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Boeing Pilot Complained of ‘Egregious’ Issue With 737 Max in 2016 Boeing Pilot Complained of ‘Egregious’ Issue With 737 Max in 2016
(32 minutes later)
A Boeing pilot working on the 737 Max said in messages from 2016 that a new automated system was making the plane difficult to control in flight simulators, more than two years before it was grounded after two deadly crashes. A Boeing pilot working on the 737 Max said in messages from 2016 that a new automated system was making the plane difficult to control in flight simulators, more than two years before it was grounded following two deadly crashes.
The pilot, Mark Forkner, complained that the system, known as MCAS, was causing him trouble. “It’s running rampant in the sim,” he said in a message to a colleague, referring to the simulator. The existence of the messages strike at a central part of Boeing’s defense over how the plane was certified to fly. For months, the company has maintained that the Max was certified in accordance with all appropriate regulations, suggesting that there was no indication that MCAS was unsafe.
“Granted, I suck at flying, but even this was egregious,” he went on to say, according to a transcript of the exchange reviewed by The New York Times. Yet in the messages, the pilot, Mark Forkner, complained that the system, known as MCAS, was causing him trouble in a flight simulator. “It’s running rampant in the sim,” he wrote to a colleague. The messages are from November 2016, months before the Max was certified by the Federal Aviation Administration.
The 737 Max was grounded this year after crashing twice in five months, killing 346 people. In both cases, MCAS malfunctioned because of erroneous data, sending the planes into unrecoverable nose dives. “Granted, I suck at flying, but even this was egregious,” he went on to say, according to a transcript of the exchange reviewed on Friday by The New York Times.
Mr. Forkner, the chief technical pilot for the plane, went on to say he had lied to the Federal Aviation Administration. The 737 Max was grounded earlier this year after crashing twice in five months, killing 346 people. In both cases, MCAS malfunctioned based on erroneous data, sending the planes into unrecoverable nose dives.
“I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly),” Mr. Forkner said in the messages. Mr. Forkner was the chief technical pilot for the 737 Max and in charge of communicating with the F.A.A. group that determined how pilots would be trained before flying the plane. The Times previously reported that Mr. Forkner had failed to tell the F.A.A. that the original version of MCAS was being overhauled, leaving regulators with the impression that the system was relatively benign and would only be used in rare cases.
Boeing provided the transcript to lawmakers in Capitol Hill over the past day, in advance of hearings this month at which Boeing’s chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, will testify about the crashes for the first time. Boeing had provided the transcript this year to the Department of Justice, which is conducting a criminal investigation, according to two people familiar with the communications, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the exchange was not yet public. In the messages, Mr. Forkner states that during simulator tests, the plane was moving unexpectedly through a process called trimming.
“The plane is trimming itself like craxy,” he wrote to Patrik Gustavsson, a fellow 737 technical pilot at Boeing. “I’m like WHAT?”
Mr. Forkner went on to say that he had lied to the Federal Aviation Administration.
“I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly),” Mr. Forkner says in the messages, though it was not clear what he was specifically referring to.
Eight months earlier, Mr. Forkner had asked the F.A.A. if it would be O.K. to remove mention of MCAS from the pilot’s manual. The F.A.A., which at the time believed the system would only activate in rare cases and wasn’t particularly dangerous, approved Mr. Forkner’s request.
[The New York Times was the first to report on Mr. Forkner’s role in the development of the 737 Max and his request to the F.A.A.]
“This is the smoking gun,” Representative Peter DeFazio, Democrat of Oregon, said in an interview. “This is no longer just a regulatory failure and a culture failure. It’s starting to look like criminal misconduct.”“This is the smoking gun,” Representative Peter DeFazio, Democrat of Oregon, said in an interview. “This is no longer just a regulatory failure and a culture failure. It’s starting to look like criminal misconduct.”
Mr. DeFazio is chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and his office is overseeing the House investigation into the crashes. As chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Mr. DeFazio’s office is overseeing the investigation into the crashes.
Mr. DeFazio said he had reviewed other internal Boeing documents and emails that suggested employees were under pressure to produce planes as fast as possible and avoid additional pilot training.
“Boeing cannot say this is about one person,” Mr. DeFazio said. “This is about a cultural failure at Boeing under pressure from Wall Street to just get this thing out there and make sure that you don’t open the door to further pilot training.”“Boeing cannot say this is about one person,” Mr. DeFazio said. “This is about a cultural failure at Boeing under pressure from Wall Street to just get this thing out there and make sure that you don’t open the door to further pilot training.”
Eight months before sending the messages, Mr. Forkner asked the F.A.A. if it would be O.K. to remove mention of MCAS from the pilot’s manual. The F.A.A., which at the time believed the system would activate only in rare cases and wasn’t particularly dangerous, approved Mr. Forkner’s request. A lawyer for Mr. Forkner downplayed the importance of the messages, suggesting Mr. Forkner was talking about issues with the simulator.
“If you read the whole chat, it is obvious that there was no ‘lie’ and the simulator program was not operating properly,” the lawyer, David Gerger, said in a statement. “Based on what he was told, Mark thought the plane was safe, and the simulator would be fixed.”
Flight simulators replicate real cockpits and are used to test planes during development. They can sometimes behave unpredictably, depending on their configuration.
Mr. Forkner, who is now a pilot for Southwest Airlines, and Mr. Gustavsson did not respond to requests for comment.
Reuters was first to report on the existence of the transcript.
Boeing provided the transcript to lawmakers on Capitol Hill on Friday morning, in advance of hearings this month at which the company’s chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, will testify about the crashes for the first time.
Boeing had provided the transcript earlier this year to the Department of Justice, which is conducting a criminal investigation, according to two people familiar with the communications who spoke on condition of anonymity because the exchange was not yet public.
The F.A.A. administrator, Stephen Dickson, sent Mr. Muilenburg a letter Friday morning demanding that the company account for why it did not provide the messages to the agency earlier.The F.A.A. administrator, Stephen Dickson, sent Mr. Muilenburg a letter Friday morning demanding that the company account for why it did not provide the messages to the agency earlier.
“I expect your explanation immediately regarding the content of this document and Boeing’s delay in disclosing the document to its safety regulator,” Mr. Dickson wrote.“I expect your explanation immediately regarding the content of this document and Boeing’s delay in disclosing the document to its safety regulator,” Mr. Dickson wrote.
Reuters was first to report on the existence of the messages. A Boeing spokesman, Gordon Johndroe, said the company was “voluntarily cooperating” with the congressional investigation and provided the messages to lawmakers as part of that process.
A lawyer for Mr. Forkner played down the importance of the messages, saying Mr. Forkner was talking about issues with the simulator. Jon Weaks, president of Southwest Airlines Pilots Association, said in a statement that “this is more evidence that Boeing misled pilots, government regulators and other aviation experts about the safety of the 737 Max.”
“If you read the whole chat, it is obvious that there was no ‘lie’ and the simulator program was not operating properly,” the lawyer, David Gerger, said in a statement. “Based on what he was told, Mark thought the plane was safe, and the simulator would be fixed.” “It is clear that the company’s negligence and fraud put the flying public at risk,” Mr. Weaks added. “As pilots, we have to be able to trust Boeing to truthfully disclose the information we need to safely operate our aircraft. In the case of the 737 MAX, that absolutely did not happen.”
Mr. Forkner, who is now a pilot for Southwest Airlines, and Mr. Gustavsson did not reply to requests for comment.
Gordon Johndroe, a Boeing spokesman, said the company was “voluntarily cooperating” with the congressional investigation and provided the messages to lawmakers as part of that process.