Can 50 Years of Minimizing Nuclear Proliferation Continue?

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/opinion/minimizing-nuclear-proliferation.html

Version 0 of 1.

Imagine we are living in the year 2030. New seismic activity indicates an underground nuclear explosion somewhere near the Arctic Circle. One more country announces it’s joining the once-exclusive club of nuclear weapons states that has now grown to 20 nations — more than double the number in 2020.

The trouble started in 2023, when a group of former allies of the United States renounced their adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and opted to acquire the very nuclear weapons capabilities that they foreswore decades earlier.

Since then, nations across the world had raced to acquire the bomb, and the global security situation had become increasingly precarious. Sooner or later, as centers of nuclear decision making multiplied, one of those weapons was bound to go off, with consequences incalculable for all.

A far-fetched future? Perhaps. The nonproliferation treaty entered into force 50 years ago, on March 5, 1970. At the time, only five nations — the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France — were recognized as nuclear weapons states. Just four more countries — India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea — have since acquired the bomb. And, yet, this scenario is more plausible now than many may think.

To understand why, we need to go back to 1963, when President John F. Kennedy warned of a “world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons.” Kennedy expressed the widely held belief that further proliferation was likely, if not inevitable. Every nation that possessed the capability to build a bomb had done so and American officials worried that the trend was about to accelerate.

That didn’t happen. Having stood at the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union redoubled efforts to stabilize their nuclear relationship and prevent other states from crossing the nuclear threshold. The nonproliferation treaty was one result of those efforts. Under the treaty, states that didn’t have nuclear weapons pledged not to develop or acquire them, while those that did committed to eventual nuclear disarmament.

But it wasn’t just U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations that turned the proliferation tide in the 1960s. Even more important was Washington’s determination to assure its allies in Europe and Asia that they could rely on America for their nuclear security. Only after they were convinced that the American nuclear guarantee was credible, did allies like Germany and Japan decide to forego a national nuclear option and join the nonproliferation treaty.

Whenever new developments seemed to call the American guarantee into question — as when a new generation of Soviet medium-range missiles were deployed in Europe in the 1970s and when North Korea expanded its nuclear and missile programs in the 1990s and 2000s — Washington worked to reassure its allies that its nuclear commitment remained strong and credible.

In recent years, new questions about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee have returned. One reason is the changing strategic environment. In Europe, a more adventurous and better-armed Russia no longer shies away from using military force, as its invasion of Ukraine and its support for the Assad regime in Syria have underscored. In Asia, China’s rapid rise has expanded its military reach throughout the Asia-Pacific, and North Korea has emerged as a potent foe, armed with nuclear weapons and long-range missiles that threaten the entire region.

Even as threats have multiplied, allied doubts about the American commitment have grown perceptibly since Donald Trump entered the White House expressing deep distrust of alliances. His early failure to reconfirm NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense commitment, his threat to leave NATO if allies did not sharply increase military spending, his insistence that Asian allies greatly increase their financial contributions to maintain the U.S. military presence, his musings about some allies acquiring their own nuclear capabilities — all these have increased uncertainty in allied capitals about whether they can still count on the United States.

Which raises the question: if not the United States, who will assure their nuclear security? So far, few experts argue that the answer lies in a national nuclear program. But as worries about America’s security commitments continue to grow, more countries may reach that conclusion.

To forestall this danger, Washington needs to act swiftly.

First, the president needs to unconditionally reaffirm America’s fundamental commitment to the security and defense of its allies. Yes, the allies need to do more and spend more, but it is in America’s vital interest to ensure that they are safe and secure — and without their own nuclear weapons.

Second, America and the other nuclear powers need to resume serious discussions on arms control. As a first step, Washington and Moscow need to extend the New START treaty capping their long-range nuclear forces before it expires next year. Next, along with Britain, France and China, they should start a serious dialogue on how to limit their nuclear capabilities and work together to prevent further proliferation. And all of them should halt nuclear modernization efforts while those talks continue.

For 50 years, the nonproliferation treaty has largely succeeded in preventing more countries from going nuclear. America’s security alliances have played an essential role in that success. Reaffirming those alliances and committing to serious arms control efforts can help ensure its continuation in the next 50 years.

Ivo Daalder, president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.