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Remembering Poland’s Doomed Fight Against the Nazis Remembering Poland’s Doomed Fight Against the Nazis
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POLAND 1939The Outbreak of World War IIBy Roger Moorhouse
A wise (and divorced) friend once told me that remembering the ending is a way to forget the beginning. In war so as in love: When we commemorate the end of a war, we neglect the way that it began. Every war ends, after all; but not every war had to begin. When earlier this year Russia commemorated the 75th anniversary of the conclusion of World War II with a parade on Red Square, we were supposed to recall Berlin in 1945, and the final defeat of Germany. We are supposed to forget Brest in 1939, where the Red Army, having defeated Poland together with the Wehrmacht, organized a joint victory parade with its German brothers in arms. It was a German-Soviet attack on Poland that began World War II in Europe.A wise (and divorced) friend once told me that remembering the ending is a way to forget the beginning. In war so as in love: When we commemorate the end of a war, we neglect the way that it began. Every war ends, after all; but not every war had to begin. When earlier this year Russia commemorated the 75th anniversary of the conclusion of World War II with a parade on Red Square, we were supposed to recall Berlin in 1945, and the final defeat of Germany. We are supposed to forget Brest in 1939, where the Red Army, having defeated Poland together with the Wehrmacht, organized a joint victory parade with its German brothers in arms. It was a German-Soviet attack on Poland that began World War II in Europe.
That campaign is Roger Moorhouse’s subject in his fine new book, “Poland 1939.” As Moorhouse helps us to see in this exemplary military history, to begin at the beginning of the war reveals where choices were made, and how they mattered. Poland’s decision to resist the Germans in summer 1939, after Austria and Czechoslovakia had yielded in 1938, was of world historical significance. Poland’s resistance forced Britain and France to honor a security guarantee, and thus established the kernel of the alliance that would eventually win the war. If Britain had not joined the war in 1939, it is hard to see how the United States would ever have found a reason to intervene in Europe.That campaign is Roger Moorhouse’s subject in his fine new book, “Poland 1939.” As Moorhouse helps us to see in this exemplary military history, to begin at the beginning of the war reveals where choices were made, and how they mattered. Poland’s decision to resist the Germans in summer 1939, after Austria and Czechoslovakia had yielded in 1938, was of world historical significance. Poland’s resistance forced Britain and France to honor a security guarantee, and thus established the kernel of the alliance that would eventually win the war. If Britain had not joined the war in 1939, it is hard to see how the United States would ever have found a reason to intervene in Europe.
Poland’s decision was even weightier than Moorhouse claims. His book focuses on the battles of September 1939 rather than German-Polish and German-Soviet relations. Hitler’s motives are presented as a desire for war, which is true enough. Yet what Hitler specifically wanted was conquest of the Soviet Union. For more than four years, Nazi diplomacy sought to draw Warsaw into an offensive alliance against Moscow.Poland’s decision was even weightier than Moorhouse claims. His book focuses on the battles of September 1939 rather than German-Polish and German-Soviet relations. Hitler’s motives are presented as a desire for war, which is true enough. Yet what Hitler specifically wanted was conquest of the Soviet Union. For more than four years, Nazi diplomacy sought to draw Warsaw into an offensive alliance against Moscow.
After the appeasement at Munich of September 1938, Hitler redoubled his efforts to gain Poland as an ally. Poland would cede some territory to Germany, went the proposal, to be compensated by land taken from Soviet Ukraine after a joint invasion. It was Warsaw’s explicit rejection of such ideas in January 1939 that forced Hitler to change his plans. Without a Polish ally, he had to destroy Poland to get to the Soviet Union. In spring his orders came down for an attack on Poland, and in summer for a pact with the Soviets that would make war on Poland safer for Germany. The arrangement was meant, of course, to be temporary.After the appeasement at Munich of September 1938, Hitler redoubled his efforts to gain Poland as an ally. Poland would cede some territory to Germany, went the proposal, to be compensated by land taken from Soviet Ukraine after a joint invasion. It was Warsaw’s explicit rejection of such ideas in January 1939 that forced Hitler to change his plans. Without a Polish ally, he had to destroy Poland to get to the Soviet Union. In spring his orders came down for an attack on Poland, and in summer for a pact with the Soviets that would make war on Poland safer for Germany. The arrangement was meant, of course, to be temporary.
Stalin might have refused Hitler’s offer in August 1939: He could have defended the status quo, as Britain and France urged. But Stalin wanted territory, and so he agreed with Germany to dismember Poland. When Poland fought Germany, beginning on Sept. 1, 1939, it was defending itself, but also shielding the Soviet Union. Poland was repaid by a Soviet invasion on Sept. 17 — and by Soviet propaganda blaming it, grotesquely, for starting the war. Today, Putin’s Russia defends the accord with Germany that began the war, aligned the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany, helped the Nazis destroy Poland and defeat France and ended anyway with a German invasion of the Soviet Union. (An earlier book by Moorhouse was on the accord; an excellent recent work in German by Claudia Weber on the subject deserves translation.)Stalin might have refused Hitler’s offer in August 1939: He could have defended the status quo, as Britain and France urged. But Stalin wanted territory, and so he agreed with Germany to dismember Poland. When Poland fought Germany, beginning on Sept. 1, 1939, it was defending itself, but also shielding the Soviet Union. Poland was repaid by a Soviet invasion on Sept. 17 — and by Soviet propaganda blaming it, grotesquely, for starting the war. Today, Putin’s Russia defends the accord with Germany that began the war, aligned the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany, helped the Nazis destroy Poland and defeat France and ended anyway with a German invasion of the Soviet Union. (An earlier book by Moorhouse was on the accord; an excellent recent work in German by Claudia Weber on the subject deserves translation.)
If Russian memory of the war is clouded by the Soviet decision to begin it as an aggressor, Britain and France also have their reasons to forget what actually happened in September 1939. As Moorhouse recounts, Britain and France were forced to abandon appeasement that March, after Germany occupied and dismembered Czechoslovakia. Both offered security guarantees to Poland. Moorhouse gives us heart-rending accounts of Poles who fought gamely against a superior enemy in early September, believing that allies were on their way. But the Royal Air Force did not respond to Germany’s bombing and strafing of Polish civilians by attacking targets in Germany, and France ignored its obligations entirely (aside from a comically legalistic border-crossing). As Moorhouse suggests, France missed a chance to turn the course of the war. With German forces fighting in Poland, Moorhouse says, France enjoyed a three to one advantage in troops in an attack from the west, as well as superiority in air power and in armor. A French invasion of Germany would likely have been more effective and less bloody than the failed defense of France in May 1940. It certainly would have been more glorious.If Russian memory of the war is clouded by the Soviet decision to begin it as an aggressor, Britain and France also have their reasons to forget what actually happened in September 1939. As Moorhouse recounts, Britain and France were forced to abandon appeasement that March, after Germany occupied and dismembered Czechoslovakia. Both offered security guarantees to Poland. Moorhouse gives us heart-rending accounts of Poles who fought gamely against a superior enemy in early September, believing that allies were on their way. But the Royal Air Force did not respond to Germany’s bombing and strafing of Polish civilians by attacking targets in Germany, and France ignored its obligations entirely (aside from a comically legalistic border-crossing). As Moorhouse suggests, France missed a chance to turn the course of the war. With German forces fighting in Poland, Moorhouse says, France enjoyed a three to one advantage in troops in an attack from the west, as well as superiority in air power and in armor. A French invasion of Germany would likely have been more effective and less bloody than the failed defense of France in May 1940. It certainly would have been more glorious.
Moorhouse’s main argument, which is unanswerable, is that the campaign in Poland was a real war. It was not the “phony war” or “dróle de guerre” of British and French memory. It was not some magical “Blitzkrieg” that scattered a racially inferior opponent, as German propaganda maintained. Nor was it a collapse of the Polish state, as Moscow argued to justify its own invasion. It was a hard-fought struggle, with advances, retreats, killing and dying. The heart of this book is the description of the fighting, which is about as good as military history can be. Moorhouse has visited the places he writes about, and understands weaponry, tactics and the structures of the German and Polish armed forces. As he generously says, he relies on work by Polish and German historians.Moorhouse’s main argument, which is unanswerable, is that the campaign in Poland was a real war. It was not the “phony war” or “dróle de guerre” of British and French memory. It was not some magical “Blitzkrieg” that scattered a racially inferior opponent, as German propaganda maintained. Nor was it a collapse of the Polish state, as Moscow argued to justify its own invasion. It was a hard-fought struggle, with advances, retreats, killing and dying. The heart of this book is the description of the fighting, which is about as good as military history can be. Moorhouse has visited the places he writes about, and understands weaponry, tactics and the structures of the German and Polish armed forces. As he generously says, he relies on work by Polish and German historians.
The reader can sense, for example, just how grindingly awful it is to fight when the enemy controls the skies. Again and again, Polish counterattacks were crushed by the Luftwaffe. Moorhouse makes a strong case that air superiority was the key to the rapid German victory. Polish resistance was brought to an end by early October. Aside from air power, Moorhouse stresses superiority in armor, the role of geography (flat plains and the ability of Germany to attack from three sides) and finally the attack by the Soviets (from the fourth side).The reader can sense, for example, just how grindingly awful it is to fight when the enemy controls the skies. Again and again, Polish counterattacks were crushed by the Luftwaffe. Moorhouse makes a strong case that air superiority was the key to the rapid German victory. Polish resistance was brought to an end by early October. Aside from air power, Moorhouse stresses superiority in armor, the role of geography (flat plains and the ability of Germany to attack from three sides) and finally the attack by the Soviets (from the fourth side).
Moorhouse uses personal accounts from Poles and Germans to great effect, bringing battlefields, burning towns and cities and even the strafed countryside into clear view. We hear the final words of Polish soldiers who chose to fight on against the odds, even after they understood that Britain and France would not be coming to their aid. They fought for a lost cause — but they were fighting for a cause, and not because it was lost. Moorhouse is rehabilitating an everyday kind of patriotism, of people who did what they thought was right in conditions of terror and ever-growing certainty of defeat. He is seeking to restore agency to Poles, to show that their country’s policy of resisting Germany (and the Soviet Union) and the willingness of soldiers and officers to fight were decisions that made a difference.Moorhouse uses personal accounts from Poles and Germans to great effect, bringing battlefields, burning towns and cities and even the strafed countryside into clear view. We hear the final words of Polish soldiers who chose to fight on against the odds, even after they understood that Britain and France would not be coming to their aid. They fought for a lost cause — but they were fighting for a cause, and not because it was lost. Moorhouse is rehabilitating an everyday kind of patriotism, of people who did what they thought was right in conditions of terror and ever-growing certainty of defeat. He is seeking to restore agency to Poles, to show that their country’s policy of resisting Germany (and the Soviet Union) and the willingness of soldiers and officers to fight were decisions that made a difference.
Like all good histories, Moorhouse’s answers an old question and raises a new one. This book, although it fills a historical gap in a way that many Polish readers will find satisfying, also challenges the way that official Poland today remembers the war. If Poles were able to make choices in the terrible circumstances of 1939, as Moorhouse shows, one can reasonably ask about the choices they made before then. “Poland 1939” is weakest in its discussions of Polish society, which was mostly peasant and about a third national minorities. The reader is not introduced to economic, social and national policy before the war, which (as many Poles understood in 1939) left the state and the armed forces weaker than they had to be. The peasants were less interested in the Polish cause than one might conclude from Moorhouse’s book, and Ukrainians, Belarusians and Jews had reason for ambivalence about a Polish state that was defined in ethnic terms. In today’s Poland, the interwar years are idealized, and the defeat of 1939 is portrayed as a cleansing victimhood. Going back to the beginning of the war clears away the propaganda of Poland’s enemies (and allies), but it also raises some questions about Poland itself.Like all good histories, Moorhouse’s answers an old question and raises a new one. This book, although it fills a historical gap in a way that many Polish readers will find satisfying, also challenges the way that official Poland today remembers the war. If Poles were able to make choices in the terrible circumstances of 1939, as Moorhouse shows, one can reasonably ask about the choices they made before then. “Poland 1939” is weakest in its discussions of Polish society, which was mostly peasant and about a third national minorities. The reader is not introduced to economic, social and national policy before the war, which (as many Poles understood in 1939) left the state and the armed forces weaker than they had to be. The peasants were less interested in the Polish cause than one might conclude from Moorhouse’s book, and Ukrainians, Belarusians and Jews had reason for ambivalence about a Polish state that was defined in ethnic terms. In today’s Poland, the interwar years are idealized, and the defeat of 1939 is portrayed as a cleansing victimhood. Going back to the beginning of the war clears away the propaganda of Poland’s enemies (and allies), but it also raises some questions about Poland itself.
POLAND 1939The Outbreak of World War IIBy Roger Moorhouse432 pp. Basic Books. $32.