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| State Investigation Fueled Flawed Understanding of Delays During Police Response in Uvalde | State Investigation Fueled Flawed Understanding of Delays During Police Response in Uvalde |
| (about 5 hours later) | |
| After the massacre in Uvalde, Texas, in May, a simple account of the police response took hold: A school police chief misread the threat and scores of officers from over a dozen federal, state and local agencies, following his command, idly stood by, waiting for equipment and SWAT teams while children trapped in classrooms with the gunman called 911 for help. | After the massacre in Uvalde, Texas, in May, a simple account of the police response took hold: A school police chief misread the threat and scores of officers from over a dozen federal, state and local agencies, following his command, idly stood by, waiting for equipment and SWAT teams while children trapped in classrooms with the gunman called 911 for help. |
| This shocking scene was described by the agency leading the criminal investigation of the mass shooting, the Texas Department of Public Safety. | This shocking scene was described by the agency leading the criminal investigation of the mass shooting, the Texas Department of Public Safety. |
| Nearly five months later, despite questions raised by other government reviews and journalists, D.P.S. continues to claim that the evidence supports this version of events and the public understanding it fueled. | Nearly five months later, despite questions raised by other government reviews and journalists, D.P.S. continues to claim that the evidence supports this version of events and the public understanding it fueled. |
| But an analysis of footage by The New York Times found major gaps and contradictions in the D.P.S. findings. | But an analysis of footage by The New York Times found major gaps and contradictions in the D.P.S. findings. |
| Visual evidence from the scene, while limited, indicates the problem was not simply one incompetent school police chief, or officers who knew better, but failed to take action. The available footage shows high-ranking officers, experienced state troopers, police academy instructors — even federal SWAT specialists — came to the same conclusions and were detoured by the same delays the school police chief has been condemned for causing. | Visual evidence from the scene, while limited, indicates the problem was not simply one incompetent school police chief, or officers who knew better, but failed to take action. The available footage shows high-ranking officers, experienced state troopers, police academy instructors — even federal SWAT specialists — came to the same conclusions and were detoured by the same delays the school police chief has been condemned for causing. |
| Three days after the shooting, D.P.S.’s director, Steven McCraw, announced his investigative team had identified why the police took 77 minutes to kill the gunman. Mr. McCraw said every officer was trained to immediately neutralize active shooters, but they were hamstrung when the incident commander, Pete Arredondo, wrongly determined the gunman was a so-called “barricaded subject,” which calls for a slower, more deliberate response. | Three days after the shooting, D.P.S.’s director, Steven McCraw, announced his investigative team had identified why the police took 77 minutes to kill the gunman. Mr. McCraw said every officer was trained to immediately neutralize active shooters, but they were hamstrung when the incident commander, Pete Arredondo, wrongly determined the gunman was a so-called “barricaded subject,” which calls for a slower, more deliberate response. |
| Mr. McCraw was more pointed during a State Senate hearing in June. | Mr. McCraw was more pointed during a State Senate hearing in June. |
| “The only thing stopping the hallway of dedicated officers from entering Room 111 and 112 was the on-scene commander who decided to place the lives of officers before the lives of children,” Mr. McCraw testified. | “The only thing stopping the hallway of dedicated officers from entering Room 111 and 112 was the on-scene commander who decided to place the lives of officers before the lives of children,” Mr. McCraw testified. |
| But claims by Mr. McCraw that Mr. Arredondo stymied 360 officers with flawed orders or misinformation are not supported by the available footage, which shows little evidence that commands were issued by the school chief, let alone widely communicated. | But claims by Mr. McCraw that Mr. Arredondo stymied 360 officers with flawed orders or misinformation are not supported by the available footage, which shows little evidence that commands were issued by the school chief, let alone widely communicated. |
| The available footage shows the D.P.S. timeline — which Mr. McCraw told lawmakers was corroborated by “frame-by-frame” video analysis — miscast Mr. Arredondo’s role and omitted actions, and inaction, by other officers, especially D.P.S. troopers and federal agents, who were involved earlier or more centrally than it notes. | The available footage shows the D.P.S. timeline — which Mr. McCraw told lawmakers was corroborated by “frame-by-frame” video analysis — miscast Mr. Arredondo’s role and omitted actions, and inaction, by other officers, especially D.P.S. troopers and federal agents, who were involved earlier or more centrally than it notes. |
| Footage shows BORTAC, the Border Patrol’s elite tactical agents, took charge about halfway into the response, and learned right away that children were trapped inside with the gunman. But it took 37 minutes of planning, testing keys and readying equipment before BORTAC breached the classrooms. | Footage shows BORTAC, the Border Patrol’s elite tactical agents, took charge about halfway into the response, and learned right away that children were trapped inside with the gunman. But it took 37 minutes of planning, testing keys and readying equipment before BORTAC breached the classrooms. |
| The Times analyzed publicly available body camera footage from seven Uvalde Police Department officers and a compilation of security-camera feeds first published by The Austin American-Statesman. D.P.S. has refused to release evidence from its investigation, which includes radio communications and over 30 body cameras. The Times is part of a media coalition suing D.P.S. over public records requests. | The Times analyzed publicly available body camera footage from seven Uvalde Police Department officers and a compilation of security-camera feeds first published by The Austin American-Statesman. D.P.S. has refused to release evidence from its investigation, which includes radio communications and over 30 body cameras. The Times is part of a media coalition suing D.P.S. over public records requests. |
| Multiple media outlets and a Texas House investigative committee have cast blame beyond Mr. Arredondo. In September, D.P.S. itself acknowledged revising its protocol for active shooter incidents and said seven employees were under review by the inspector general. | Multiple media outlets and a Texas House investigative committee have cast blame beyond Mr. Arredondo. In September, D.P.S. itself acknowledged revising its protocol for active shooter incidents and said seven employees were under review by the inspector general. |
| In an interview with The Times last week, Mr. McCraw said the response was a “multi-agency failure” and that no officer would escape scrutiny.“Everybody’s actions — at all rank, at all agencies — are going to be evaluated for the criminal culpability,” he said.The U.S. Border Patrol and the Uvalde Police Department declined to answer questions from Times reporters, citing internal investigations. Two Uvalde County constables and the Uvalde school district did not respond to inquiries from The Times. The district recently announced an internal investigation and suspended its police force. The Times reached out to individual officers mentioned in this article, but some never responded while others declined to comment. | In an interview with The Times last week, Mr. McCraw said the response was a “multi-agency failure” and that no officer would escape scrutiny.“Everybody’s actions — at all rank, at all agencies — are going to be evaluated for the criminal culpability,” he said.The U.S. Border Patrol and the Uvalde Police Department declined to answer questions from Times reporters, citing internal investigations. Two Uvalde County constables and the Uvalde school district did not respond to inquiries from The Times. The district recently announced an internal investigation and suspended its police force. The Times reached out to individual officers mentioned in this article, but some never responded while others declined to comment. |
| Mr. McCraw told The Times that his assessment about Mr. Arredondo hasn’t changed. | Mr. McCraw told The Times that his assessment about Mr. Arredondo hasn’t changed. |
| “He’s the guy in charge. There’s no question about it. He’s issuing commands and all his commands are designed or intended or — around a barricaded subject scenario when it was anything but,” he said. | “He’s the guy in charge. There’s no question about it. He’s issuing commands and all his commands are designed or intended or — around a barricaded subject scenario when it was anything but,” he said. |
| Mr. Arredondo declined to comment for this story. Before he was fired in August, he admitted that he had thought the gunman was “barricaded,” but said because the “crime spree” started outside the school district’s jurisdiction, he acted only as a front-line responder, not incident commander. | Mr. Arredondo declined to comment for this story. Before he was fired in August, he admitted that he had thought the gunman was “barricaded,” but said because the “crime spree” started outside the school district’s jurisdiction, he acted only as a front-line responder, not incident commander. |
| Mr. Arredondo was designated to take command by the school’s active shooter plan, which he wrote, and footage shows some officers referred to him as “in charge,” but there’s little visual evidence he actually directed the response, or even stayed abreast of key developments from the position he took during the incident. | Mr. Arredondo was designated to take command by the school’s active shooter plan, which he wrote, and footage shows some officers referred to him as “in charge,” but there’s little visual evidence he actually directed the response, or even stayed abreast of key developments from the position he took during the incident. |
| Whatever mistakes Mr. Arredondo made, footage indicates that the D.P.S. findings are selective, often imprecise and do not explain how a chief who failed to establish command could compel hundreds of trained officers, several with family members at the school, to disregard long-established policing protocol with almost no discernible dissent. The Times found discrepancies during three phases of the police response. | Whatever mistakes Mr. Arredondo made, footage indicates that the D.P.S. findings are selective, often imprecise and do not explain how a chief who failed to establish command could compel hundreds of trained officers, several with family members at the school, to disregard long-established policing protocol with almost no discernible dissent. The Times found discrepancies during three phases of the police response. |
| Some of the video clips contain disturbing content. | Some of the video clips contain disturbing content. |
| After the massacre, Mr. McCraw said that active shooter protocol requires every individual officer, local, state or federal, to immediately engage the gunman without waiting for orders or backup. | After the massacre, Mr. McCraw said that active shooter protocol requires every individual officer, local, state or federal, to immediately engage the gunman without waiting for orders or backup. |
| Mr. McCraw testified that D.P.S. and federal agents arrived too late, saying that by the time they reached the school, Mr. Arredondo had already derailed the response by deciding the gunman was no longer an active shooter. | Mr. McCraw testified that D.P.S. and federal agents arrived too late, saying that by the time they reached the school, Mr. Arredondo had already derailed the response by deciding the gunman was no longer an active shooter. |
| But this sequence of events conflicts with visual evidence, which indicates several officers, including state and federal agents, arrived in the same time-frame as Mr. Arredondo, also heard gunfire, yet did not confront the gunman despite their active shooter training. | But this sequence of events conflicts with visual evidence, which indicates several officers, including state and federal agents, arrived in the same time-frame as Mr. Arredondo, also heard gunfire, yet did not confront the gunman despite their active shooter training. |
| The gunman entered one of the school’s buildings with an AR-15-style rifle at 11:33 a.m. It took almost three minutes of gunfire before the police zeroed in on his location. | The gunman entered one of the school’s buildings with an AR-15-style rifle at 11:33 a.m. It took almost three minutes of gunfire before the police zeroed in on his location. |
| Footage shows local officers enter the building from two directions. The group coming in the north end at 11:36 a.m. has six Uvalde Police Department officers, including the acting chief and top-ranking deputies. Also visible is a school district officer, Ruben Ruiz, whose wife is inside Room 112. | Footage shows local officers enter the building from two directions. The group coming in the north end at 11:36 a.m. has six Uvalde Police Department officers, including the acting chief and top-ranking deputies. Also visible is a school district officer, Ruben Ruiz, whose wife is inside Room 112. |
| Within seconds, body camera footage shows four officers, including Mr. Arredondo, rush into the same hallway from the south. | Within seconds, body camera footage shows four officers, including Mr. Arredondo, rush into the same hallway from the south. |
| Mr. Arredondo’s group converges with officers from the north outside Rooms 111 and 112, which are connected by an internal door. The gunman is inside.The officers prepare to enter. Staff Sgt. Eduardo Canales, commander of the Uvalde Police SWAT team, positions his rifle. There is no gunfire audible or sounds of distress. Police radios beep as officers try to contact dispatchers, but signals are blocked inside the building. One officer attempts to look through the door window. | Mr. Arredondo’s group converges with officers from the north outside Rooms 111 and 112, which are connected by an internal door. The gunman is inside.The officers prepare to enter. Staff Sgt. Eduardo Canales, commander of the Uvalde Police SWAT team, positions his rifle. There is no gunfire audible or sounds of distress. Police radios beep as officers try to contact dispatchers, but signals are blocked inside the building. One officer attempts to look through the door window. |
| “I can’t see in it,” he says. “I can’t see.” | “I can’t see in it,” he says. “I can’t see.” |
| Just then, the gunman fires through the wall. Mr. Canales and another officer are injured. The whole group retreats, some to the north end of the hall and others to the south — a divide that ultimately creates two fronts in the police response, hindering communication and coordination. | Just then, the gunman fires through the wall. Mr. Canales and another officer are injured. The whole group retreats, some to the north end of the hall and others to the south — a divide that ultimately creates two fronts in the police response, hindering communication and coordination. |
| While Mr. McCraw repeatedly denounced Mr. Arredondo for not immediately re-engaging the gunman, he did not publicly criticize officers who took no action during this phase, including those who ultimately fall under his command. | While Mr. McCraw repeatedly denounced Mr. Arredondo for not immediately re-engaging the gunman, he did not publicly criticize officers who took no action during this phase, including those who ultimately fall under his command. |
| Uvalde’s acting police chief, Lt. Mariano Pargas is visible, quietly hanging back. | Uvalde’s acting police chief, Lt. Mariano Pargas is visible, quietly hanging back. |
| Footage also captures Sgt. Juan Maldonado of D.P.S. standing outside the north entrance at 11:37 a.m., five minutes before the D.P.S. timeline indicates their first agent arrives on scene. | Footage also captures Sgt. Juan Maldonado of D.P.S. standing outside the north entrance at 11:37 a.m., five minutes before the D.P.S. timeline indicates their first agent arrives on scene. |
| D.P.S. said Mr. Maldonado drove Mr. Ruiz to the school but was omitted from the timeline because he did not enter the building with him and the other officers.In the footage, Mr. Maldonado, armed with a rifle and wearing a tactical vest, is holding the door open. When Mr. Canales stumbles outside bleeding and says, “We’ve got to get in there,” Mr. Maldonado does not run toward gunfire as active shooter protocol dictates. Instead he says, “D.P.S. is sending people,” and remains outside. | D.P.S. said Mr. Maldonado drove Mr. Ruiz to the school but was omitted from the timeline because he did not enter the building with him and the other officers.In the footage, Mr. Maldonado, armed with a rifle and wearing a tactical vest, is holding the door open. When Mr. Canales stumbles outside bleeding and says, “We’ve got to get in there,” Mr. Maldonado does not run toward gunfire as active shooter protocol dictates. Instead he says, “D.P.S. is sending people,” and remains outside. |
| Mr. McCraw told The Times they now have additional evidence from Mr. Maldonado’s dashcam indicating he parked at the school at 11:34 a.m. (D.P.S. said Mr. Maldonado is currently under internal investigation. Mr. Pargas was put on administrative leave.) | Mr. McCraw told The Times they now have additional evidence from Mr. Maldonado’s dashcam indicating he parked at the school at 11:34 a.m. (D.P.S. said Mr. Maldonado is currently under internal investigation. Mr. Pargas was put on administrative leave.) |
| The D.P.S. timeline also incorrectly indicates the first U.S. Border Patrol agents arrived at 11:51 a.m., while footage shows one entering the building at 11:38 a.m. The agent does not engage the gunman, who can be heard firing. | The D.P.S. timeline also incorrectly indicates the first U.S. Border Patrol agents arrived at 11:51 a.m., while footage shows one entering the building at 11:38 a.m. The agent does not engage the gunman, who can be heard firing. |
| Mr. McCraw told The Times the D.P.S. timeline was “consolidated” to avoid disclosures that could compromise the prosecutorial process, but said it was “objective” and “exacting,” and included only information confirmed by video footage. | Mr. McCraw told The Times the D.P.S. timeline was “consolidated” to avoid disclosures that could compromise the prosecutorial process, but said it was “objective” and “exacting,” and included only information confirmed by video footage. |
| What crippled the police response, Mr. McCraw said in May, was Mr. Arredondo’s “wrong decision” that the active shooter transitioned to a barricaded subject. | What crippled the police response, Mr. McCraw said in May, was Mr. Arredondo’s “wrong decision” that the active shooter transitioned to a barricaded subject. |
| Barricaded subject training instructs officers to contain the threat, attempt communication and call in tactical specialists. But a gunman who is actively firing, even after a pause, requires the opposite response, Mr. McCraw said. | Barricaded subject training instructs officers to contain the threat, attempt communication and call in tactical specialists. But a gunman who is actively firing, even after a pause, requires the opposite response, Mr. McCraw said. |
| Mr. Arredondo was not the only one misreading the threat, in contrast to Mr. McCraw’s claims. | Mr. Arredondo was not the only one misreading the threat, in contrast to Mr. McCraw’s claims. |
| Footage shows the first radio message officers hear indicating the gunman is “contained” and “barricaded” comes not from Mr. Arredondo, but Uvalde Police Sgt. Daniel Coronado. | Footage shows the first radio message officers hear indicating the gunman is “contained” and “barricaded” comes not from Mr. Arredondo, but Uvalde Police Sgt. Daniel Coronado. |
| When the gunman fires at officers, Mr. Coronado retreats to the south end of the hall, slips outside and reports via radio at 11:38 a.m. that the gunman is “contained” — a dispatch that footage shows reaches officers across the campus, but is missing from the D.P.S. timeline. Mr. Coronado adds later that the gunman is “barricaded in one of the offices,” misstating his actual location. | When the gunman fires at officers, Mr. Coronado retreats to the south end of the hall, slips outside and reports via radio at 11:38 a.m. that the gunman is “contained” — a dispatch that footage shows reaches officers across the campus, but is missing from the D.P.S. timeline. Mr. Coronado adds later that the gunman is “barricaded in one of the offices,” misstating his actual location. |
| Why Mr. Coronado described a gunman inside a school as “contained” or “barricaded” is unclear. He told the Texas House committee he thought the suspect had probably fled to the school during a “bailout” — shorthand for police chases involving human traffickers, which the committee noted led to nearly 50 school lockdown and security alerts in the previous three months. | Why Mr. Coronado described a gunman inside a school as “contained” or “barricaded” is unclear. He told the Texas House committee he thought the suspect had probably fled to the school during a “bailout” — shorthand for police chases involving human traffickers, which the committee noted led to nearly 50 school lockdown and security alerts in the previous three months. |
| According to the committee’s report, the initial responding officers “uniformly testified” they heard “no screams or cries from within the rooms” and didn’t know if anyone was trapped inside. | According to the committee’s report, the initial responding officers “uniformly testified” they heard “no screams or cries from within the rooms” and didn’t know if anyone was trapped inside. |
| Mr. Arredondo told the committee that he noticed bullet holes in an empty classroom next to Room 111, which prompted him to prioritize evacuating other classes potentially in the line of fire before re-engaging the gunman, who he believed was “barricaded” — a decision the committee called a “terrible, tragic mistake” in retrospect. | Mr. Arredondo told the committee that he noticed bullet holes in an empty classroom next to Room 111, which prompted him to prioritize evacuating other classes potentially in the line of fire before re-engaging the gunman, who he believed was “barricaded” — a decision the committee called a “terrible, tragic mistake” in retrospect. |
| Mr. McCraw told The Times that D.P.S. has no evidence Mr. Arredondo prompted Mr. Coronado’s “contained” message or that the two even communicated during this period, but he maintained Mr. Coronado often acted as proxy for the school chief, who was physically cut off from the main police position and had no radio contact. | Mr. McCraw told The Times that D.P.S. has no evidence Mr. Arredondo prompted Mr. Coronado’s “contained” message or that the two even communicated during this period, but he maintained Mr. Coronado often acted as proxy for the school chief, who was physically cut off from the main police position and had no radio contact. |
| Mr. McCraw also emphasized that Mr. Arredondo’s misdiagnosis spread when he called the Uvalde Police Department requesting firepower, a radio and a SWAT team. | Mr. McCraw also emphasized that Mr. Arredondo’s misdiagnosis spread when he called the Uvalde Police Department requesting firepower, a radio and a SWAT team. |
| “There’s consequences when you’re the person in charge, people are going to listen to you,” Mr. McCraw said. | |
| But the consequences are not evident in the footage, which shows by the time Mr. Arredondo’s requests are relayed via radio by a dispatcher, it’s nearly five minutes after Mr. Coronado’s “contained” message ricocheted around the campus. There had also been radio requests for backup, shields, air support and critically, a report that classes in Rooms 111 and 112 were “in session.” And, more gunfire. | But the consequences are not evident in the footage, which shows by the time Mr. Arredondo’s requests are relayed via radio by a dispatcher, it’s nearly five minutes after Mr. Coronado’s “contained” message ricocheted around the campus. There had also been radio requests for backup, shields, air support and critically, a report that classes in Rooms 111 and 112 were “in session.” And, more gunfire. |
| Additional shots, Mr. McCraw testified, should have signaled every individual officer to immediately return to active shooter tactics. But footage shows that does not happen. | Additional shots, Mr. McCraw testified, should have signaled every individual officer to immediately return to active shooter tactics. But footage shows that does not happen. |
| Among the new group of officers entering the north hallway, three are instructors at the regional police academy with decades of law enforcement experience between them, and also serve as elected officials. Johnny Field and Emmanuel Zamora are Uvalde County constables, and J.J. Suarez is a Uvalde school board trustee. | Among the new group of officers entering the north hallway, three are instructors at the regional police academy with decades of law enforcement experience between them, and also serve as elected officials. Johnny Field and Emmanuel Zamora are Uvalde County constables, and J.J. Suarez is a Uvalde school board trustee. |
| Also visible is D.P.S. Trooper Crimson Elizondo, who lingers outside as the others enter. When she does step inside, she remains by the doorway and exits in less than two minutes. | Also visible is D.P.S. Trooper Crimson Elizondo, who lingers outside as the others enter. When she does step inside, she remains by the doorway and exits in less than two minutes. |
| (Ms. Elizondo left D.P.S. in August after getting hired by Uvalde’s school district police, but she was fired last week after CNN revealed her actions during the response.) | (Ms. Elizondo left D.P.S. in August after getting hired by Uvalde’s school district police, but she was fired last week after CNN revealed her actions during the response.) |
| The gunman fires again at 11:44 a.m. No officer rushes to the classrooms. The police instructors barely move. | The gunman fires again at 11:44 a.m. No officer rushes to the classrooms. The police instructors barely move. |
| Three minutes later, footage shows the instructors discuss negotiating with the gunman. One leaves to look for a bullhorn. | Three minutes later, footage shows the instructors discuss negotiating with the gunman. One leaves to look for a bullhorn. |
| While Mr. Arredondo’s attempts to communicate with — instead of kill — an active shooter were detailed extensively by D.P.S., others involved in negotiations, such as the police instructors, were not publicly mentioned. | While Mr. Arredondo’s attempts to communicate with — instead of kill — an active shooter were detailed extensively by D.P.S., others involved in negotiations, such as the police instructors, were not publicly mentioned. |
| Mr. McCraw excoriated Mr. Arredondo for letting injured children and teachers languish while waiting for SWAT, protective equipment and keys. | Mr. McCraw excoriated Mr. Arredondo for letting injured children and teachers languish while waiting for SWAT, protective equipment and keys. |
| But the visual evidence indicates BORTAC waited for 37 minutes for things that Mr. McCraw said the police didn’t need. | But the visual evidence indicates BORTAC waited for 37 minutes for things that Mr. McCraw said the police didn’t need. |
| At 12:12 p.m., footage shows officers in the north hallway hear a radio dispatcher reporting that a child trapped with the gunman called 911 and said the classroom was “full of victims.” | At 12:12 p.m., footage shows officers in the north hallway hear a radio dispatcher reporting that a child trapped with the gunman called 911 and said the classroom was “full of victims.” |
| This information is conveyed one minute later to a BORTAC agent who just arrived, one of the SWAT specialists Mr. Arredondo and others have been waiting for to breach Rooms 111 and 112. Using information from the House committee’s report, The Times determined the agent is BORTAC’s acting commander, but the agency declined to confirm it. | This information is conveyed one minute later to a BORTAC agent who just arrived, one of the SWAT specialists Mr. Arredondo and others have been waiting for to breach Rooms 111 and 112. Using information from the House committee’s report, The Times determined the agent is BORTAC’s acting commander, but the agency declined to confirm it. |
| Even with BORTAC in control, and victims calling from classrooms, no immediate assault is launched. Instead, there’s a discussion about tear gas, gas masks and flash bangs, none of which are used. | Even with BORTAC in control, and victims calling from classrooms, no immediate assault is launched. Instead, there’s a discussion about tear gas, gas masks and flash bangs, none of which are used. |
| Meanwhile, footage shows Mr. Arredondo and officers at the south position appear to miss reports about the 911 calls as they fixate on evacuating Room 109, two doors down from the gunman, where the lock is jammed. When an officer warns them to prepare for a BORTAC-led assault from the north position, Mr. Arredondo, who just obtained keys he believes will unlock 109, says to tell them to wait, using an expletive. “No one comes in,” he adds. | Meanwhile, footage shows Mr. Arredondo and officers at the south position appear to miss reports about the 911 calls as they fixate on evacuating Room 109, two doors down from the gunman, where the lock is jammed. When an officer warns them to prepare for a BORTAC-led assault from the north position, Mr. Arredondo, who just obtained keys he believes will unlock 109, says to tell them to wait, using an expletive. “No one comes in,” he adds. |
| But D.P.S. did not claim this message actually delayed a BORTAC-led advance. In the available footage, they do not appear ready to breach imminently. | But D.P.S. did not claim this message actually delayed a BORTAC-led advance. In the available footage, they do not appear ready to breach imminently. |
| At 12:21 p.m., after 37 minutes of silence from the classroom, the gunman resumes shooting. | At 12:21 p.m., after 37 minutes of silence from the classroom, the gunman resumes shooting. |
| Officers advance to Rooms 111 and 112, but do not attempt to enter.Why they stop is unclear. Part of the delay might stem from Room 109, which is finally getting cleared through the windows. A teacher and a student in that room suffered injuries from gunfire that penetrated the walls. But radio traffic indicates the evacuation is complete by 12:26 p.m., and there’s still no breach. | Officers advance to Rooms 111 and 112, but do not attempt to enter.Why they stop is unclear. Part of the delay might stem from Room 109, which is finally getting cleared through the windows. A teacher and a student in that room suffered injuries from gunfire that penetrated the walls. But radio traffic indicates the evacuation is complete by 12:26 p.m., and there’s still no breach. |
| Footage shows a variety of gear getting ferried in, tested and deemed insufficient as minutes tick by. | Footage shows a variety of gear getting ferried in, tested and deemed insufficient as minutes tick by. |
| BORTAC’s acting commander spends several minutes testing keys on a janitor’s closet. None open the door. | BORTAC’s acting commander spends several minutes testing keys on a janitor’s closet. None open the door. |
| About 10 minutes later, footage shows him carrying a breaching tool into the hallway. | About 10 minutes later, footage shows him carrying a breaching tool into the hallway. |
| According to the House committee, the acting commander tests the tool on a nearby door and decides using it “would take too long and dangerously expose” officers to gunfire. | According to the House committee, the acting commander tests the tool on a nearby door and decides using it “would take too long and dangerously expose” officers to gunfire. |
| At 12:36 p.m., footage shows a D.P.S. officer, Ranger Christopher Kindell, delivering another set of keys. This time, one unlocks the janitor’s closet, suggesting it will also open Rooms 111 and 112. (Mr. Kindell is under internal investigation, D.P.S. said.) | |
| After 12 more minutes go by, another breaching tool arrives: a sledgehammer. | After 12 more minutes go by, another breaching tool arrives: a sledgehammer. |
| At 12:50 p.m., almost 40 minutes after BORTAC arrived, the team of officers makes entry into the classrooms and kills the gunman. | At 12:50 p.m., almost 40 minutes after BORTAC arrived, the team of officers makes entry into the classrooms and kills the gunman. |
| J. David Goodman contributed reporting from Houston. Danielle Miller contributed video production. Emily Rhyne, Brenna Smith and Amudalat Ajasa contributed research and reporting from Uvalde and New York. | J. David Goodman contributed reporting from Houston. Danielle Miller contributed video production. Emily Rhyne, Brenna Smith and Amudalat Ajasa contributed research and reporting from Uvalde and New York. |