2.3 percent.” In a September 2022 paper, “Tasks, Automation and The Rise In U.S. Wage Inequality,” Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo, an economist at Boston University, found that automation “accounts for 50 percent of the changes in the wage structure” from 1980 and 2016, reducing “the real wage of high-school dropout men by 8.8 percent and high-school dropout women by 2.3 percent.”
Task displacement — that is, the replacement of workers with machines — has wide-ranging adverse impacts, they write: “A 10-percentage point higher task displacement is associated with a 4.4-percentage point decline in employment between 1980 and 2016, and a similar 3.5 percentage point increase in nonparticipation (in the work force).” Task displacement — the replacement of workers with machines — has wide-ranging adverse impacts, they write: “A 10 percentage point higher task displacement is associated with a 4.4 percentage point decline in employment between 1980 and 2016, and a similar 3.5 percentage point increase in nonparticipation (in the work force).”
Dani Rodrik, an economist at Harvard’s Kennedy School, emailed me to say that “it is extremely unlikely that we will create an employment miracle in manufacturing.” Even if the CHIPS and Science Act, which President Biden signed in August, is “successful in reshoring some manufacturing,” he argued,Dani Rodrik, an economist at Harvard’s Kennedy School, emailed me to say that “it is extremely unlikely that we will create an employment miracle in manufacturing.” Even if the CHIPS and Science Act, which President Biden signed in August, is “successful in reshoring some manufacturing,” he argued,
In addition, Rodrik wrote, In addition, Rodrik wrote:
There is, Rodrik observed,There is, Rodrik observed,
In an April 2021 paper, “Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism,” Rodrik wrote that he studiedIn an April 2021 paper, “Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism,” Rodrik wrote that he studied
I asked Gordon Hanson, a professor of urban policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School, whether there was any reason for these adverse economic trends to abate. “I see none,” he said, “at least in the medium run.”I asked Gordon Hanson, a professor of urban policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School, whether there was any reason for these adverse economic trends to abate. “I see none,” he said, “at least in the medium run.”
The Democrats, he continued, “have come to be seen as the party of free trade, given President Clinton pushing through both NAFTA and China’s entry to the WTO and President Obama championing the Trans-Pacific Partnership — they are seen as the engineers of manufacturing job loss.” The Democrats, he continued, “have come to be seen as the party of free trade, given President Clinton pushing through both NAFTA and China’s entry to the W.T.O. and President Obama championing the Trans-Pacific Partnership — they are seen as the engineers of manufacturing job loss.”
The strongest rightward push for the non-college educated, Hanson wrote,The strongest rightward push for the non-college educated, Hanson wrote,
In 2024, Hanson predicted, “the G.O.P. will be in position to restate its 2016 message. And, at least in places hurt by globalization, Democrats will not have obvious arguments to make in their defense.”In 2024, Hanson predicted, “the G.O.P. will be in position to restate its 2016 message. And, at least in places hurt by globalization, Democrats will not have obvious arguments to make in their defense.”
In a July 2022 paper “The Labor Market Impacts of Technological Change: From Unbridled Enthusiasm to Qualified Optimism to Vast Uncertainty,” Autor describes how artificial intelligence radically enlarges the potential of robotics and automation to replace workers not only performing routine tasks but more complex procedures: “What makes a task routine is that it follows an explicit, fully specified set of rules and procedures. Tasks fitting this description can in many cases be codified in computer software and executed by machines.” In a July 2022 paper, “The Labor Market Impacts of Technological Change: From Unbridled Enthusiasm to Qualified Optimism to Vast Uncertainty,” Autor describes how artificial intelligence radically enlarges the potential of robotics and automation to replace workers not only performing routine tasks but more complex procedures: “What makes a task routine is that it follows an explicit, fully specified set of rules and procedures. Tasks fitting this description can in many cases be codified in computer software and executed by machines.”
Conversely, Autor goes on to say, tasks that rely on “tacit knowledge (e.g., riding a bicycle, telling a clever joke) have historically been challenging to program because the explicit steps for accomplishing these tasks are often not formally known.”Conversely, Autor goes on to say, tasks that rely on “tacit knowledge (e.g., riding a bicycle, telling a clever joke) have historically been challenging to program because the explicit steps for accomplishing these tasks are often not formally known.”
“Artificial intelligence,” Autor writes, “overturns the second piece of the task framework — specifically, the stipulation that computers can accomplish only explicitly understood (i.e., ‘routine’) tasks. A.I. tools surmount this longstanding constraint because they can be used to infer tacit relationships that are not fully specified by underlying software.”“Artificial intelligence,” Autor writes, “overturns the second piece of the task framework — specifically, the stipulation that computers can accomplish only explicitly understood (i.e., ‘routine’) tasks. A.I. tools surmount this longstanding constraint because they can be used to infer tacit relationships that are not fully specified by underlying software.”
Autor uses the manufacture of a chair to explain the power of A.I.:Autor uses the manufacture of a chair to explain the power of A.I.:
A.I. cuts through the problem of computerizing the manufacture of a chair, according to Autor, by learningA.I. cuts through the problem of computerizing the manufacture of a chair, according to Autor, by learning
In comparison with the non-college workers hurt by earlier levels of automation, the impact of artificial intelligence will be on better-educated, more upscale employees, in Autor’s view:In comparison with the non-college workers hurt by earlier levels of automation, the impact of artificial intelligence will be on better-educated, more upscale employees, in Autor’s view:
In addition, Autor writes,In addition, Autor writes,
Autor joined Acemoglu in arguing that policymakers can influence the direction that artificial intelligence takes:Autor joined Acemoglu in arguing that policymakers can influence the direction that artificial intelligence takes:
There is, however, another side to the potential of A.I., Autor wrote:There is, however, another side to the potential of A.I., Autor wrote:
In his May 2022 essay, “The Turing Trap: The Promise & Peril of Human-Like Artificial Intelligence,” Erik Brynjolfsson, a professor at Stanford’s Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, warns that “an excessive focus on developing and deploying Human-Like Artificial Intelligence can lead us into a trap. As machines become better substitutes for human labor, workers lose economic and political bargaining power and become increasingly dependent on those who control the technology.” In his May 2022 essay “The Turing Trap: The Promise & Peril of Human-Like Artificial Intelligence,” Erik Brynjolfsson, a professor at Stanford’s Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, warns that “an excessive focus on developing and deploying Human-Like Artificial Intelligence can lead us into a trap. As machines become better substitutes for human labor, workers lose economic and political bargaining power and become increasingly dependent on those who control the technology.”
There is, Brynjolfsson argues, an alternative: “When A.I. is focused on augmenting humans rather than mimicking them, humans retain the power to insist on a share of the value created. What is more, augmentation creates new capabilities and new products and services, ultimately generating far more value than merely humanlike A.I.”There is, Brynjolfsson argues, an alternative: “When A.I. is focused on augmenting humans rather than mimicking them, humans retain the power to insist on a share of the value created. What is more, augmentation creates new capabilities and new products and services, ultimately generating far more value than merely humanlike A.I.”
But, he adds, “While both types of A.I. can be enormously beneficial, there are currently excess incentives for automation rather than augmentation among technologists, business executives, and policymakers.”But, he adds, “While both types of A.I. can be enormously beneficial, there are currently excess incentives for automation rather than augmentation among technologists, business executives, and policymakers.”
The appeal to the technological elite “of a greater concentration of technological and economic power to beget a greater concentration of political power risks trapping a powerless majority into an unhappy equilibrium” and threatens a repeat of “the backlash against free trade” that blossomed with the election of Donald Trump.The appeal to the technological elite “of a greater concentration of technological and economic power to beget a greater concentration of political power risks trapping a powerless majority into an unhappy equilibrium” and threatens a repeat of “the backlash against free trade” that blossomed with the election of Donald Trump.
“As the economic winners gained power,” Brynjolfsson writes, they left “many workers worse off than before,” fueling“As the economic winners gained power,” Brynjolfsson writes, they left “many workers worse off than before,” fueling
Brynjolfsson is not alone in the economic community — in fact, he has widespread support — for his argument that a “moral imperative of treating people as ends, and not merely as means, calls for everyone to share in the gains of automation. The solution is not to slow down technology, but rather to eliminate or reverse the excess incentives for automation over augmentation.”Brynjolfsson is not alone in the economic community — in fact, he has widespread support — for his argument that a “moral imperative of treating people as ends, and not merely as means, calls for everyone to share in the gains of automation. The solution is not to slow down technology, but rather to eliminate or reverse the excess incentives for automation over augmentation.”
At the moment, calls for policies to institute a moral imperative like this are limited to the universe of artificial intelligence and automation technologies, with little or no momentum in the political community. Worse yet, the bitter divisions throughout our political system suggest that the development of this momentum will be a long time coming.At the moment, calls for policies to institute a moral imperative like this are limited to the universe of artificial intelligence and automation technologies, with little or no momentum in the political community. Worse yet, the bitter divisions throughout our political system suggest that the development of this momentum will be a long time coming.
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