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Iran’s new Quds Force commander brings continuity, if not charisma, to the post held by his slain predecessor Iran’s new Quds Force commander brings continuity to the post held by his slain predecessor
(about 2 hours later)
ISTANBUL — Just hours after a U.S. drone strike killed Iran's charismatic elite Quds Force commander in Baghdad early Friday, Tehran announced it had named a successor: the force's little-known deputy chief, Brig. Gen. Ismail Qaani.ISTANBUL — Just hours after a U.S. drone strike killed Iran's charismatic elite Quds Force commander in Baghdad early Friday, Tehran announced it had named a successor: the force's little-known deputy chief, Brig. Gen. Ismail Qaani.
Qaani, 62, was appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who issued a statement praising the general’s role as a prominent commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. As a key branch of the Revolutionary Guard, the country’s most powerful security organ, the Quds Force carries out the Iranian military’s special operations abroad.Qaani, 62, was appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who issued a statement praising the general’s role as a prominent commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. As a key branch of the Revolutionary Guard, the country’s most powerful security organ, the Quds Force carries out the Iranian military’s special operations abroad.
Qaani’s predecessor, Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, was a larger-than-life figure and deft architect of Iran’s success in building loyal proxy forces in the Middle East. It is a network that Tehran used to help defeat the Islamic State and to project military and political power in places such as Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.Qaani’s predecessor, Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, was a larger-than-life figure and deft architect of Iran’s success in building loyal proxy forces in the Middle East. It is a network that Tehran used to help defeat the Islamic State and to project military and political power in places such as Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.
But the bespectacled Qaani — whose portfolio as deputy included Quds Force operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asian republics — boasts few distinct military victories. Instead, experts say, he is believed to have focused on the day-to-day administrative affairs of the organization. But the bespectacled Qaani — whose portfolio as deputy included Quds Force operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asian republics — boasts few notable military victories. Instead, experts say, he is believed to have focused on the organization’s day-to-day administrative affairs.
At Baghdad funeral procession for Qasem Soleimani, calls for retaliation against the United StatesAt Baghdad funeral procession for Qasem Soleimani, calls for retaliation against the United States
“Qaani’s war-era record does not display the same degree of distinction as Soleimani’s, but at times Qaani has displayed the courage to question the wisdom of decisions made by his superiors,” said Ali Alfoneh, a senior fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington and author of “Iran Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards are Transforming Iran from Theocracy Into Military Dictatorship.” “Qaani’s war-era record does not display the same degree of distinction as Soleimani’s,” said Ali Alfoneh, a senior fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington and author of “Iran Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards are Transforming Iran from Theocracy Into Military Dictatorship.”
According Arash Azizi, a New York-based writer who is researching a forthcoming book on Iran’s external military operations, “Qaani was presumed to be the heir apparent for a long time. But he’s very bureaucratic — he does not have Soleimani’s charisma.” Arash Azizi, a New York-based writer who is researching a forthcoming book on Iran’s external military operations, said: “Qaani was presumed to be the heir apparent for a long time. But he’s very bureaucratic — he does not have Soleimani’s charisma.”
“Nobody expects Qaani to be like Soleimani,” he said. “But as someone who works in Iran’s national security apparatus, he hasn’t really distinguished himself. Nobody knew his name, and nobody in Iran really knows who he is.” “As someone who works in Iran’s national security apparatus, he hasn’t really distinguished himself,” Azizi said.
What the obscure new commander brings, however, is continuity in the face of an extraordinary blow to the Quds Force’s leadership and the Trump administration’s unprecedented “maximum pressure campaign” against Tehran, analysts say. As deputy Quds Force commander, a position he assumed in the late 1990s or early 2000s, according to reports, he possesses intimate knowledge of the unit’s inner workings and covert activities. What the obscure new commander brings, however, is continuity in the face of an extraordinary blow to the Quds Force’s leadership, analysts say. As deputy commander, a position he assumed in the late 1990s or early 2000s, according to reports, he possesses intimate knowledge of the force’s inner workings and covert activities.
“Under Qaani’s leadership, there is likely to be greater continuity than change in the Quds Force,” said Alfoneh.“Under Qaani’s leadership, there is likely to be greater continuity than change in the Quds Force,” said Alfoneh.
Qaani first joined the Revolutionary Guard as a young man in 1980, when it was a nascent, ragtag force tasked with protecting the Islamic Republic after the overthrow of the shah. He quickly rose to become a division commander, leading battles in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and oversaw operations in northeastern Iran. There, according to experts, Qaani likely helped facilitate support for Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, a group of fighters that sought to overthrow the Taliban, a Sunni militant movement that came to power in 1996. “I suspect he’ll have little difficulty filling Soleimani’s shoes when it comes to operations and strategy,” said Afshon Ostovar, author of “Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.”
Qaani first joined the Revolutionary Guard as a young man in 1980, when it was a nascent force tasked with protecting the Islamic Republic. He soon became division commander, leading battles in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and oversaw operations in northeastern Iran, where he was born.
There, according to Alfoneh, Qaani likely helped facilitate support for Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, a group of fighters that sought to overthrow the Taliban, a Sunni militant movement that came to power in 1996.
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In 1998, when Taliban forces attacked Iran’s consulate in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif, killing nine diplomats, Qaani was instrumental in dissuading Tehran’s leadership from responding militarily in Afghanistan, Azizi said. In 1998, when Taliban forces attacked Iran’s consulate in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif, killing nine diplomats, Qaani was instrumental in dissuading Tehran’s leadership from responding militarily, Azizi said.
“Many people were eager for Iran to take action, which would have embroiled it in another conflict” so soon after the war with Iraq, Azizi said. “It was an act of maturity on Qaani’s part in deciding not do anything rash.” “Many people were eager for Iran to take action,” Azizi said. “It was an act of maturity on Qaani’s part in deciding not do anything rash.”
According to Alfoneh, few details are available about the exact nature of Qaani’s activities as Soleimani’s deputy. The two generals appear, however, to have divided the force’s labor: Soleimani operated on Iran’s western front, in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, while Qaani’s focus remained on its eastern borders. Qaani and his predecessor appear to have divided the labor: Soleimani operated on Iran’s western front, while Qaani’s focus remained on its eastern borders.
Qaani also once traveled with Iran’s then-president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to several countries in Africa and South America. In 2012, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Qaani for overseeing the distribution of the Quds Force’s finances to regional allies. The office also said Qaani was responsible for a weapons shipment to Gambia that was intercepted in Nigeria in 2010. Qaani also once traveled with Iran’s then-president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to several countries in Africa and South America. In 2012, the Treasury Department sanctioned Qaani for overseeing the distribution of the Quds Force’s finances to regional allies. He was also responsible for a weapons shipment to Gambia that was intercepted in Nigeria in 2010, the department said.
In Afghanistan, the Quds Force has had marginal success in cultivating relations with and supplying weapons to the Taliban, which Tehran now sees as a bulwark against both the United States and a local branch of the Islamic State. He is also believed to have to have played a prominent role in establishing Liwa al-Fatemiyoun, a military brigade of mostly Afghan Shiite Hazaras who were deployed to Syria to assist government forces.
Qaani, however, is believed to have to have played a particularly prominent role in establishing Liwa al-Fatemiyoun, a military brigade of mostly Afghan Shiite Hazaras who were deployed to Syria to assist government forces. In 2012, Qaani was the first Revolutionary Guard commander to publicly acknowledge Iran’s military presence in Syria, telling an Iranian news outlet that due to Iran’s involvement in the war, “big massacres were prevented.”
In 2012, Qaani was the first Revolutionary Guard commander to publicly acknowledge Iran’s military presence in Syria, in an interview with the Iranian Students’ News Agency. The article was swiftly taken down.
“Thanks to Iran’s presence in Syria, big massacres were prevented,” he was quoted as saying. “Despite all of the problems that the Syrian government has . . . Syria is a location of resistance.”
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“Qaani seems to be a more cagey personality than his predecessor. But like Soleimani, Qaani seems to have a strong personal relationship with the supreme leader,” said Ostovar.
His decades-long career at the highest levels of the Revolutionary Guard “says a lot about the trust both Khamenei and Soleimani had in him,” he said.
Still, experts say, Qaani lacks broader experience in the Arab world, an area crucial to Iran’s efforts to counter U.S. and Israeli military power.Still, experts say, Qaani lacks broader experience in the Arab world, an area crucial to Iran’s efforts to counter U.S. and Israeli military power.
“I don’t think that he speaks Arabic, and he doesn’t have the same understanding of the Arab world or of Israel that Soleimani had,” said Azizi.“I don’t think that he speaks Arabic, and he doesn’t have the same understanding of the Arab world or of Israel that Soleimani had,” said Azizi.
In an interview with the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency in 2015, Qaani remarked on his relationship with Soleimani. According to Ostovar, “it’s unlikely that Qaani’s friendships with proxy commanders are as well developed or run as deep as Soleimani’s.”
“We are war comrades, and it was the war that made us friends,” Qaani said. “He is superior to me in certain fields . . . [but] those who become friends at times of hardship have deeper and more lasting relations than those who became friends because they are from the same neighborhood.” As a result, he will “probably run operations primarily from a distance,” Ostovar said. “Even if he wanted to replicate Soleimani’s general-on-the-frontlines photo ops, it’ll be difficult for him to do now.”
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