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| Highlights From the Horowitz Report on the Russia Investigation | Highlights From the Horowitz Report on the Russia Investigation |
| (32 minutes later) | |
| WASHINGTON — A much-anticipated report on the early stages of the F.B.I.’s investigation into possible ties between the Trump campaign and Russia heavily criticized how the F.B.I. obtained court orders to eavesdrop on a former Trump campaign aide but found no evidence of political bias or improper motivation by the F.B.I. | WASHINGTON — A much-anticipated report on the early stages of the F.B.I.’s investigation into possible ties between the Trump campaign and Russia heavily criticized how the F.B.I. obtained court orders to eavesdrop on a former Trump campaign aide but found no evidence of political bias or improper motivation by the F.B.I. |
| The report by the Justice Department’s independent inspector general, Michael E. Horowitz, is an exhaustive examination of a case that has reverberated throughout official Washington for more than three years. Totaling more than 400 pages, it found no evidence to back up the president’s claim that the F.B.I.’s investigations of his campaign and four former aides were inspired and tainted by political bias. | The report by the Justice Department’s independent inspector general, Michael E. Horowitz, is an exhaustive examination of a case that has reverberated throughout official Washington for more than three years. Totaling more than 400 pages, it found no evidence to back up the president’s claim that the F.B.I.’s investigations of his campaign and four former aides were inspired and tainted by political bias. |
| But in a finding that President Trump is certain to seize on, the report documented a pattern of omissions, errors and inconsistencies in the bureau’s applications for warrants to eavesdrop on Carter Page, a former Trump campaign aide. | But in a finding that President Trump is certain to seize on, the report documented a pattern of omissions, errors and inconsistencies in the bureau’s applications for warrants to eavesdrop on Carter Page, a former Trump campaign aide. |
| Here are some of the key findings. | Here are some of the key findings. |
| The report debunked essential elements of the president’s theory about partisan motivations. | The report debunked essential elements of the president’s theory about partisan motivations. |
| In an F.B.I. operation that began July 31, 2016 and was dubbed “Crossfire Hurricane,” the bureau opened investigations into four Trump campaign officials: Mr. Page; Paul Manafort, who stepped down that month as campaign chairman; George Papadopoulos, a foreign policy adviser, and Michael T. Flynn, who went to become Mr. Trump’s first national security adviser. | In an F.B.I. operation that began July 31, 2016 and was dubbed “Crossfire Hurricane,” the bureau opened investigations into four Trump campaign officials: Mr. Page; Paul Manafort, who stepped down that month as campaign chairman; George Papadopoulos, a foreign policy adviser, and Michael T. Flynn, who went to become Mr. Trump’s first national security adviser. |
| The president and his allies have claimed that a cabal of politically biased law enforcement and intelligence officials — a “deep state” — set out to sabotage and spy on the Trump campaign because they opposed Mr. Trump. They have alleged that the F.B.I. deliberately relied on false opposition research as part of a conspiracy infiltrate and spy on the Trump campaign and later, to undermine Mr. Trump’s presidency. | The president and his allies have claimed that a cabal of politically biased law enforcement and intelligence officials — a “deep state” — set out to sabotage and spy on the Trump campaign because they opposed Mr. Trump. They have alleged that the F.B.I. deliberately relied on false opposition research as part of a conspiracy infiltrate and spy on the Trump campaign and later, to undermine Mr. Trump’s presidency. |
| Mr. Horowitz did not find evidence supporting that narrative. | Mr. Horowitz did not find evidence supporting that narrative. |
| “We did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivation influenced the decisions” by the bureau, the report concluded. | “We did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivation influenced the decisions” by the bureau, the report concluded. |
| The report also said, “Witnesses told us that they did not recall observing during these discussions any instances or indications of improper motivations or political bias on the part of the participants.” | The report also said, “Witnesses told us that they did not recall observing during these discussions any instances or indications of improper motivations or political bias on the part of the participants.” |
| There were serious errors in the applications for secret eavesdropping warrants. | There were serious errors in the applications for secret eavesdropping warrants. |
| Mr. Horowitz found that F.B.I. officials appeared to discount evidence that did not support probable cause to wiretap Mr. Page while playing up information that seemed to justify one. | Mr. Horowitz found that F.B.I. officials appeared to discount evidence that did not support probable cause to wiretap Mr. Page while playing up information that seemed to justify one. |
| “That so many basic and fundamental errors were made by three separate, handpicked teams on one of the most sensitive F.B.I. investigations that was briefed to the highest levels within the F.B.I., and that F.B.I. officials expected would eventually be subjected to close scrutiny, raised significant questions regarding the F.B.I. chain of command’s management and supervision of the FISA process,” the report said. | “That so many basic and fundamental errors were made by three separate, handpicked teams on one of the most sensitive F.B.I. investigations that was briefed to the highest levels within the F.B.I., and that F.B.I. officials expected would eventually be subjected to close scrutiny, raised significant questions regarding the F.B.I. chain of command’s management and supervision of the FISA process,” the report said. |
| The inspector general did not speculate whether the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court would have granted the application — renewed three times — to wiretap Mr. Page anyway. But he said the F.B.I. should review the actions of everyone who had a hand in drafting the applications. And he identified in each application where information verifying a fact was not included. | The inspector general did not speculate whether the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court would have granted the application — renewed three times — to wiretap Mr. Page anyway. But he said the F.B.I. should review the actions of everyone who had a hand in drafting the applications. And he identified in each application where information verifying a fact was not included. |
| Relying on the F. B.I.’s information, the Justice Department first obtained court approval to wiretap Mr. Page in October 2016. The wiretap application portrayed Mr. Page, who had recently stepped down as a Trump campaign aide and had close ties to Russia, as a suspected unregistered agent of a foreign power. Mr. Horowitz found dozens of examples of missing or flawed documentation in the applications to wiretap Mr. Page. | Relying on the F. B.I.’s information, the Justice Department first obtained court approval to wiretap Mr. Page in October 2016. The wiretap application portrayed Mr. Page, who had recently stepped down as a Trump campaign aide and had close ties to Russia, as a suspected unregistered agent of a foreign power. Mr. Horowitz found dozens of examples of missing or flawed documentation in the applications to wiretap Mr. Page. |
| The applications relied heavily on information provided by Christopher Steele, a British former intelligence agent whose research was funded by Democratic organizations. Mr. Steele told the F.B.I. that he based much of his information on a confidential source. | |
| But when the F.B.I. interviewed that person, the source failed to back up some of Mr. Steele’s assertions, the report said. For instance, according to the F.B.I. interview, the source saw “nothing bad” about communications between the Trump team and the Kremlin, and never discussed WikiLeaks with Mr. Steele, according to the report. The F.B.I.’s failure to inform the court of those discrepancies was a serious error, Mr. Horowitz said. | But when the F.B.I. interviewed that person, the source failed to back up some of Mr. Steele’s assertions, the report said. For instance, according to the F.B.I. interview, the source saw “nothing bad” about communications between the Trump team and the Kremlin, and never discussed WikiLeaks with Mr. Steele, according to the report. The F.B.I.’s failure to inform the court of those discrepancies was a serious error, Mr. Horowitz said. |
| “Despite the inconsistencies between Steele’s reporting and the information his primary sub-source provided to the F.B.I., the subsequent FISA renewal applications continued to rely on the Steele information, without any revisions or notice to the court,” the report stated. | “Despite the inconsistencies between Steele’s reporting and the information his primary sub-source provided to the F.B.I., the subsequent FISA renewal applications continued to rely on the Steele information, without any revisions or notice to the court,” the report stated. |
| The F.B.I. also failed to notify the court after it learned that Mr. Steele was desperate for Mr. Trump’s candidacy to fail and “passionate” about the need to defeat him, the report said. Nor did the bureau reveal that Mr. Page had previously given information to the C.I.A. about his contacts with Russian intelligence officials, which might have made his behavior seem less suspicious, Mr. Horowitz found. | The F.B.I. also failed to notify the court after it learned that Mr. Steele was desperate for Mr. Trump’s candidacy to fail and “passionate” about the need to defeat him, the report said. Nor did the bureau reveal that Mr. Page had previously given information to the C.I.A. about his contacts with Russian intelligence officials, which might have made his behavior seem less suspicious, Mr. Horowitz found. |
| In fact, Kevin Clinesmith, an F.B.I. lawyer, altered an email from the C.I.A. to state that Mr. Page was not a source for the intelligence agency. That information was then repeated in an application to renew the warrant. Mr. Horowitz has referred his findings about Mr. Clinesmith for possible criminal investigation for making a false statement. | In fact, Kevin Clinesmith, an F.B.I. lawyer, altered an email from the C.I.A. to state that Mr. Page was not a source for the intelligence agency. That information was then repeated in an application to renew the warrant. Mr. Horowitz has referred his findings about Mr. Clinesmith for possible criminal investigation for making a false statement. |
| Attorney General William P. Barr praised one element of the inspector general’s findings, saying the report showed “malfeasance and misfeasance” and “clear abuse” of the wiretap application process by the F.B.I. But Mr. Barr also suggested that he disagreed with Mr. Horowitz’s conclusion that the F.B.I. had sufficient reason to open an investigation of the Trump campaign and Russia. | Attorney General William P. Barr praised one element of the inspector general’s findings, saying the report showed “malfeasance and misfeasance” and “clear abuse” of the wiretap application process by the F.B.I. But Mr. Barr also suggested that he disagreed with Mr. Horowitz’s conclusion that the F.B.I. had sufficient reason to open an investigation of the Trump campaign and Russia. |
| “The inspector general’s report now makes clear that the F.B.I. launched an intrusive investigation of a U.S. presidential campaign on the thinnest of suspicions that, in my view, were insufficient to justify the steps taken,” Mr. Barr said in a statement. | “The inspector general’s report now makes clear that the F.B.I. launched an intrusive investigation of a U.S. presidential campaign on the thinnest of suspicions that, in my view, were insufficient to justify the steps taken,” Mr. Barr said in a statement. |
| John H. Durham, a federal prosecutor whom Mr. Barr appointed to run a separate criminal investigation into the origins of the Russia investigation, backed Mr. Barr’s findings in his own highly unusual statement. “Last month, we advised the inspector general that we do not agree with some of the report’s conclusions as to predication and how the F.B.I. case was opened,” Mr. Durham said. | John H. Durham, a federal prosecutor whom Mr. Barr appointed to run a separate criminal investigation into the origins of the Russia investigation, backed Mr. Barr’s findings in his own highly unusual statement. “Last month, we advised the inspector general that we do not agree with some of the report’s conclusions as to predication and how the F.B.I. case was opened,” Mr. Durham said. |
| Mr. Horowitz concluded that the F.B.I. did not attempt to place informants or undercover agents inside the Trump campaign, but he found that the current policy for using informants should include more oversight. | Mr. Horowitz concluded that the F.B.I. did not attempt to place informants or undercover agents inside the Trump campaign, but he found that the current policy for using informants should include more oversight. |
| As part of the Russia investigation, F.B.I. agents authorized the use of at least one informant to determine whether Mr. Page and Mr. Papadopoulos were working with the Russians. The informant met with the two men while they were still associated with the campaign. | As part of the Russia investigation, F.B.I. agents authorized the use of at least one informant to determine whether Mr. Page and Mr. Papadopoulos were working with the Russians. The informant met with the two men while they were still associated with the campaign. |
| The use of the informant, Stefan A. Halper, a Cambridge professor, has led Mr. Trump and his allies to accuse the F.B.I. of spying on his campaign. The F.B.I. director, Christopher A. Wray, has defended the bureau against accusations of spying. | The use of the informant, Stefan A. Halper, a Cambridge professor, has led Mr. Trump and his allies to accuse the F.B.I. of spying on his campaign. The F.B.I. director, Christopher A. Wray, has defended the bureau against accusations of spying. |
| Mr. Horowitz found that the F.B.I. did not try to infiltrate the campaign itself. And the inspector general found no evidence that the F.B.I. used informants to interact with anyone on the Trump campaign before the official opening of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. | Mr. Horowitz found that the F.B.I. did not try to infiltrate the campaign itself. And the inspector general found no evidence that the F.B.I. used informants to interact with anyone on the Trump campaign before the official opening of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. |
| The inspector general said Joseph Mifsud, a Maltese professor who met with Mr. Papadopoulos and offered him dirt on Hillary Clinton, was not an F.B.I. informant, debunking a right-wing conspiracy theory. | The inspector general said Joseph Mifsud, a Maltese professor who met with Mr. Papadopoulos and offered him dirt on Hillary Clinton, was not an F.B.I. informant, debunking a right-wing conspiracy theory. |
| The report shows the relatively low bar for the F.B.I. to open an incredibly consequential investigation. | The report shows the relatively low bar for the F.B.I. to open an incredibly consequential investigation. |
| Top F.B.I. counterintelligence investigators made the decision to open Crossfire Hurricane without consulting the Justice Department, according to the report. The investigators had consulted with the deputy F.B.I. director and the bureau’s top lawyer. | Top F.B.I. counterintelligence investigators made the decision to open Crossfire Hurricane without consulting the Justice Department, according to the report. The investigators had consulted with the deputy F.B.I. director and the bureau’s top lawyer. |
| The F.B.I. director, James B. Comey, was not involved in the decision, the report said. Sometime after the investigation was opened, Mr. Comey told the attorney general, Loretta Lynch, and deputy attorney general, Sally Yates, a few details about it. | The F.B.I. director, James B. Comey, was not involved in the decision, the report said. Sometime after the investigation was opened, Mr. Comey told the attorney general, Loretta Lynch, and deputy attorney general, Sally Yates, a few details about it. |
| The Justice Department guidelines for opening an investigation give the F.B.I. the authority to start an investigation — no matter how politically sensitive — on its own. | The Justice Department guidelines for opening an investigation give the F.B.I. the authority to start an investigation — no matter how politically sensitive — on its own. |
| Nonetheless, Mr. Horowitz noted: “We believe that investigations affecting core First Amendment activity and national political campaigns raise significant constitutional and prudential issues.” | Nonetheless, Mr. Horowitz noted: “We believe that investigations affecting core First Amendment activity and national political campaigns raise significant constitutional and prudential issues.” |
| Mr. Horowitz said that in the future a top official — such as the deputy attorney general — should be notified before “such an investigation so that department leadership can consider these issues from the outset.” | Mr. Horowitz said that in the future a top official — such as the deputy attorney general — should be notified before “such an investigation so that department leadership can consider these issues from the outset.” |
| The report provides new information about when the F.B.I. started scrutinizing the links. | The report provides new information about when the F.B.I. started scrutinizing the links. |
| For the past two years, it has been widely reported that the F.B.I. began its investigation into the Trump campaign in July 2016. But the report provides new details that show that Mr. Page was actually under investigation in April of that year. | For the past two years, it has been widely reported that the F.B.I. began its investigation into the Trump campaign in July 2016. But the report provides new details that show that Mr. Page was actually under investigation in April of that year. |
| According to the report, counterintelligence investigators in New York began the investigation after Mr. Page, who had been on their radar for his ties to Russia, told them about his recent contacts with Russian officials. | According to the report, counterintelligence investigators in New York began the investigation after Mr. Page, who had been on their radar for his ties to Russia, told them about his recent contacts with Russian officials. |
| The investigators were aware of Mr. Page’s ties to the campaign and were concerned that he might receive a security clearance. They did little work on the investigation into Mr. Page, and in August, agents at the F.B.I.’s headquarters in Washington took over the case. | The investigators were aware of Mr. Page’s ties to the campaign and were concerned that he might receive a security clearance. They did little work on the investigation into Mr. Page, and in August, agents at the F.B.I.’s headquarters in Washington took over the case. |
| Mr. Trump has long claimed his predecessor’s administration was behind the investigation. | Mr. Trump has long claimed his predecessor’s administration was behind the investigation. |
| The report found that President Barack Obama and top White House officials played no role in starting the investigation or the F.I.S.A. application. Mr. Comey said he believes he told Mr. Obama and other top White House officials about the broad outlines of the investigation in an August 2016 meeting in the Situation Room, at least a month after it was opened. | The report found that President Barack Obama and top White House officials played no role in starting the investigation or the F.I.S.A. application. Mr. Comey said he believes he told Mr. Obama and other top White House officials about the broad outlines of the investigation in an August 2016 meeting in the Situation Room, at least a month after it was opened. |
| “Comey said he thought it was important that the President know the nature of the F.B.I.’ s efforts without providing any specifics,” according to the report. | “Comey said he thought it was important that the President know the nature of the F.B.I.’ s efforts without providing any specifics,” according to the report. |
| Mr. Comey said that the meeting was also attended by the White House chief of staff, Denis McDonough; the national security adviser, Susan Rice; the C.I.A. director, John Brennan, and two other top intelligence officials. Mr. Comey said after he relayed this information no one responded or followed up with questions. | Mr. Comey said that the meeting was also attended by the White House chief of staff, Denis McDonough; the national security adviser, Susan Rice; the C.I.A. director, John Brennan, and two other top intelligence officials. Mr. Comey said after he relayed this information no one responded or followed up with questions. |
| The inspector general also took on media reports that Mr. Brennan gave the F.B.I. information that led to the inquiry. Mr. Comey told the inspector general that the information Mr. Brennan passed to the F.B.I. related to election interference but that Mr. Brennan did not provide any information “that predicated or prompted” the opening of Crossfire Hurricane. | The inspector general also took on media reports that Mr. Brennan gave the F.B.I. information that led to the inquiry. Mr. Comey told the inspector general that the information Mr. Brennan passed to the F.B.I. related to election interference but that Mr. Brennan did not provide any information “that predicated or prompted” the opening of Crossfire Hurricane. |
| The report appeared to absolve them of taking investigative action out of political bias against Mr. Trump. | The report appeared to absolve them of taking investigative action out of political bias against Mr. Trump. |
| Mr. Trump and his allies have demonized a group of top F.B.I. officials who oversaw the opening and early stages of the investigation of the Trump campaign, portraying them as participants in an attempted coup. The targets included the former director, James B. Comey; the former deputy and acting director, Andrew G. McCabe; Peter Strzok, a former top counterintelligence agent; Lisa Page, a former F.B.I. lawyer who worked on the case, and James A. Baker, the former general counsel. | Mr. Trump and his allies have demonized a group of top F.B.I. officials who oversaw the opening and early stages of the investigation of the Trump campaign, portraying them as participants in an attempted coup. The targets included the former director, James B. Comey; the former deputy and acting director, Andrew G. McCabe; Peter Strzok, a former top counterintelligence agent; Lisa Page, a former F.B.I. lawyer who worked on the case, and James A. Baker, the former general counsel. |
| Mr. Horowitz had earlier uncovered the fact that Mr. Strzok and Ms. Page had sent text messages to each other expressing animus toward Mr. Trump. He also found messages by Mr. Clinesmith indicating that he did not like Mr. Trump or his policies. The findings led special counsel Robert S. Mueller III to remove Mr. Strzok and Mr. Clinesmith from the special counsel team. | Mr. Horowitz had earlier uncovered the fact that Mr. Strzok and Ms. Page had sent text messages to each other expressing animus toward Mr. Trump. He also found messages by Mr. Clinesmith indicating that he did not like Mr. Trump or his policies. The findings led special counsel Robert S. Mueller III to remove Mr. Strzok and Mr. Clinesmith from the special counsel team. |
| While these electronic messages demonstrated bad judgment and cast a cloud over the bureau, Mr. Horowitz found no evidence that the personal political views of these officials influenced the steps they took with the Russia investigation. | While these electronic messages demonstrated bad judgment and cast a cloud over the bureau, Mr. Horowitz found no evidence that the personal political views of these officials influenced the steps they took with the Russia investigation. |
| Mr. Trump’s allies have also disparaged Bruce G. Ohr, a senior Justice Department expert in Russian organized crime. Mr. Ohr knew Mr. Steele, met with him and relayed information he got from him to the F.B.I. in more than a dozen meetings after the F.B.I. had officially severed its relationship with the former British intelligence agent. Mr. Ohr’s wife, Nellie, was a researcher at Fusion GPS, the opposition research firm for which Mr. Steele worked until late September 2016. | Mr. Trump’s allies have also disparaged Bruce G. Ohr, a senior Justice Department expert in Russian organized crime. Mr. Ohr knew Mr. Steele, met with him and relayed information he got from him to the F.B.I. in more than a dozen meetings after the F.B.I. had officially severed its relationship with the former British intelligence agent. Mr. Ohr’s wife, Nellie, was a researcher at Fusion GPS, the opposition research firm for which Mr. Steele worked until late September 2016. |
| Mr. Horowitz faulted Mr. Ohr for keeping his supervisors at the Justice Department in the dark about his interactions with Mr. Steele and the F.B.I. Mr. Ohr failed to inform them out of fear that he would be told to stop communicating with Mr. Steele, the report said. While Mr. Ohr did not violate any specific policy, Mr. Horowitz recommended that the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility review Mr. Ohr’s conduct. | Mr. Horowitz faulted Mr. Ohr for keeping his supervisors at the Justice Department in the dark about his interactions with Mr. Steele and the F.B.I. Mr. Ohr failed to inform them out of fear that he would be told to stop communicating with Mr. Steele, the report said. While Mr. Ohr did not violate any specific policy, Mr. Horowitz recommended that the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility review Mr. Ohr’s conduct. |