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| The Choice That’s Coming: An Iran With the Bomb, or Bombing Iran | |
| (about 4 hours later) | |
| The costs of the United States’ targeted killing of Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, are mounting beyond the already significant risks of Iranian retaliation and subsequent military confrontation. | The costs of the United States’ targeted killing of Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, are mounting beyond the already significant risks of Iranian retaliation and subsequent military confrontation. |
| On Sunday, Tehran announced that it will cease to honor all “operational restrictions” imposed by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known as the Iran nuclear deal, which aimed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. | On Sunday, Tehran announced that it will cease to honor all “operational restrictions” imposed by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known as the Iran nuclear deal, which aimed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. |
| While Iran has not announced what, if any, specific nuclear activities it intends to resume, its decision to remove the restrictions on its uranium enrichment, production and research could soon pose a challenge for the Trump administration at least as great as retaliation against the assassination. | While Iran has not announced what, if any, specific nuclear activities it intends to resume, its decision to remove the restrictions on its uranium enrichment, production and research could soon pose a challenge for the Trump administration at least as great as retaliation against the assassination. |
| In accordance with the nuclear deal, Iran abandoned some two-thirds of its operational centrifuges, 97 percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium and a heavy water reactor capable of producing enough plutonium for one to two nuclear weapons every year. It also agreed to restrictions on the level to which it could enrich uranium and to more intrusive international inspections than before. | In accordance with the nuclear deal, Iran abandoned some two-thirds of its operational centrifuges, 97 percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium and a heavy water reactor capable of producing enough plutonium for one to two nuclear weapons every year. It also agreed to restrictions on the level to which it could enrich uranium and to more intrusive international inspections than before. |
| If Iran resumes some or all of the activities it gave up, or, even worse, if it ceases cooperation with the inspectors, the Trump administration could find itself facing a choice between allowing Iran to get nuclear weapons or to bomb Iran. | If Iran resumes some or all of the activities it gave up, or, even worse, if it ceases cooperation with the inspectors, the Trump administration could find itself facing a choice between allowing Iran to get nuclear weapons or to bomb Iran. |
| The United States had already faced that terrible dilemma, and avoiding it was what led to the Iran nuclear deal in the first place. | The United States had already faced that terrible dilemma, and avoiding it was what led to the Iran nuclear deal in the first place. |
| President Trump pulled out of the 2015 nuclear deal in 2018 and replaced it with a “maximum pressure” campaign that has included heavy sanctions on Iran and its trading partners, designation of the I.R.G.C. as a terrorist organization, and the elimination of waivers that had allowed Iran to continue to sell some oil. | President Trump pulled out of the 2015 nuclear deal in 2018 and replaced it with a “maximum pressure” campaign that has included heavy sanctions on Iran and its trading partners, designation of the I.R.G.C. as a terrorist organization, and the elimination of waivers that had allowed Iran to continue to sell some oil. |
| Iran responded to what it considered to be economic warfare by gradually implementing a policy of “maximum resistance.” The Iranian policy has included both kinetic and nuclear steps. Iran has targeted American facilities and military assets directly and through proxies, most recently, the killing of an American contractor by Iran-backed militias in Kirkuk, Iraq. Tehran has also targeted shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, shot down an American drone and attacked Saudi oil facilities. | Iran responded to what it considered to be economic warfare by gradually implementing a policy of “maximum resistance.” The Iranian policy has included both kinetic and nuclear steps. Iran has targeted American facilities and military assets directly and through proxies, most recently, the killing of an American contractor by Iran-backed militias in Kirkuk, Iraq. Tehran has also targeted shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, shot down an American drone and attacked Saudi oil facilities. |
| Around the same time, as part of its maximum resistance strategy, Tehran has also been gradually, and cautiously, ramping up its nuclear activities. | Around the same time, as part of its maximum resistance strategy, Tehran has also been gradually, and cautiously, ramping up its nuclear activities. |
| Iran expanded its stockpile of low enriched uranium beyond the nuclear deal’s limit of 300 kilograms, conducted research that could enable it to build more advanced centrifuges, exceeded the previous limits on the level of enrichment, and started operating centrifuges in a hardened bunker near the city of Qom — but it stopped short of exiting the agreement entirely. | Iran expanded its stockpile of low enriched uranium beyond the nuclear deal’s limit of 300 kilograms, conducted research that could enable it to build more advanced centrifuges, exceeded the previous limits on the level of enrichment, and started operating centrifuges in a hardened bunker near the city of Qom — but it stopped short of exiting the agreement entirely. |
| All of these steps have been reversible, since the Iranians hoped they would either force President Trump to accept a new deal that would lift the American sanctions on Iran — he seemed to consider that seriously when he came close to meeting with President Hassan Rouhani of Iran last September — or get European leaders to provide financial compensation. Now any such deal seems impossible. | All of these steps have been reversible, since the Iranians hoped they would either force President Trump to accept a new deal that would lift the American sanctions on Iran — he seemed to consider that seriously when he came close to meeting with President Hassan Rouhani of Iran last September — or get European leaders to provide financial compensation. Now any such deal seems impossible. |
| The resumption of previously frozen Iranian nuclear activities — uranium enrichment to the more dangerous level of 20 percent, a significant step toward weapons-grade levels, or resuming construction on the plutonium-producing heavy water reactor could dramatically reduce the time necessary for Iran to acquire the material needed to build a nuclear weapon. The nuclear deal’s restrictions, now abandoned, had established a threshold of at least a year. | The resumption of previously frozen Iranian nuclear activities — uranium enrichment to the more dangerous level of 20 percent, a significant step toward weapons-grade levels, or resuming construction on the plutonium-producing heavy water reactor could dramatically reduce the time necessary for Iran to acquire the material needed to build a nuclear weapon. The nuclear deal’s restrictions, now abandoned, had established a threshold of at least a year. |
| Iran’s nuclear expansion would force the Trump administration to either accept the risk that Tehran acquires a nuclear weapons capability — an ironic outcome of leaving the allegedly “bad” nuclear deal — or it will have to conduct military strikes to prevent it and initiate the conflict it claims it wants to avoid. | Iran’s nuclear expansion would force the Trump administration to either accept the risk that Tehran acquires a nuclear weapons capability — an ironic outcome of leaving the allegedly “bad” nuclear deal — or it will have to conduct military strikes to prevent it and initiate the conflict it claims it wants to avoid. |
| Iranian leaders understand that a “dash” for a bomb would provoke international opposition and garner support for military strikes. Tehran is likely to take incremental steps and raise the bar for an American response. | Iranian leaders understand that a “dash” for a bomb would provoke international opposition and garner support for military strikes. Tehran is likely to take incremental steps and raise the bar for an American response. |
| Under the nuclear deal, it would have been many years before Iran could increase enrichment, the size of its uranium stockpile or the number of its centrifuges. By destroying a deal that it claimed did not last long enough or impose enough restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, the Trump administration has created a situation in which Iran may soon end up with no nuclear restrictions at all. | Under the nuclear deal, it would have been many years before Iran could increase enrichment, the size of its uranium stockpile or the number of its centrifuges. By destroying a deal that it claimed did not last long enough or impose enough restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, the Trump administration has created a situation in which Iran may soon end up with no nuclear restrictions at all. |
| Some Americans may see Iran’s nuclear expansion as an opportunity to take military action against the Iranian regime. When he was a member of Congress, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued the United States could “destroy the Iranian nuclear capacity” with “under 2,000 sorties” and it was “not an insurmountable task.” | Some Americans may see Iran’s nuclear expansion as an opportunity to take military action against the Iranian regime. When he was a member of Congress, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued the United States could “destroy the Iranian nuclear capacity” with “under 2,000 sorties” and it was “not an insurmountable task.” |
| Senator Tom Cotton, another adviser to President Trump, confidently predicted the United States could win a war with Iran with “two strikes, the first strike and the last strike.” Mr. Trump himself has echoed these points, noting that war with Iran would “go very quickly.” Others have speculated that taking out Iranian nuclear program could topple the regime. | Senator Tom Cotton, another adviser to President Trump, confidently predicted the United States could win a war with Iran with “two strikes, the first strike and the last strike.” Mr. Trump himself has echoed these points, noting that war with Iran would “go very quickly.” Others have speculated that taking out Iranian nuclear program could topple the regime. |
| But this is all fantasy. The United States could no doubt set back Tehran for a limited amount of time with military strikes. Such strikes would also lead to violent retaliation and likely Iranian determination to build a bomb. | But this is all fantasy. The United States could no doubt set back Tehran for a limited amount of time with military strikes. Such strikes would also lead to violent retaliation and likely Iranian determination to build a bomb. |
| Instead of continuing on its current path, the Trump administration needs to urgently de-escalate tensions with Iran. Some American allies, such as President Emmanuel Macron of France, have offered to help, but so far the administration has declined their services. Mr. Pompeo has expressed disappointment with Europe’s unwillingness to back the American attack on General Suleimani. | Instead of continuing on its current path, the Trump administration needs to urgently de-escalate tensions with Iran. Some American allies, such as President Emmanuel Macron of France, have offered to help, but so far the administration has declined their services. Mr. Pompeo has expressed disappointment with Europe’s unwillingness to back the American attack on General Suleimani. |
| A genuine policy of de-escalation would require facing the reality that the maximum pressure campaign has failed. That campaign was designed to curb Iranian violent behavior in the region and stop its nuclear program. The tragic irony is that it now seems set to do the opposite. | A genuine policy of de-escalation would require facing the reality that the maximum pressure campaign has failed. That campaign was designed to curb Iranian violent behavior in the region and stop its nuclear program. The tragic irony is that it now seems set to do the opposite. |
| If the Trump administration does not move to reduce tensions, it will soon find itself facing the very dilemma the nuclear deal was designed to avoid: the choice between a nuclear Iran or the need to start a war to prevent one. | If the Trump administration does not move to reduce tensions, it will soon find itself facing the very dilemma the nuclear deal was designed to avoid: the choice between a nuclear Iran or the need to start a war to prevent one. |
| Philip H. Gordon is senior fellow in US Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, a former senior adviser to President Barack Obama on the Middle East and the author of the forthcoming book, “Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East.” | Philip H. Gordon is senior fellow in US Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, a former senior adviser to President Barack Obama on the Middle East and the author of the forthcoming book, “Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East.” |
| Ariane Tabatabai is an adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University and the author of the forthcoming book, “No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran’s National Security Strategy.” | Ariane Tabatabai is an adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University and the author of the forthcoming book, “No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran’s National Security Strategy.” |
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