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| MI5 'too stretched' before 7 July | MI5 'too stretched' before 7 July |
| (21 minutes later) | |
| The security service did not have the manpower to do extra checks on the 7 July ringleader before he carried out the attacks in 2005, a report has said. | The security service did not have the manpower to do extra checks on the 7 July ringleader before he carried out the attacks in 2005, a report has said. |
| But the Intelligence and Security Committee declined to criticise MI5, which it said had other priorities. | But the Intelligence and Security Committee declined to criticise MI5, which it said had other priorities. |
| It stressed that while officers knew of Mohammad Sidique Khan's terrorist links, there was no evidence to suggest he was a threat to national security. | It stressed that while officers knew of Mohammad Sidique Khan's terrorist links, there was no evidence to suggest he was a threat to national security. |
| Fifty-two people were killed in the suicide bombings in London in 2005. | Fifty-two people were killed in the suicide bombings in London in 2005. |
| The long-awaited report by a group of MPs describes in unprecedented detail what officers knew of Khan before the attacks. | |
| It reveals that a police surveillance team filmed him in 2001 as part of an operation against suspected extremists. | |
| However, he was not identified from the picture - and his significance was only realised after the bombings. | However, he was not identified from the picture - and his significance was only realised after the bombings. |
| 'Astounding' | |
| The report reveals that MI5 teams were stretched almost to breaking point in 2004 - the year before the attacks - attempting to trace terror suspects around the UK. | |
| During that year, MI5 did not have the resources to watch 52 suspects who were classed as "essential targets". | |
| Dominic Casciani,Home affairs correspondent | Dominic Casciani,Home affairs correspondent |
| This very detailed report lifts the lid on the security services in a way we've not seen before. | This very detailed report lifts the lid on the security services in a way we've not seen before. |
| It clears MI5 of failing to anticipate the 7/7 attacks because it had so much on its plate in 2004. Quite simply, Mohammad Siddique Khan was not listed as an essential target. | It clears MI5 of failing to anticipate the 7/7 attacks because it had so much on its plate in 2004. Quite simply, Mohammad Siddique Khan was not listed as an essential target. |
| Why? Because he had not been identified. | Why? Because he had not been identified. |
| That's not to say the security service and police didn't know anything about him. We've now learned that police filmed him in 2001 when he went camping with known extremists. | That's not to say the security service and police didn't know anything about him. We've now learned that police filmed him in 2001 when he went camping with known extremists. |
| But by 2004 MI5 still didn't know "what" Khan was: they knew he was hanging around with terror suspects - but insist there was no intelligence that he was a security threat. | But by 2004 MI5 still didn't know "what" Khan was: they knew he was hanging around with terror suspects - but insist there was no intelligence that he was a security threat. |
| It's this critical difference between "who" and "what" that the security service relies upon amid accusations that it had seen enough dots - but failed to join them up. | It's this critical difference between "who" and "what" that the security service relies upon amid accusations that it had seen enough dots - but failed to join them up. |
| In fact, the security service could only provide "reasonable" surveillance coverage of about one in 20 terror suspects - a fact the committee described as "astounding". | In fact, the security service could only provide "reasonable" surveillance coverage of about one in 20 terror suspects - a fact the committee described as "astounding". |
| The committee said Khan and fellow 7/7 bomber Shehzad Tanweer were defined as "desirable" targets by MI5 after they were overheard discussing fraud and travel to Pakistan. | |
| But resources were so stretched that officers could not even assess whether such "desirable" targets should be examined more closely unless they were known to be actively plotting an attack. | |
| The report concluded that there would "always be gaps in intelligence coverage" and the country must be "realistic" about what the security services could achieve. | |
| "Despite the increased efforts of the agencies, and the increased resources at their disposal, the odds are stacked against them," it said. | |
| "It is an uncomfortable truth that, at some time in the future, and without any prior warning, it is very possible the UK will be the subject of another terrorist attack." | |
| Fertiliser bomb plot | |
| MI5 currently employs 3,500 officers. The committee said it would need an unachievable "several hundred thousand" to provide comprehensive intelligence coverage. | MI5 currently employs 3,500 officers. The committee said it would need an unachievable "several hundred thousand" to provide comprehensive intelligence coverage. |
| In that context, it said the decision not to follow Khan after he had initially appeared on radar was understandable, taking into account operational pressures. | In that context, it said the decision not to follow Khan after he had initially appeared on radar was understandable, taking into account operational pressures. |
| But the MPs said that given the amount of information held on Khan, it was "surprising" that they did not identify him prior to 7 July. | But the MPs said that given the amount of information held on Khan, it was "surprising" that they did not identify him prior to 7 July. |
| There were six contacts recorded by MI5 and police with Khan between 1993, when he was arrested for assault, and January 2005, when a hire car was linked to a terror investigation. | |
| Surveillance teams also witnessed several meetings between Khan and Tanweer and Omar Khyam, the man later discovered to be the leader of a plot to detonate fertiliser bombs. | |
| Analysts decided the three men were not planning an attack and were instead involved in financial fraud. | |
| The report also pointed out the overwhelming number of leads relating to Khyam - more than 4,000 telephone contacts and 1,154 links to vehicles - that MI5 were faced with. | |
| Were you affected by the July 7th bombings in London? What is your reaction to the report? Send us your comments and experiences using the form below. | Were you affected by the July 7th bombings in London? What is your reaction to the report? Send us your comments and experiences using the form below. |
| The BBC may edit your comments and not all emails will be published. Your comments may be published on any BBC media worldwide. Terms & Conditions | The BBC may edit your comments and not all emails will be published. Your comments may be published on any BBC media worldwide. Terms & Conditions |