This article is from the source 'nytimes' and was first published or seen on . It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.
You can find the current article at its original source at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/05/opinion/putin-nuclear-ukraine.html
The article has changed 2 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.
Previous version
1
Next version
| Version 0 | Version 1 |
|---|---|
| If Putin Uses a Nuclear Weapon, How Should the World Respond? | If Putin Uses a Nuclear Weapon, How Should the World Respond? |
| (5 days later) | |
| This article is part of the Debatable newsletter. You can sign up here to receive it on Wednesdays. | This article is part of the Debatable newsletter. You can sign up here to receive it on Wednesdays. |
| The threat of nuclear war has hummed in the background of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for over seven months now, and in the past couple of weeks, it’s become even more difficult to tune out. In a televised speech, President Vladimir Putin warned that should Western forces endanger the “integrity” of Russian territory — which, as Putin defines it, may now include the four regions of Ukraine that he illegally annexed — “we will certainly use all the means at our disposal.” He added, “This is not a bluff.” | The threat of nuclear war has hummed in the background of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for over seven months now, and in the past couple of weeks, it’s become even more difficult to tune out. In a televised speech, President Vladimir Putin warned that should Western forces endanger the “integrity” of Russian territory — which, as Putin defines it, may now include the four regions of Ukraine that he illegally annexed — “we will certainly use all the means at our disposal.” He added, “This is not a bluff.” |
| The Ukrainian government, at least, seems to be taking him at his word. According to a top adviser to President Volodymyr Zelensky, the country’s intelligence agencies believe there is a “very high” risk that Russia might use so-called tactical nuclear weapons, less powerful cousins of conventional nuclear weapons that are designed to be used on the battlefield. | The Ukrainian government, at least, seems to be taking him at his word. According to a top adviser to President Volodymyr Zelensky, the country’s intelligence agencies believe there is a “very high” risk that Russia might use so-called tactical nuclear weapons, less powerful cousins of conventional nuclear weapons that are designed to be used on the battlefield. |
| U.S. officials maintain that the risk remains low, having detected no evidence of a nuclear mobilization. But they are far more worried about the possibility than they were at the outset of the conflict, The Times reported, and have begun gaming out post-strike scenarios. If Putin does break the 77-year-old nuclear taboo, how should the world respond? Here’s what people are saying. | U.S. officials maintain that the risk remains low, having detected no evidence of a nuclear mobilization. But they are far more worried about the possibility than they were at the outset of the conflict, The Times reported, and have begun gaming out post-strike scenarios. If Putin does break the 77-year-old nuclear taboo, how should the world respond? Here’s what people are saying. |
| In response to Putin’s speech, President Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said that any nuclear weapon use would result in “catastrophic consequences” for Russia, which he had “spelled out” in private communications with Moscow. | In response to Putin’s speech, President Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said that any nuclear weapon use would result in “catastrophic consequences” for Russia, which he had “spelled out” in private communications with Moscow. |
| What exactly those consequences would be is of course not known to the public. One option would be for the United States to respond in kind with its own tactical nuclear weapon strike. As the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig writes, “A nuclear response is most likely to reinforce the deterrence of adversaries, result in the assurance of allies, and re-establish the global taboo against nuclear use in the future by demonstrating that countries cannot use nuclear weapons without dire consequences.” Otherwise, he added, “both allies and adversaries might be surprised or perceive weakness.” | What exactly those consequences would be is of course not known to the public. One option would be for the United States to respond in kind with its own tactical nuclear weapon strike. As the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig writes, “A nuclear response is most likely to reinforce the deterrence of adversaries, result in the assurance of allies, and re-establish the global taboo against nuclear use in the future by demonstrating that countries cannot use nuclear weapons without dire consequences.” Otherwise, he added, “both allies and adversaries might be surprised or perceive weakness.” |
| Administration officials, however, have said for months that there are almost no scenarios in which the United States would respond with nuclear weapons, and for good reason: As Kroenig notes, while U.S. nuclear retaliation could restore the nuclear taboo, it could also start a cycle of mutual escalation ending in full-blown nuclear war. | Administration officials, however, have said for months that there are almost no scenarios in which the United States would respond with nuclear weapons, and for good reason: As Kroenig notes, while U.S. nuclear retaliation could restore the nuclear taboo, it could also start a cycle of mutual escalation ending in full-blown nuclear war. |
| Less remote are the chances of other military responses, such as using conventional weapons against the site from which the nuclear strike originated or giving Ukrainian forces the weaponry to do so themselves. The former general and C.I.A. director David Petraeus recently went so far as to speculate that the Biden administration would lead NATO in a collective military effort to “take out every Russian conventional force that we can see and identify on the battlefield in Ukraine and also in Crimea and every ship in the Black Sea.” | Less remote are the chances of other military responses, such as using conventional weapons against the site from which the nuclear strike originated or giving Ukrainian forces the weaponry to do so themselves. The former general and C.I.A. director David Petraeus recently went so far as to speculate that the Biden administration would lead NATO in a collective military effort to “take out every Russian conventional force that we can see and identify on the battlefield in Ukraine and also in Crimea and every ship in the Black Sea.” |
| Any attack on Russian forces would still be considered an attack on Russia, “but it would be sort of at a half step, if you will,” said Hans Kristensen, the director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. “You could still say to the Russians, ‘We’re doing this not to threaten Russia, as such, but to tell you that if you continue to do this then the next phase would be a lot more serious.’” | Any attack on Russian forces would still be considered an attack on Russia, “but it would be sort of at a half step, if you will,” said Hans Kristensen, the director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. “You could still say to the Russians, ‘We’re doing this not to threaten Russia, as such, but to tell you that if you continue to do this then the next phase would be a lot more serious.’” |
| Still, even a conventional military response — which, it bears noting, would probably be conducted without congressional approval — would result in a direct clash between Russia and NATO, “and therefore incurs the risk of World War III, with Armageddon still one scenario at the end,” Andreas Kluth argues in Bloomberg. “Putin might conclude that the U.S. isn’t prepared to retaliate with nukes, and launch even more nuclear strikes.” | Still, even a conventional military response — which, it bears noting, would probably be conducted without congressional approval — would result in a direct clash between Russia and NATO, “and therefore incurs the risk of World War III, with Armageddon still one scenario at the end,” Andreas Kluth argues in Bloomberg. “Putin might conclude that the U.S. isn’t prepared to retaliate with nukes, and launch even more nuclear strikes.” |
| Russian officials seem to believe that they could deploy a nuclear weapon in Ukraine without running a high risk of military retaliation from NATO. “Overseas and European demagogues are not going to perish in a nuclear apocalypse,” Dmitri Medvedev, vice chairman of Putin’s security council, wrote in a post on the Telegram social network. “Therefore, they will swallow the use of any weapon in the current conflict.” | Russian officials seem to believe that they could deploy a nuclear weapon in Ukraine without running a high risk of military retaliation from NATO. “Overseas and European demagogues are not going to perish in a nuclear apocalypse,” Dmitri Medvedev, vice chairman of Putin’s security council, wrote in a post on the Telegram social network. “Therefore, they will swallow the use of any weapon in the current conflict.” |
| But inviting a “nuclear apocalypse” and doing nothing are not the only ways Ukraine’s allies could respond: | But inviting a “nuclear apocalypse” and doing nothing are not the only ways Ukraine’s allies could respond: |
| Ukraine has received tens of billions of dollars in military aid, including $15 billion in weapons and equipment from the United States. Still, after Putin brandished the nuclear option last week, Zelensky called on allies to provide his military with tanks for its offensives in the east and the south, as well as air defenses to protect civilian infrastructure from Russian barrages. Should Putin follow through on his threat, those allies may feel more pressure to grant Zelensky’s request. | Ukraine has received tens of billions of dollars in military aid, including $15 billion in weapons and equipment from the United States. Still, after Putin brandished the nuclear option last week, Zelensky called on allies to provide his military with tanks for its offensives in the east and the south, as well as air defenses to protect civilian infrastructure from Russian barrages. Should Putin follow through on his threat, those allies may feel more pressure to grant Zelensky’s request. |
| As severe as the sanctions on Russia are now, Eliot A. Cohen, a professor at the school of international studies at Johns Hopkins, argues that Ukraine’s allies still have economic arrows in their quiver: The United States, in particular, he says, could impose unlimited secondary sanctions on anyone doing business with Russia and move to confiscate the roughly $300 billion Russia has in accounts held abroad. Ukraine’s allies are also mulling putting a price cap on Russian oil to further squeeze the Russian economy. | As severe as the sanctions on Russia are now, Eliot A. Cohen, a professor at the school of international studies at Johns Hopkins, argues that Ukraine’s allies still have economic arrows in their quiver: The United States, in particular, he says, could impose unlimited secondary sanctions on anyone doing business with Russia and move to confiscate the roughly $300 billion Russia has in accounts held abroad. Ukraine’s allies are also mulling putting a price cap on Russian oil to further squeeze the Russian economy. |
| Some analysts believe that the oil price cap scheme could succeed only with the cooperation of big oil purchasers like China and India, which, like most of the world’s 195 countries, have not joined in imposing sanctions on Russia. If Putin were to break the nuclear taboo, however, that could well change: “The whole world would stop,” said Joseph Cirincione, a nuclear policy and national security expert. | |
| Yet given the strength of Putin’s resolve to this point, some analysts doubt that expanded sanctions and military support would be enough to break it or restore the nuclear taboo. “Moscow would have gotten away with using a nuclear weapon, shown that deterrence was meaningless, and set itself up to use nuclear weapons again in the future,” Dan Goure, a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington Institute, writes in The National Interest. “Putin’s fortunes at home would certainly improve. He would claim to be the Russian leader that stood up to the West and got away with employing a nuclear weapon to defend the motherland.” | Yet given the strength of Putin’s resolve to this point, some analysts doubt that expanded sanctions and military support would be enough to break it or restore the nuclear taboo. “Moscow would have gotten away with using a nuclear weapon, shown that deterrence was meaningless, and set itself up to use nuclear weapons again in the future,” Dan Goure, a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington Institute, writes in The National Interest. “Putin’s fortunes at home would certainly improve. He would claim to be the Russian leader that stood up to the West and got away with employing a nuclear weapon to defend the motherland.” |
| Shocking as a Russian nuclear detonation would be, the strategic payoff would be far from certain: Last week, the Institute for the Study of War concluded that at best, the use of even multiple tactical nuclear weapons would merely freeze the war’s front lines, enabling the Kremlin to retain the Ukrainian territory it now occupies. But it would not, the institute concluded, “enable Russian offensives to capture the entirety of Ukraine.” | Shocking as a Russian nuclear detonation would be, the strategic payoff would be far from certain: Last week, the Institute for the Study of War concluded that at best, the use of even multiple tactical nuclear weapons would merely freeze the war’s front lines, enabling the Kremlin to retain the Ukrainian territory it now occupies. But it would not, the institute concluded, “enable Russian offensives to capture the entirety of Ukraine.” |
| For many high-ranking Russian officials and elites, if not for Putin himself, “entering into talks now with the gains Russia has already made under its belt would be an entirely reasonable course of action that would not necessarily mean defeat,” Tatiana Stanovaya writes for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. | For many high-ranking Russian officials and elites, if not for Putin himself, “entering into talks now with the gains Russia has already made under its belt would be an entirely reasonable course of action that would not necessarily mean defeat,” Tatiana Stanovaya writes for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. |
| If she is right, there might be an opportunity to avert a nuclear strike in the first place, and some believe that Ukrainians should at least try to seize it. “A cease-fire would help to calm the situation and avoid further escalation,” writes Christopher Chivvis, director of the American statecraft program at Carnegie. “Western capitals should at least point out to Ukrainian leaders that their prospects of retaking all their territory may not be as bright as they hope.” | If she is right, there might be an opportunity to avert a nuclear strike in the first place, and some believe that Ukrainians should at least try to seize it. “A cease-fire would help to calm the situation and avoid further escalation,” writes Christopher Chivvis, director of the American statecraft program at Carnegie. “Western capitals should at least point out to Ukrainian leaders that their prospects of retaking all their territory may not be as bright as they hope.” |
| Ukraine is “ready for a dialogue with Russia,” Zelensky said last week — but, he added, only “with another president of Russia.” To many, his resolve is more than defensible: “Russian atrocities in Ukrainian lands they occupy are well documented,” writes Daniel Fried, a former U.S. ambassador to Poland. “Murder, rape, kidnapping of children, and eradication of Ukrainian cultures are the playbook. That reality should create a high bar for any settlement that surrenders Ukrainian land or people to Russia.” | Ukraine is “ready for a dialogue with Russia,” Zelensky said last week — but, he added, only “with another president of Russia.” To many, his resolve is more than defensible: “Russian atrocities in Ukrainian lands they occupy are well documented,” writes Daniel Fried, a former U.S. ambassador to Poland. “Murder, rape, kidnapping of children, and eradication of Ukrainian cultures are the playbook. That reality should create a high bar for any settlement that surrenders Ukrainian land or people to Russia.” |
| Whether a nuclear strike would break this diplomatic gridlock or reinforce it is difficult to predict. Faced with calls to do whatever it takes to stave off further bloodshed and nuclear escalation, Ukrainians could reasonably argue that settling with Russia would vindicate a new strategy of imperial war-making for Putin and others to revisit. “Every ambitious dictator will scramble to obtain nuclear weapons, and every responsible nonnuclear nation will seek to acquire nuclear weapons for self-defense,” writes Andriy Yermak, a top adviser to Zelensky, in The Atlantic. “Nonproliferation agreements will be worthless. Nuclear wars, with their millions of casualties, will follow.” | Whether a nuclear strike would break this diplomatic gridlock or reinforce it is difficult to predict. Faced with calls to do whatever it takes to stave off further bloodshed and nuclear escalation, Ukrainians could reasonably argue that settling with Russia would vindicate a new strategy of imperial war-making for Putin and others to revisit. “Every ambitious dictator will scramble to obtain nuclear weapons, and every responsible nonnuclear nation will seek to acquire nuclear weapons for self-defense,” writes Andriy Yermak, a top adviser to Zelensky, in The Atlantic. “Nonproliferation agreements will be worthless. Nuclear wars, with their millions of casualties, will follow.” |
| Alternatively, the world might receive Russia’s violation of the nuclear taboo as a ghastly and desperate coda to its national decline under Putin: He would become a truly global pariah, and whatever face he might have saved by de-escalating would be lost. | Alternatively, the world might receive Russia’s violation of the nuclear taboo as a ghastly and desperate coda to its national decline under Putin: He would become a truly global pariah, and whatever face he might have saved by de-escalating would be lost. |
| “Over seven months of an optional war have gutted the Russian military, sunk the Russian economy, weakened Russia’s partnership with China, alienated Russia’s trading partners, and touched off a stampede by Russia’s best and brightest to escape a dysfunctional country,” writes David Von Drehle in The Washington Post. “The case for negotiation is that a deal might create space for Russia to deflate rather than explode.” | “Over seven months of an optional war have gutted the Russian military, sunk the Russian economy, weakened Russia’s partnership with China, alienated Russia’s trading partners, and touched off a stampede by Russia’s best and brightest to escape a dysfunctional country,” writes David Von Drehle in The Washington Post. “The case for negotiation is that a deal might create space for Russia to deflate rather than explode.” |
| Do you have a point of view we missed? Email us at debatable@nytimes.com. Please note your name, age and location in your response, which may be included in the next newsletter. | Do you have a point of view we missed? Email us at debatable@nytimes.com. Please note your name, age and location in your response, which may be included in the next newsletter. |
| “The Age of Predatory Nuclear-Weapon States Has Arrived” [Politico] | “The Age of Predatory Nuclear-Weapon States Has Arrived” [Politico] |
| “What Putin’s latest threats mean for the risk of nuclear war” [Vox] | “What Putin’s latest threats mean for the risk of nuclear war” [Vox] |
| “What if Russia Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine?” [The Atlantic] | “What if Russia Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine?” [The Atlantic] |
| “Putin’s World Is Now Smaller Than Ever” [Foreign Policy] | “Putin’s World Is Now Smaller Than Ever” [Foreign Policy] |
Previous version
1
Next version