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We’re Still Living in Stalin’s World We’re Still Living in Stalin’s World
(about 8 hours later)
If you polled global security experts today about the parts of the world that keep them up at night, the top three would probably be Ukraine and Crimea, the Korean Peninsula and post-Brexit Western Europe. Coincidentally, the troubles facing all three can be traced back to a short conference held 75 years ago on Tuesday.If you polled global security experts today about the parts of the world that keep them up at night, the top three would probably be Ukraine and Crimea, the Korean Peninsula and post-Brexit Western Europe. Coincidentally, the troubles facing all three can be traced back to a short conference held 75 years ago on Tuesday.
The meeting, at the Crimean resort of Yalta, brought together the three top Allied leaders, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin. The war was winding down, and they were there to determine what came next.The meeting, at the Crimean resort of Yalta, brought together the three top Allied leaders, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin. The war was winding down, and they were there to determine what came next.
Among the most pressing issues were the borders and future democratic freedoms of Poland, which Roosevelt and Churchill had pledged to safeguard. By February 1945, however, the Red Army was in control of most of Eastern Europe. As Stalin was fond of saying, “Whoever occupies a territory imposes on it his own social system,” and the Soviet Union was simply too powerful to resist. Roosevelt and Churchill battled for self-determination for Poland and other Eastern European countries, but in the end secured only paper promises that the West had no way to enforce and that Stalin violated within weeks.Among the most pressing issues were the borders and future democratic freedoms of Poland, which Roosevelt and Churchill had pledged to safeguard. By February 1945, however, the Red Army was in control of most of Eastern Europe. As Stalin was fond of saying, “Whoever occupies a territory imposes on it his own social system,” and the Soviet Union was simply too powerful to resist. Roosevelt and Churchill battled for self-determination for Poland and other Eastern European countries, but in the end secured only paper promises that the West had no way to enforce and that Stalin violated within weeks.
Poland was the reason Britain had originally gone to war, a fact not lost on Churchill that month. Soon after he returned from Yalta, Churchill even asked his military commanders to assess the cost of using force to compel Stalin to give Poland a fair deal. The response was 45 Anglo-American divisions, several Polish divisions and 100,000 rearmed German troops. The commanders nicknamed the idea of going to war against the Soviet Union “Operation Unthinkable,” which, of course, it was. A year later, Churchill declared that an “iron curtain” had descended across Europe.Poland was the reason Britain had originally gone to war, a fact not lost on Churchill that month. Soon after he returned from Yalta, Churchill even asked his military commanders to assess the cost of using force to compel Stalin to give Poland a fair deal. The response was 45 Anglo-American divisions, several Polish divisions and 100,000 rearmed German troops. The commanders nicknamed the idea of going to war against the Soviet Union “Operation Unthinkable,” which, of course, it was. A year later, Churchill declared that an “iron curtain” had descended across Europe.
Though the Soviet Union collapsed some 30 years ago, the division, and the flash points, remain. It’s no coincidence that the crux of the split between Russia and the West is over Crimea and parts of Ukraine, annexed by Vladimir Putin. Just as in 1945, Western leaders know they have few viable options beyond moral pressure on the occupying Russians. Stalin once said, “If you are afraid of wolves, keep out of the woods.” Entering Putin’s woods seems no less problematic.Though the Soviet Union collapsed some 30 years ago, the division, and the flash points, remain. It’s no coincidence that the crux of the split between Russia and the West is over Crimea and parts of Ukraine, annexed by Vladimir Putin. Just as in 1945, Western leaders know they have few viable options beyond moral pressure on the occupying Russians. Stalin once said, “If you are afraid of wolves, keep out of the woods.” Entering Putin’s woods seems no less problematic.
The Yalta Conference bequeathed other troubling legacies. One of Roosevelt’s key objectives at the meeting was to secure the Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan to save the millions of American lives he believed it would cost to invade the Japanese home islands. A timely Soviet entry might force Japan to surrender. He therefore readily accepted Stalin’s demands for territorial and other concessions at the expense of America’s ally China; Stalin also demanded future concessions from a defeated Japan.The Yalta Conference bequeathed other troubling legacies. One of Roosevelt’s key objectives at the meeting was to secure the Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan to save the millions of American lives he believed it would cost to invade the Japanese home islands. A timely Soviet entry might force Japan to surrender. He therefore readily accepted Stalin’s demands for territorial and other concessions at the expense of America’s ally China; Stalin also demanded future concessions from a defeated Japan.
Then, just five months later, the three Allied leaders learned that the United States had tested an atomic bomb; within weeks two were dropped on Japan. The availability of a powerful new weapon earlier than many doubters, Roosevelt and Churchill included, had believed possible made Soviet intervention in the Pacific Theater unnecessary.Then, just five months later, the three Allied leaders learned that the United States had tested an atomic bomb; within weeks two were dropped on Japan. The availability of a powerful new weapon earlier than many doubters, Roosevelt and Churchill included, had believed possible made Soviet intervention in the Pacific Theater unnecessary.
Grasping this immediately, Stalin hastened his plans to attack Japan. On Aug. 9, 1945, three days after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and the day the bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, the Red Army swept into Japanese-occupied Manchuria and on into northern Korea, held by Japan since 1910, advancing rapidly to the 38th Parallel. Under terms hurriedly drafted with American military planners, Soviet forces took the surrender of all Japanese troops north of that line while American forces, after a little delay, did so to the south.Grasping this immediately, Stalin hastened his plans to attack Japan. On Aug. 9, 1945, three days after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and the day the bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, the Red Army swept into Japanese-occupied Manchuria and on into northern Korea, held by Japan since 1910, advancing rapidly to the 38th Parallel. Under terms hurriedly drafted with American military planners, Soviet forces took the surrender of all Japanese troops north of that line while American forces, after a little delay, did so to the south.
Soon after, despite Stalin’s pledge to support a free and independent Korea, Soviet troops sealed the 38th Parallel. The Korean Communist leader Kim Il-sung arrived in Pyongyang in the uniform of a Red Army major and, with Soviet backing, took power in the north. The scene was set for the establishment of North and South Korea, the Korean War, continuing partition and the instabilities posed by the Kim dynasty today.Soon after, despite Stalin’s pledge to support a free and independent Korea, Soviet troops sealed the 38th Parallel. The Korean Communist leader Kim Il-sung arrived in Pyongyang in the uniform of a Red Army major and, with Soviet backing, took power in the north. The scene was set for the establishment of North and South Korea, the Korean War, continuing partition and the instabilities posed by the Kim dynasty today.
Another perhaps less obvious legacy of the Yalta Conference is Britain’s often-fractious relationship with France, and by extension the European Union. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French forces, had insisted on an invitation to the conference, but Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin decided against it. So great was the haughty de Gaulle’s resentment that during the conference he broadcast to the French people that he would not be bound by the conference’s decisions, but would pursue an independent line.Another perhaps less obvious legacy of the Yalta Conference is Britain’s often-fractious relationship with France, and by extension the European Union. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French forces, had insisted on an invitation to the conference, but Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin decided against it. So great was the haughty de Gaulle’s resentment that during the conference he broadcast to the French people that he would not be bound by the conference’s decisions, but would pursue an independent line.
De Gaulle’s exclusion from Yalta fed his growing distrust of what he saw as an emerging postwar Anglo-American hegemony. In 1963, and again in 1967, he vetoed Britain’s entry into the European Community; in 1966 he withdrew France from NATO’s active command structure. Britain eventually joined the European Union in 1973; had it done so earlier, it might have integrated better into the bloc. While it’s impossible to know for sure, 43 years later the Brexit referendum might never have been called.De Gaulle’s exclusion from Yalta fed his growing distrust of what he saw as an emerging postwar Anglo-American hegemony. In 1963, and again in 1967, he vetoed Britain’s entry into the European Community; in 1966 he withdrew France from NATO’s active command structure. Britain eventually joined the European Union in 1973; had it done so earlier, it might have integrated better into the bloc. While it’s impossible to know for sure, 43 years later the Brexit referendum might never have been called.
Many regard Yalta as a byword for compromise, even betrayal. In 2005 George W. Bush likened the outcomes to the 1938 Munich Agreement — “a sellout” to dictatorship. Yalta undoubtedly left the peoples of Eastern Europe in thrall to the Soviet Union for nearly half a century. But Western leaders had little leverage over Stalin, especially as the Soviet Union had a strong moral claim to its postwar bounty, having suffered by far the most during the war.Many regard Yalta as a byword for compromise, even betrayal. In 2005 George W. Bush likened the outcomes to the 1938 Munich Agreement — “a sellout” to dictatorship. Yalta undoubtedly left the peoples of Eastern Europe in thrall to the Soviet Union for nearly half a century. But Western leaders had little leverage over Stalin, especially as the Soviet Union had a strong moral claim to its postwar bounty, having suffered by far the most during the war.
Elsewhere, though, the Western allies met many of their objectives. Roosevelt secured agreement to his long-cherished dream of a United Nations. Though the veto arrangements agreed to at Yalta often cripple the Security Council in addressing disputes among the great powers (any of the five permanent members of the Security Council can veto an action), the organization has become an effective global peacekeeping force, and many of its agencies, like the World Health Organization and the High Commissioner for Refugees, do valuable work.Elsewhere, though, the Western allies met many of their objectives. Roosevelt secured agreement to his long-cherished dream of a United Nations. Though the veto arrangements agreed to at Yalta often cripple the Security Council in addressing disputes among the great powers (any of the five permanent members of the Security Council can veto an action), the organization has become an effective global peacekeeping force, and many of its agencies, like the World Health Organization and the High Commissioner for Refugees, do valuable work.
Churchill attained his goal — albeit Pyrrhic, short-term and, to modern thinking, immoral — to maintain the British Empire. In one instance, retaining control over Hong Kong, he preserved a Western outpost on the coast of China for many troubled years, the consequences of which are now playing out.Churchill attained his goal — albeit Pyrrhic, short-term and, to modern thinking, immoral — to maintain the British Empire. In one instance, retaining control over Hong Kong, he preserved a Western outpost on the coast of China for many troubled years, the consequences of which are now playing out.
Transcripts of the Yalta Conference reveal as much about the personalities as the politics of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. Cracks in the once close relationship between the cool, detached American president and the often emotional British prime minister are obvious. For Roosevelt, it was his last turn on the world stage; already in visible physical decline, he died two months later. Churchill made it to the next Allied conference, at Potsdam, Germany, but was replaced a few days into the meeting by the new prime minister, Clement Atlee. Transcripts of the Yalta Conference reveal as much about the personalities as the politics of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. Cracks in the once close relationship between the cool, detached American president and the often emotional British prime minister are obvious. For Roosevelt, it was his last turn on the world stage; already in visible physical decline, he died two months later. Churchill made it to the next Allied conference, at Potsdam, Germany, but was replaced a few days into the meeting by the new prime minister, Clement Attlee.
Only Stalin remained. Geopolitical negotiations always revolve around the personalities and strategies of the people involved; those with the most uncompromising objectives and the vision and determination to achieve them have an edge. At Yalta he showed a tight grasp of detail, rigid determination and ability to spot and exploit others’ weaknesses. A senior British official thought him “much the most impressive of the three men” and “very quiet and restrained.” Three quarters of a century later, Stalin’s quiet strength is still shaping global affairs.Only Stalin remained. Geopolitical negotiations always revolve around the personalities and strategies of the people involved; those with the most uncompromising objectives and the vision and determination to achieve them have an edge. At Yalta he showed a tight grasp of detail, rigid determination and ability to spot and exploit others’ weaknesses. A senior British official thought him “much the most impressive of the three men” and “very quiet and restrained.” Three quarters of a century later, Stalin’s quiet strength is still shaping global affairs.
Diana Preston is the author of “Eight Days at Yalta: How Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin Shaped the Post-War World.”Diana Preston is the author of “Eight Days at Yalta: How Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin Shaped the Post-War World.”
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